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Abstract
The goal of the work reported here is to capture the commonsense
knowledge of non-expert human contributors. Achieving this goal will
enable more intelligent human-computer interfaces and pave the way
for computers to reason about our world. In the domain of natural
language processing, it will provide the world knowledge much needed
for semantic processing of natural language.
To acquire knowledge from contributors not trained in knowledge
engineering, I take the following four steps: (i) develop a knowledge rep-
resentation (KR) model for simple assertions in natural language, (ii)
introduce cumulative analogy, a class of nearest-neighbor based ana-
logical reasoning algorithms over this representation, (iii) argue that
cumulative analogy is well suited for knowledge acquisition (KA) based
on a theoretical analysis of effectiveness of KA with this approach, and
(iv) test the KR model and the effectiveness of the cumulative analogy
algorithms empirically.
To investigate effectiveness of cumulative analogy for KA empiri-
cally, Learner, an open source system for KA by cumulative analogy
has been implemented, deployed,1 and evaluated. Learner acquires
assertion-level knowledge by constructing shallow semantic analogies
between a KA topic and its nearest neighbors and posing these analo-
gies as natural language questions to human contributors.
Suppose, for example, that based on the knowledge about “newspa-
pers” already present in the knowledge base, Learner judges “news-
paper” to be similar to “book” and “magazine.” Further suppose that
assertions “books contain information” and “magazines contain infor-
mation” are also already in the knowledge base. Then Learner will
use cumulative analogy from the similar topics to ask humans whether
“newspapers contain information.”
1The site, “1001 Questions,” is publicly available at http://teach-
computers.org/learner.html at the time of writing.
2
Because similarity between topics is computed based on what is al-
ready known about them, Learner exhibits bootstrapping behavior —
the quality of its questions improves as it gathers more knowledge. By
summing evidence for and against posing any given question, Learner
also exhibits noise tolerance, limiting the effect of incorrect similarities.
The KA power of shallow semantic analogy from nearest neighbors
is one of the main findings of this thesis. I perform an analysis of
commonsense knowledge collected by another research effort that did
not rely on analogical reasoning and demonstrate that indeed there is
sufficient amount of correlation in the knowledge base to motivate using
cumulative analogy from nearest neighbors as a KA method.
Empirically, evaluating the percentages of questions answered af-
firmatively, negatively and judged to be nonsensical in the cumulative
analogy case compares favorably with the baseline, no-similarity case
that relies on random objects rather than nearest neighbors. Of the
questions generated by cumulative analogy, contributors answered 45%
affirmatively, 28% negatively and marked 13% as nonsensical; in the
control, no-similarity case 8% of questions were answered affirmatively,
60% negatively and 26% were marked as nonsensical.
Thesis Supervisor: Patrick H. Winston
Title: Ford Professor of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Knowledge acquisition bottleneck
For decades now, the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has recognized
the need for representing knowledge that people have in a form that
computers can use. Knowledge acquisition (KA) is a task in AI con-
cerned with eliciting and representing knowledge of human experts so
that it can later be used in an application, typically a knowledge-based
system.
One of the most fundamental and still unsolved problems in knowl-
edge acquisition goes by the name of knowledge acquisition bottleneck.
The term, coined by Feigenbaum (Feigenbaum, 1984), refers to the dif-
ficulty of collecting from contributors data sets containing knowledge of
sufficient level of detail and subtlety. Since that time, the advent of the
web has made billions of documents available for near-instantaneous
access, helping people share information with each other. This glut of
human-readable data, however, has not yet translated into a windfall
of machine-understandable data. Rather, it has only exacerbated the
need for machine-understandable data to help process all the ordinary
documents.
In addition, I believe the acquisition bottleneck also stems from the
desire to capture perfectly unambiguous and non-contradictory knowl-
edge at acquisition time. While such knowledge seems easier to work
with, it is very difficult to formulate and add. Lack of methods for
handling ambiguous and contradictory knowledge is, in my view, the
other part of the problem.
This thesis attacks the acquisition bottleneck for commonsense
knowledge by providing a framework for collecting large datasets from
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many independent non-expert human contributors. To this end, I for-
mulate cumulative analogy, a class of algorithms that formulate plau-
sible new assertions about objects in the knowledge base. I test cumu-
lative analogy empirically by implementing, deploying and evaluating
Learner, a system for formulating and selecting the appropriate ques-
tions to pose to contributors who are not expert knowledge engineers.
This approach can enable acquisition of commonsense knowledge as-
sertions from very large numbers (potentially millions) of contributors.
This thesis demonstrates the following:
Commonsense knowledge can be acquired from contributors
not trained in knowledge engineering. High-quality knowl-
edge acquisition questions can be formulated automatically
by surface-level analogy that poses new questions based on
the information already in the system; the employed ana-
logical reasoning exhibits bootstrapping and noise canceling
features.
To make the notion of commonsense knowledge in the above state-
ment more concrete, I cite several examples of the kind of assertions
collected by Learner. Some assertions formulated by Learner using
cumulative analogy and confirmed to be true by human contributors
are as follows:
• Cars are useful tools
• A jar can hold a liquid
• A person can own a laptop
• Tomatoes are sold at stores
• Humans hold guitars when playing them
Some assertions that Learner has formulated as plausible hypotheses,
but with the help of human contributors, has discovered to be false are
as follows:
• A crab is a kind of fish
• An apple is a high fat food
• Salt becomes ice when frozen
• A germ is an animal
• A guitar is a brass instrument
• Dogs purr when stroked.
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In addition to demonstrating applicability of analogical reasoning
to knowledge acquisition, this work also aims to provide a growing col-
lection of commonsense knowledge to the research community, as well
as provide the platform for experimenting with analogical reasoning
over the collected knowledge for purposes other than knowledge acqui-
sition, for example, for answering questions about what is asserted and
implied by the assertions gathered in the knowledge base.
1.2 Motivation
In this section, which consists of four parts, I motivate both the goal and
the methodology of the work presented here. In Section 1.2.1, I moti-
vate the need for creating large knowledge repositories of commonsense
knowledge. In Section 1.2.2, I describe some important real-world goals
that a system such as Learner can help accomplish. In Section 1.2.3,
I motivate the approach of acquiring commonsense knowledge from
human contributors (as contrasted with, for example, attempting to
automatically extract such knowledge from textual corpora). Finally,
in Section 1.2.4, I argue that research in sophisticated knowledge ac-
quisition techniques, being both incremental and “AI-complete” in the
limit, is a good way to make progress towards “hard AI” (human-level
knowledge and reasoning ability in a constructed system).
1.2.1 The case for creating a commonsense knowl-
edge base
Knowledge acquisition techniques enable construction of knowledge
bases. Yet, is it important to have a knowledge base of commonsense
knowledge at all? I believe creation of a large, publicly available com-
monsense knowledge base (together with methods for reasoning over
such a knowledge base) is very important for attaining a number of
both research and practical goals. In this section, I cite the literature
motivating creation of such knowledge bases and put forth additional
arguments for importance of attaining this goal.
There is practical evidence of usefulness of WordNet, a lexical
knowledge base that captures some commonsense knowledge (Fellbaum,
1998; Lenat, Miller and Yokoi, 1995). WordNet provides information
about senses of words, as well as “is-a,” “part-of,” “antonym,” and a
few other relationships between senses of words. As such, it can be
viewed as capturing a subset of commonsense knowledge (containing
knowledge such as “an automobile is a kind of vehicle” and “a wheel is
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a part of a bicycle.” Applicability of WordNet to human language tech-
nology and knowledge processing community “has been cited by more
than 200 papers and implemented systems that have been implemented
using WordNet” (Harabagiu, Miller and Moldovan, 1999).
At the same time, WordNet is far from an exhaustive source of
codified commonsense knowledge (Lenat, Miller and Yokoi, 1995). It
does not provide more extensive commonsense knowledge such as that
represented by the CYC project (Lenat, 1995; Lenat and Guha, 1990).
Lenat has motivated the need for the more extensive commonsense
knowledge by pointing to need for it in a number of Natural Language
Processing (NLP) tasks. For example, Lenat argues that commonsense
knowledge is needed to address NLP tasks such as resolving pronoun
reference and machine translation. As example of commonsense knowl-
edge base helping resolve pronoun reference, consider resolving what
“they” refers to in “The police arrested the demonstrators because they
feared violence” and “The police arrested the demonstrators because
they advocated violence” (Lenat, 1995). An example of importance of
commonsense knowledge in machine translation Lenat cites is as fol-
lows. Consider translating the sentence “Mary poured the water into
the teakettle; when it whistled, she poured the water into a teacup.”
Since Japanese does not provide a single word for liquid water, trans-
lating the above sentence requires substitution of the Japanese word
for “cold water” for the first instance and the Japanese word for “hot
water” for the second (Lenat, 1995). Another argument by Lenat in
favor of commonsense knowledge has to do with semantic interpreta-
tion of compound nominals. Consider the phrase “tree doctor.” In
the absence of commonsense knowledge, it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to interpret it as a person who treats trees rather than a tree that
practices medicine (Lenat, Miller and Yokoi, 1995).
Additional arguments in favor of constructing large knowledge bases
emerge from the community that tries to mine the knowledge from
texts. For example, Moldovan and Gıˆrju state: “[The field’s] inability
to build large knowledge bases without much effort has impeded many
AI developments” (Moldovan and Gıˆrju, 2001). As specific examples,
they point to reliance of the most successful current information extrac-
tion (IE) systems on hand-coded linguistic rules, making these systems
difficult to port to other domains. Moldovan and Gıˆrju also point to the
leveling off of results obtained at the Message Understanding Confer-
ence (MUC), and cite the common sentiment in that field that further
progress will not be possible without knowledge intensive tools that
support commonsense reasoning (Moldovan and Gıˆrju, 2001). Finally,
Moldovan and Gıˆrju point out the need for commonsense knowledge
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and the need for it to enable further progress in in question answering
(Moldovan and Gıˆrju, 2001).
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of creating a publicly avail-
able knowledge base of commonsense knowledge is the evidence that
much research on natural language understanding is currently trying
to work around the problem. In other words, the lack of commonsense
knowledge is having a widespread effect on methods being developed,
approaches being taken, and progress being made by researchers work-
ing in various areas of Natural Language Understanding (NLU).
“Commonsense knowledge” in the NLU and NLP communities is
often referred to as “world knowledge.” Lack of codified world knowl-
edge shaping is having a widespread effect on the current research. I
present two specific examples: one from the field of machine transla-
tion, and one from question answering. In machine translation, Dorna
and Emele argue that a practical system should avoid disambiguation
whenever possible because disambiguation needs world knowledge plus
some ability to reason over it (Dorna and Emele, 1996).
In question answering, evaluation criteria and goals of research are
being set lower, with unavailability of world knowledge (and mecha-
nisms to carry out commonsense reasoning over it) being cited as the
reason for backing off from the more ambitious task of reading compre-
hension (Schwitter, Moll’a, Fournier and Hess, 2000).
As further evidence of need for broad commonsense knowledge, the
importance of developing large knowledge bases capable of providing
shallow but broad knowledge about motives, goals, people, countries
and conflict situations (a subset of commonsense knowledge) in con-
junction with deeper specific domain knowledge has been recognized
by DARPA’s $34 million High Performance Knowledge Bases (HPKB)
initiative that ran from 1996 to 1999 (Cohen, Schrag, Jones, Pease,
Lin, Starr, Gunning and Burke, 1998), followed by the Rapid Knowl-
edge Formation initiative of similar magnitude (DARPA, 2000).
As an additional argument for need for a commonsense knowledge
base and a system such as Learner capable of reasoning over it and
enlarging it, the next section lists some specific practical goals accom-
plishing which requires, among other technologies, a large commonsense
knowledge base and a mechanism of reasoning over it.
1.2.2 Practical goals Learner helps achieve
The goals of the Learner system described here are similar to those of
the CYC project, despite some important differences in methodology.
In addition to the reasons described in the previous section, I believe
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implementing Learner is important because it will help to take us
toward the following practical goals:
Self-service Help Desks. Gathering knowledge directly from con-
tributors and integrating it with natural language processing can
enable responding to customer support queries posed in natural
language. Such knowledge repositories, coupled with mechanisms
for inference over them can enable deployment of help desks that
answer questions without duplication of human effort and with
ever increasing precision, automating what is today still costly
and cumbersome. Such technology can also be applied in edu-
cational settings, taking FAQs and independent learning to the
next level.
Voice Command and Control. The knowledge Learner gathers
can enable controlling computers and other devices with your
voice. Continuous speech recognition has made great advances in
recent years (Lamel, Gauvain and Adda, 2001). The new chal-
lenge is: given the recognized speech, figure out what the user
actually wanted to do, what commands should actually be exe-
cuted.
When speaking to each other, people communicate effectively
because the listener is assumed to have a lot of commonsense
knowledge and some reasoning ability. Computers and other de-
vices can potentially join the class of intelligent listeners if they
are equipped with a large common sense knowledge base and can
operate on that knowledge.
Databases for Heterogeneous Knowledge. Currently, databases
serve the task of storing and manipulating structured knowledge.
A lot of valuable knowledge is simply too heterogeneous to be
stored in a structured format. That is in part why the looser
organizational approach of the World Wide Web has been so suc-
cessful. Learner can capture assertion-level information and be
as useful on that level as the Web is on the document-level.
Under this approach, knowledge repositories can be created and
grown without the need for designing a data schema. Such knowl-
edge repositories would be able to capture exceptions and nuances
of data in a very natural way. Rather than performing joins,
these repositories would run inference operations over their data
to respond to queries. Finally, they would work with natural
language, eliminating the need for specialized programming to
encode queries that extract data from a repository.
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1.2.3 A comparison of approaches to collecting
commonsense knowledge
In this section, I compare some plausible approaches to creating large
commonsense knowledge bases and motivate the methodology of this
thesis, namely approaching the problem by collecting knowledge from
contributors who are not knowledge engineers. I briefly compare the
approach with having a team of knowledge engineers hand-craft a large
knowledge base, and compare it more extensively with attempting
to mine a knowledge base automatically from electronically accessible
texts.
Creating a large knowledge base by having a team of knowledge
engineers hand-craft it is perhaps the most straightforward approach.
The prime example of this approach is the CYC project. The diffi-
culties include the large cost and complexity of such an effort. The
CYC project has consumed over two hundred man-years, but the orig-
inal goal are yet to be reached (and have been restated as possibly
overly optimistic) (Guha and Lenat, 1990; Lenat, 1995). Another dat-
apoint on the amount of effort required in constructing a knowledge
base is the knowledge base for Botany containing 20,000 concepts and
100,000 facts took Porter and staff ten years of development (Porter
and Souther, 1999). At the same time, the approach of bringing knowl-
edge engineers to bear on a problem has some undeniable advantages
and should not be discounted. Such an approach provides the highest
quality of knowledge, trading off the amount (or rate) of acquisition for
quality.
In light of this “knowledge acquisition bottleneck,” there is a sig-
nificant desire in the knowledge acquisition community to address the
bottleneck by acquiring knowledge via text mining. (As a discipline,
text mining employs a combination of statistical and linguistic meth-
ods to extract information (often automatically) from large corpora of
human-generated text. For the purpose of this discussion, I use the
term interchangeably with “knowledge acquisition from texts.”)
As discussed below, text mining may yield much useful knowledge.
However, at least some researchers that work on issues of commonsense
knowledge feel that much of the commonsense knowledge needed to un-
derstand texts is not actually written down. Rather, the texts, even
didactic texts such as encyclopedia, presume that the reader already
has the commonsense knowledge needed to understand them (Lenat,
Guha, Pittman, Pratt and Shepherd, 1990),(Nilsson, 1995, p. 14).1
1I believe there are two exceptions to the observation. Some simple common-
sense knowledge is present in books for young children (which, however, usually
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Similar sentiment has been expressed in the context of a discussion
of the commonsense knowledge necessary to construct intelligent com-
puter interfaces:
Much of our commonsense knowledge information has never
been recorded at all because it has always seemed so obvious
we never thought of describing it. (Minsky, 2000).
A more focused discussion of what information is and is not present
in dictionaries can be found in (Atkins, Kegl and Levin, 1986), who gen-
erally find that dictionaries omit much of the commonsense information
humans know about objects. Dolan et al. point out that in addition to
the main entry for a concept (e.g., “flower”), more information about
a concept is also sometimes found in definitions of related concepts
(“petals,” “leafy plants,” and so on). They also point out, however,
that the their example is drawn from a dictionary for someone learning
the language — of the approximately 40,000 concepts defined in it only
about 2,500 appear in the bodies of definitions. This causes the dic-
tionary to contain much information about the “core” 2,500 concepts,
but little information about other concepts (Dolan, Vanderwende and
Richardson, 1993).
Keeping in mind the caveat of a large portion of commonsense
knowledge not being written down, I now overview some systems that
aim to extract concepts as well as taxonomic and other relations be-
tween concepts. One of the earlier examples of such systems is Hearst’s
system for acquisition of ontological information from text (Hearst,
1992). The system extracts pairs of words in the hypernym, or “is-
a” relationship by leveraging specific syntactic patterns in unrestricted
text, such as “noun1 such as noun2” where neither noun1 nor noun2
are unmodified by additional nouns. For example, when the system
encounters the phrase “animals such as cats,” it will extract the rela-
tionship “a cat is a kind of animal.”
MindNet is another system which extracts semantic relationships.
MindNet extracts approximately 25 semantic relationships including
Location, Part of, Purpose, Hypernym, Time, (Typical )subject, (Typ-
ical )object, and Instrument (Dolan, Vanderwende and Richardson,
1993; Richardson, Vanderwende and Dolan, 1993). To my knowledge,
this represents the largest number of relationships extracted by a sys-
tem that mines a closed class of relationships. Akin to Hearst’s system,
rely extensively on illustrations to convey much of such knowledge). The second
source, in small amounts, is texts discussing commonsense knowledge in which such
knowledge is presented by way of example.
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semantic relationships are extracted via specifically constructed heuris-
tic rules that recognize “occurrence of syntactic and lexical patterns
which are consistently associated with some specific semantic relation,
such as instrument or location” (Dolan, Vanderwende and Richard-
son, 1993). The heuristic rules are designed for and the extraction is
applied to a particular dictionary available in electronic format, Long-
man’s Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDOCE).
KAT (Knowledge Acquisition from Text) is another system that ac-
quires both concepts and some semantic relationships from text (Moldo-
van and Gıˆrju, 2001). Starting with seed concepts such as “stock mar-
ket” and “employment,” KAT applies lexical heuristics (created semi-
automatically with some human intervention), syntactic patterns and
filtering by humans to identify additional related concepts and semantic
relationships between them such as hypernymy (Is-a), influence, cause,
and Equivalent. Extraction is done from textual corpora such as news-
papers. Extraction of both the concepts and the relationships between
them is performed with humans in the loop to filter out nonsensical
concepts and misidentified relationships.
Compared to knowledge bases crafted by experts, text mining sys-
tems represent another point in the quality vs. quantity trade-off, trad-
ing off precision of the collected data for volume. In my view, the em-
pirically observed (to date) weakness in distinguishing the extracted
knowledge from noise is the Achilles’ heel of current systems that aim
to acquire knowledge from text. Let us review some results from the
three systems mentioned above.
Hearst (Hearst, 1992) does not report overall statistics on the qual-
ity of the extraction. Rather, she reports some pairs that the algorithm
has extracted that exemplify some classes of noise that can trip up ex-
traction systems. For example, Hearst’s system extracted pairs such
as “king is-a institution”. Hearst attributes it to metonymy in texts
(substitution of the name of an attribute or feature for the name of the
thing itself, an example of metonymy being “the White House signed a
bill”). Other pairs exemplify a more common problem of underspecifi-
cation in text. Examples included taxonomic relations between “plot”
and “device,” “metaphor” and “device” and “character” and “device”
(omitting that the device in question is a literary device). Another class
of problematic relations extracted involved relations that may be con-
text or point-of-view dependent, such as “Washington is-a nationalist”
and “aircraft is-a target.”
In MindNet, the overall precision of extracting its semantic relations
from LDOCE is estimated by the authors to be 78% (with the margin
of error of ±5%). About half of the extracted relations are of the type
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Hypernym (Is-a), and these were accurate 87% of the time. The Part of
relation was accurate only 15% of the time, and the remaining relations
were accurate 78% of the time.
KAT explicitly relied on humans in the loop to help identify relevant
concepts. Some were extracted fully automatically, while the remaining
ones were passed to human judges for inspection. KAT’s implementors
report that the human intervention in accepting or declining the con-
cepts took about 20 minutes to process roughly 1500 concepts. Of
the 196 concepts (such as “financial market”) that were discovered in
text and were not found in any of the preexisting dictionaries that the
system consulted, the automated procedure has identified 77 (39.2%)
with precision of 90%. Human filtering of the concept candidates that
the automatic procedure neither accepted nor discarded identified the
remaining 119 concepts (60.7%). In contrast to the concepts, all of the
relations extracted by KAT were subjected to human filtering. Of 166
candidate pairs, 64 were accepted and 102 were rejected by inspection,
a process that took approximately 7 minutes (Moldovan and Gıˆrju,
2001).
Moldovan and Gıˆrju argue for the promise of automatic extraction.
They feel that among others, addition of ability to handle “complex
linguistic phenomena such as coreference resolution, word sense disam-
biguation and others” as well as “incorporation of an elaborate process
for pattern classification” will bring a system such as KAT closer to
fully automatic acquisition. Their results, however, can be interpreted
differently. Rather than viewing human intervention as a limiting fac-
tor of knowledge acquisition, it can be viewed as a powerful alternative
solution to the unsolved problem of low-noise automatic acquisition of
knowledge from texts.
To sum up, I believe the observations that much of commonsense
knowledge is not written down, together with the noisiness of the knowl-
edge that can be extracted with today’s technology, militate in favor
of use of human contributors. The case for collection of commonsense
knowledge from human contributors is further bolstered by the option
to distribute the collection to the potentially enormous population of
“netizens” — volunteers contributing over the world wide web (Hearst,
Hunson and Stork, 1999). Such an approach has humans as the di-
rect source of knowledge; such an approach permits clarification and
verification of knowledge by asking several contributors. At the same
time, the potential number of contributors is enormous. As such, this
approach represents a combination of quality and quantity that lies
somewhere in between the other two methods discussed in this section
— creation of knowledge bases by professional knowledge engineers and
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acquiring knowledge from text. For the reasons stated above, I believe
it is a powerful approach on its own and it may also be useful in combi-
nation with the other two. As Edward Fredkin, former director of MIT
Laboratory of Computer Science once said: “the best way to find out
the answer to a question is to ask someone who knows the answer.”
1.2.4 Research in knowledge-based KA contributes
to broader progress in AI
In this section, I argue that research in formulating knowledge acquisi-
tion questions by reasoning over already collected knowledge and pos-
ing these questions to a population of human contributors provides a
viable path to getting at human-like reasoning, the core of artificial
intelligence. Here are the reasons supporting this stance:
You can start simple
A KA system can be made operational with very simple acqui-
sition mechanisms in place. At a later point, more sophisticated
ones mechanisms can be swapped in. Extensions of a simple
uniform reasoning mechanism can include adding internal repre-
sentations for notions of space and time, adding ability to handle
simple arithmetic reasoning, and other competences or “agen-
cies”, in the sense introduced by Minsky (Minsky, 1986).
You get feedback quickly
The performance is “directly evaluable” — the amount of knowl-
edge being collected and the quality of the questions posed using
a specific reasoning mechanism can be tracked easily. For exam-
ple, if a certain mechanism is overly ambitious in generalizing, it
can be observed through it making a lot of incorrect (and hence
corrected by contributors) predictions.
You need to solve the hard problems to do it well
While having a low entry barrier, the task is difficult to do per-
fectly. Arguably, it is “AI-complete” (which, analogously to “NP-
complete,” means that a full solution is equivalent to solving other
AI-complete problems such as Machine Vision or Natural Lan-
guage Understanding). Posing knowledge acquisition questions
well requires analysis of prior knowledge to determine what new
questions to ask, and evaluation the incoming in light of the prior
knowledge. In a way, figuring out how to gather knowledge is also
addressing how to effectively use the knowledge.
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Many can contribute
Deploying a knowledge acquisition system online makes the chal-
lenges of creating an understanding system visible to a broader
audience. I believe that making such a system publicly available
can help provide a common testbed for various approaches in
AI. Even more importantly, has a shot at attracting more people
not in the mainstream of the field to contributing knowledge to
the KA system, to extending the system’s mechanisms, and ulti-
mately to working on artificial intelligence. In a sense, a parallel
can be drawn between the resulting process of bootstrapping an
increasingly intelligent KA system and the bootstrapping of its
scientific knowledge performed by a modern human society as a
whole.
1.3 Structure of this document
Chapter 2 presents a high level example of how Learner — the imple-
mented cumulative analogy KA system — operates, Chapters 3 (Rep-
resentation), 4 (Algorithms), and 5 (Interface) explain how Learner
works. They present, respectively, (i) the overall architecture of Lear-
ner and the knowledge representation scheme used, (ii) the algorithms
that operate on this representation to pose knowledge acquisition ques-
tions, and (iii) the interface that presents the questions and provides
users with feedback about the impact made by the knowledge they
have just added. Chapter 6 discusses the kinds of ambiguity in the
collected knowledge, the sets of tasks for which ambiguity is and is not
problematic, and suggests ways to reduce such ambiguity.
Chapter 7 (The Correlated Universe) provides a theoretical analysis
of effectiveness of cumulative analogy, motivating its use for knowledge
acquisition by studying the amount of correlation between assertions in
a subset of a commonsense knowledge base collected by Singh (Singh,
Lin, Mueller, Lim, Perkins and Zhu, 2002).
Chapter 8 presents experimental evaluation of effectiveness of
knowledge acquisition by cumulative analogy and reports on the kinds
of knowledge collected. Chapter 9 consists of three sections. The first
section overviews some of the relevant prior work from the expert sys-
tem, machine learning, knowledge acquisition interface, and text min-
ing traditions. The next section discusses how Learner can be im-
proved further, including improvements to the process of measuring
similarity as well as sketching a generalization of cumulative analogy.
Ways to improve the resulting knowledge base are also briefly discussed.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Section 9.3 distills the contri-
butions of the thesis, summarizing what this work has demonstrated.
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Chapter 2
Examples of Acquiring
Knowledge in Learner
I describe the details of the implementation of the system in Chapters 3
through 5. In this chapter, I introduce the sort of analogy that Lear-
ner performs, present examples of how Learner operates, and provide
a screenshot of the acquisition interface.
A clarification of my use of the term “analogy” is in order. When
writing “make an analogy” or “by analogy,” I do not refer to analogies
of the sort found on standardized tests, such as
hat:head::glove:hand,
or “hat is to head as glove is to hand.” Neither do I refer to the more
elaborate kind of analogy that arises from aligning graph-like struc-
tures (Gentner, 1987; Winston, 1980). Rather, I refer to “analogy”
as a process of inference that maps assertions about objects onto an-
other (typically similar) object. This usage is consistent with the first
definition of analogy provided by the Merriam-Webster dictionary:
Analogy: “Inference that if two or more things agree
with one another in some respects they will probably agree
in others.”
This usage is also consistent with the usage in scientific literature.
For example, a work on assessing the role of analogy in Natural Lan-
guage Processing (Federici, Montemagni and Pirrell, 1996) provides the
following definition for the process of “generalization by analogy”:
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“Generalization by analogy can be defined as the in-
ferential process by which an unfamiliar object (the tar-
get object) is seen as an analogue of known objects of the
same type (the base objects) so that whatever properties
are known about the latter are assumed to be transferable
to the former.”
By “generalization by analogy,” I shall mean, formally, if O and O′
are objects and P1 and P2 are properties, then:
If O has property P1, and
O′ has property P1, and
O has property P2, then it can expected that
O′ may have the property P2.
Let us consider a simple example. Imagine that the system already
knows the following assertions about (or, equivalently, properties of)
computer mice and keyboards:
a computer mouse has buttons
a computer mouse fits in your hand
a computer mouse helps you use a computer
a computer mouse attaches to the computer with a
cable
a keyboard helps you use a computer
a keyboard attaches to the computer with a cable
Based on these statements, the system would decide that key-
boards are similar to mice (because they both “help you use a
computer” and “attach to the computer with a cable”) and, by
analogy, map additional statements known about mice onto keyboards.
As a result, it may come up with the following hypotheses:
a keyboard has buttons
a keyboard fits in your hand
It is then up to the human contributor to clarify that yes, “a key-
board has buttons” (or to enter a modified assertion “a keyboard has
keys,” but that “a keyboard does not fit in your hand.” In this ex-
ample, knowledge about “computer mice” (a source topic) allowed us
to pose questions about “keyboards” (the target topic). As described
in the following chapters, the implemented Learner algorithm uses
multiple source topics for any given target topic, summing “pro” and
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“con” evidence from each source topic when evaluating whether to pose
any given question about the target topic.
Given a target topic selected by the contributor, the system presents
a number of multiple-choice questions. A sample screenshot is pre-
sented in Figure 2.1. The snapshot of the web page shows Learner
posing questions about “newspaper.” Comparing what is known about
“newspaper” with what is known about other topics has determined
that newspaper (when the snapshot was taken), was most similar to
“book,” “map,” “magazine,” and “bag.” These are shown in the line
beginning with the words “Similar topics.” From these, properties are
mapped onto “newspaper,” and presented as questions in text boxes.
For example, the first question shown is “newspapers contain informa-
tion?”
Figure 2.1: Screenshot of acquiring knowledge about “newspaper.”
Contributors can reply to these questions by selecting an answer
such as “Yes” or “No” from the drop-down box next to the question.
Contributors are also free to modify the question prior to answering it.
For example, the contributor may choose to modify the above question
to read “newspapers contain recent information?” and reply to this
modified question. This ability to modify and enter new information
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keeps expanding the potential set of questions Learner can pose. See
Section 5 for a more in-depth explanation of the details of the interface.
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Chapter 3
Representation
This and the following two chapters explain how Learner works. They
present the knowledge representation scheme used, the algorithms that
operate on this representation to pose knowledge acquisition questions,
and the interface that presents the questions and provides users with
feedback about the impact made by the knowledge they have just
added.
The seed knowledge base that Learner was launched with is pre-
sented in Section 7.1. Further analysis of kinds and amount of knowl-
edge collected as a result of running the system is given in Section 8.3.
The current chapter covers the form of knowledge Learner accepts
(Section 3.2) and how this knowledge is represented internally (Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4).
3.1 Overall architecture
In this section, I introduce the overall architecture of the system. Fig-
ure 3.1 specifies the existing technologies used in Learner and their
overall arrangement. Learner uses components developed by other
researchers:
• Link Grammar Parser (Sleator and Temperley, 1993; Temperley,
Sleator and Lafferty, 2000) as the underlying parsing technology.
• FramerD (Haase, 1996) for the storage model and the language
in which Learner is implemented.
• WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998), a lexical knowledge base, for tok-
enization of noun phrases and “is-a” information about nouns.
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Figure 3.1: Overall architecture of the Learner knowledge acquisition
system.
Details about Link Grammar Parser and FramerD can be found in
Appendices A and B, respectively. Contributors interact with Lear-
ner using a web CGI interface implemented in Perl. Contributor input
is processed with the Link Grammar Parser, and the parsed assertions
are passed to the core Learner component. Excluding the Web in-
terface, Learner has been implemented in FDscript, a freely available
variant of Scheme with integrated access to object oriented database
(FramerD) and additional features such as simulation of nondetermin-
istic computation.
On top of FramerD, the two additional components that Lear-
ner draws upon are WordNet and the growing commonsense knowl-
edge base. WordNet is a well-known lexical knowledge base; its use
is detailed in Section 4.2.3. WordNet information has been stored as
a FramerD database; WordNet is distributed in this format as part
of the bricolage package available with FramerD. The collection of
commonsense knowledge that Learner uses in posing knowledge ac-
quisition questions consists of a seed knowledge base extracted by me
from the knowledge collected by a different knowledge acquisition ef-
fort (Singh, 2002; Singh, Lin, Mueller, Lim, Perkins and Zhu, 2002) (as
described further in Section 7.1). The knowledge acquisition questions
and other output generated by Learner (such as results of searching
30
the knowledge base for assertions containing a specific term) are passed
back to the Web interface which presents this information back to the
contributors.
The code for the project is open source. At the time of writing,
everything needed to install, run and modify a copy of the system is
available at
http://sourceforge.net/projects/learner.
The reader is encouraged to experiment with and extend the system.
3.2 Form of accepted knowledge
Learner imposes no restrictions on the domain of textual knowledge
it operates on. There are, however, a number of restrictions on the
form of such knowledge. To allow volunteers to add knowledge without
any special training in description logics or knowledge representation
languages, Learner accepts input in the form of assertions in English.
Learner is designed to handle only single-sentence syntactically
valid assertions, each of which is interpretable by a human reader on
its own, in isolation. Furthermore, Learner is designed to handle
primarily general factual knowledge about generic concepts (classes of
objects), rather than specific events or individual objects. Here are
some examples of assertions Learner is designed to handle:
• “swans are white,”
• “a hammer is a tool,”
• “a yacht has a sail,”
• “keys can unlock locks,”
• “computers are made up of parts.”
The system expects each assertion to be one (possibly qualified)
piece of information, not a conjunction of several. Disjunctive asser-
tions are not supported, either. Here are some examples of assertions
Learner is not designed to handle:
• “it is round” (needs context),
• “John likes sandwiches” (concerns an individual, not a class of
objects),
• “a shopper bought a carrot” (concerns a specific event),
• “a yacht has a sail and an anchor” (a conjunction of two asser-
tions),
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• “John thinks that Mary knows that cars have wheels” (second-
order logic).
As the last example suggests, Learner is not designed to handle
“assertions about assertions,” — assertions that require second order
logic when represented in a formal logic.
Because human-level understanding of the assertions has not been
achieved, the above constraints cannot be enforced perfectly. For exam-
ple, assertions concerning specific events such as “a professor cut grass
on his lawn” are quite difficult to distinguish from general assertions
such as “lawnmowers cut grass”. Adding knowledge which lies outside
of the system’s intended scope is likely to result in generation of a larger
number of strange or nonsensical knowledge acquisition questions.
There are, however, some enforced syntactic constraints that limit
what assertions can be added. These constrains require that an asser-
tion:
Be parsable — Learner uses the Link Grammar Parser internally;
only sentences accepted by this parser are admitted. The Link
Grammar Parser, developed by researchers at CMU (Sleator and
Temperley, 1993; Temperley, Sleator and Lafferty, 2000), imple-
ments the “link” theory of grammar and is described briefly in
Appendix A.
Be declarative — In particular, imperative statements (such as “go
clean your room”) are disallowed. This constraint is also imple-
mented by analyzing the parser’s output.
Not be in past, past perfect, or present perfect tenses —
This serves to disallow assertions about specific events. The
constraint is implemented by analyzing the parser’s output.
Not start with referential words — Sentences starting with words
such as “it,” “this,” “that,” “these,” “my,” “I,” and “both” are
disallowed because such sentences, usually indicate that the sen-
tence either requires a context (the referent for the anaphora), is
about a specific object (as in “that man has a knife”).1
Not contain conjunctions or disjunctions — Many conjunctions
can instead be entered as two or more statements. This constraint
is implemented by analyzing the parser’s output.
1In the reported experiments, sentences beginning with the word “the” have also
been disallowed (to exclude such assertions as in “the building is tall”). However,
based on contributor feedback and experience with the system, sentences beginning
with “the” (such as “the heart pumps blood”, “the Earth is round”, and “the lion
is one of the largest cats”) have since been allowed again.
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As will become clear from the more technical description that fol-
lows, Learner addresses primarily collecting knowledge about objects
and their properties. There are other segments of the full spectrum
of commonsense knowledge that deserve further attention but which
lie largely outside the scope of this work. The kinds of knowledge not
covered or addressed only peripherally include:
• knowledge about “verbs” — knowledge about goals and effects
of actions, sequence of subevents (scripts) for actions, knowledge
about required tools as well as spatial and temporal preconditions
for actions,
• knowledge about causes — “why can birds fly?”,
• knowledge about typical motives and actions taken by people
specific to more narrow contexts (e.g. “a person usually stands
on a chair to change a light bulb”),
• knowledge about how knowledge is to be combined — “ostriches
can run,” but “dead things cannot run”, so the answer to whether
“dead ostriches can run” is unclear.
I believe that knowledge about objects and their properties, col-
lection of which is tackled by the current system, is one of the more
fundamental kinds of knowledge. Collecting this knowledge can lay the
foundation on top of which collection of other kinds of knowledge (such
as knowledge about causes) can be reasoned about and thus intelli-
gently collected.
3.3 Sentences and their signatures
This and the following sections describe how natural language state-
ments are processed into assertions to be stored in the knowledge base.
Each sentence has a dual representation: (i) a link representation, which
constitutes the parser’s output from which the original string can be
reconstructed. Note that the parser used in this work, Link Gram-
mar parser (Sleator and Temperley, 1993), normally parses sentences
into a set of links between words rather than producing a parse tree.
Link output is more informative than a typical parse tree, providing
more information about the relationships that hold between words in a
sentence. and (ii) the signature representation produced from the link
representation (“signature” is a term I introduce; it is not standard in
the literature. The signature of an assertion is a canonical form that
abstracts away syntactic details while capturing — well enough for the
purposes of the system — what the assertion states.
33
The link representation is used to construct new assertions by sub-
stituting words in existing assertions. When a new knowledge acquisi-
tion question is generated, it is this representation that is used to ensure
number agreement between subject and main verb, that the right in-
definite article (“a” or “an”) is used, and so on. See Appendix A for
details about the parser, and Appendix C for details on the syntactic
processing performed by Learner to generate knowledge acquisition
questions.
All other processing of knowledge by the system, most importantly
retrieval and matching, is done over signatures and data structures
derived from them. In this section, I describe how a signature is derived
from a sentence. In the next section, I detail how a sentence and its
signature are transformed into an assertion about an object.
The signature of a sentence is the set of nouns, verbs, adjectives
(together with their parts of speech) that appear in subject, main verb,
object(s) and prepositional phrases of a sentence, as well as adverbs in
adverbial phrases. A signature is meant to preserve its most important
information. In the signature, the base form of the word appearing
in the sentence is used (the singular form for nouns, the infinitive for
verbs). Determiners (such as “a,” “the,” “some” and so on) and closed-
class words (such as “of,” “with,” “on,” “if,” and so on) are omitted.
For efficiency of comparing signatures, signatures are stored as sorted
lists of words (with their parts of speech), without preserving the order.
(See the next section for an explanation how “an elephant pushes a
cart” and “a cart pushes an elephant” result in different assertions.)
Because of this method of computing signatures, variations such as
“a dog barks,” “a dog can bark,” “all dogs bark” will all have the same
signature: “{dognoun , barkverb}”.
3.4 Phrases, properties and assertions
Many declarative sentences can be viewed as an assertion in more than
one way. Most declarative sentences accepted by Learner can be
viewed at least as assertions about the sentence’s syntactic subject.
For example, “cats eat mice” asserts that “cats” “eat mice.” Some
sentences, (such as “cats eat mice”), can also be viewed as assertions
about their syntactic object: “mice” have the property that “cats eat”
(them). Note that not all sentences have a noun phrase object (e.g.
“cats are beautiful” does not). Finally, some sentences can also be
viewed as assertions about their prepositional phrases. For example,
“people eat with forks” can be viewed as asserting that a “fork” is
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something “people eat with.” These sentences may or may not have
a direct syntactic object.
In all, three important kinds of phrases which may be present in a
sentence can be identified: subj (subject), obj (object), and pp (prepo-
sitional) phrases. These, when present, give rise to subj-, obj-, and
pp-assertions. Each sentence is interpreted as an assertion about each
kind of phrase present in it. For example, “cats eat mice” is interpreted
as both as a (subject) assertion about “cat” and an (object) assertion
about “mouse.” Every assertion has two parts: the object O (not to
be confused with the sentence’s syntactic object) about which some-
thing is asserted, and the property P being asserted about this object.
I denote an assertion that an object O has the property P as A(O,P ).
The phrase (one of subj, obj, or pp) that gave rise to this assertion
is not included in the notation and is not important unless explicitly
specified.
To create a subject assertion from a sentence, the sentence’s sig-
nature and its syntactic subject (the nouns and adjectives making up
the subject noun phrase) are extracted. The order of words in the
subject is preserved, but the words are converted to canonical form
(i.e. nouns are singularized). The singularized noun phrase becomes
the subj-assertion’s object O. The property P is computed by taking
the sentence’s signature, and removing from it all words present in the
object. As in signatures, the order of words in properties is not pre-
served. Obj-assertions and pp-assertions are created similarly, using
the corresponding phrase in forming the assertion’s object.
When creating assertions from sentences, Learner attempts to
handle negation correctly. Syntactic analysis of the sentence looks for
“not” negating the meaning of the sentence. Here are some examples
of negation that is correctly recognized:
cats do not fly
cats don’t fly
a cat cannot fly
To represent the recognized negation, each assertion in the knowl-
edge base has one of two truth values: Tv = 1 or 0. When referring
to a specific object-property pair Oi and Pj , I will denote these as
Tv(Oi, Pj) = 1 and Tv(Oi, Pj) = 0, and informally refer to assertions
in these two classes as “is true” and “is false” assertions, respectively.
Because each assertion consists of an object and a property, the
entire knowledge base can be visualized as a large matrix, with every
known object of some assertion being a row and every known prop-
erty being a column. See Figure 3.2 for an illustration of an objects-
35
Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 3.2: Example of a matrix encoding assertions about objects and
their properties. The actual matrix has tens of thousands of rows and
columns. For simplicity, only “is true” subject-assertions are shown,
marked by ‘x’es. Blank cells denote that truth values for these asser-
tions are not explicitly known.
properties matrix depicting a set of assertions.
Each sentence is assigned a unique ID that can be retrieved given
the string of the sentence. The assertions that the sentence encodes
are indexed by this ID, allowing for rapid retrieval of all assertions a
sentence encodes, as well retrieval of some additional information such
as phrases present, and the head noun of each phrase present.
Additionally, assertions are indexed by phrases and properties. For
example, it is possible to quickly retrieve all subj-assertions with the
object O being “cat,” or all subj-assertions with the property “have
tail.”
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Chapter 4
Algorithms
In this chapter, I present the principles that guided the formula-
tion of the algorithms for question generation, the algorithms them-
selves, Select-NN (for “select nearest neighbors”) and Map-Props
(for “map properties”), and algorithms to further refine the set of gen-
erated questions.
4.1 Guiding principles
The goal of Learner is to acquire knowledge from human volunteers.
What features should an approach to the problem of knowledge acqui-
sition have? I discuss both methodological and architectural consider-
ations.
Some top level methodological principles adopted in developing a
solution are as follows:
• knowledge needs to be acquired actively. That is, the system
should direct the acquisition to the knowledge not already present
(DARPA, 1998).
• knowledge, especially in large multi-purpose knowledge bases,
should be acquired incrementally (Menzies, 1998).
• knowledge needs to be maintained after it has been acquired. In
other words, it is necessary to constantly analyze how acquired
knowledge can be operationalized (used) and how it can be faulted
(when does using it produce undesirable or incorrect results), and
what actions may be needed to correct the behavior (e.g., adding
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new knowledge to address the limitations of existing knowledge
or correcting the already acquired knowledge) (Menzies, 1998).
• successful acquisition has to be transparent. That is, it should
be possible to understand why the system did what it did, to
see the impact your contribution made, and to correct behavior
of the system. The importance of exposing the summary of the
system’s operations to a naive user is discussed by (Hellerstein,
1997). Hellerstein argues that in situations involving naive users
and long processing times by the system, it is important to give
the user access to a summary of the system’s operation to reduce
user frustration and provide a path for the user to learn how to
best interact with the system.
The architectural desiderata are (i) modularity, so that many algo-
rithms for question generation can be plugged in, and (ii) orthogonality,
so that modules focus on their tasks without having to duplicate the
same functionality.
To accommodate these goals, a kind of generate and test archi-
tecture has been employed. That is, the initial stage of processing
generates questions, passing them to a set of modules that filter the
questions, passing them to the output. I refer to the modules that pro-
pose questions as generators and to modules that combine and filter
questions as critics, a term I use in the sense consistent with Minsky
(Minsky, 1986) to refer to a more powerful version of a test. Unlike
tests, critics are able to combine and modify their inputs in addition
to merely filtering them.
Currently, Learner employs only one method for generating ques-
tions — by analogy. There are several filters being applied to questions
generated. The filters remove questions that are non-grammatical, re-
dundant, or those which are not likely to yield useful new knowledge.
Armed with these goals and architectural motivations, the following
sections explain (i) the algorithms for generating questions by analogy,
(ii) the filtering of the generated questions before they are presented
to the user, and (iii) how the acquisition interface conforms to these
goals.
4.2 Analogy
Generating knowledge acquisition questions by using analogy is at the
heart of this thesis. This section presents the algorithms involved. A
novel feature the analogical reasoning method employed in this work is
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that it relies on mapping properties from many similar objects, sum-
ming the evidence for posing any given question.
Because of its reliance on many sources of analogy, I call this method
cumulative analogy. In this section, I present the algorithms for cumu-
lative analogy and explains the algorithms’ operation on a step-by-step
example. (Recall that Ch. 2 presented a bird’s-eye-view example of
analogy in operation).
Given a knowledge acquisition topic Otarget about which knowledge
is being acquired, cumulative analogy is performed in two stages: (i)
Select-NN, selecting the set O of nearest neighbors Osrci , and (ii)
Map-Props, projecting known properties of Osrci back onto Otarget
and presenting them as questions.1
Both algorithms are explained on a simplified example of posing
questions about “newspaper.” The formal pseudocode for the two
algorithms is also presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.8, respectively.
4.2.1 Select-NN
The details of Select-NN are as follows. First, Select-NN retrieves the
properties of the target object, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 4.1: Select-NN: Preparing to formulate questions about “news-
paper.” Properties already known about “newspaper” are identified.
Next, for each selected property, all assertions about this property
and some other object with this property are identified, as shown in
Figure 4.2. Both objects about which this property “is true” and “is
false” are included.
Next, for every object that shares properties with “newspaper,” the
similarity between this object and “newspaper” are computed based on
1It is the second step of projecting properties that motivates the terminology of
“Osrc” (“src” for “source”) and “Otarget .”
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Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 4.2: Select-NN: All assertions about known properties of
“newspaper” are identified, in this example the two being “has pages”
and “is for reading.”
properties that they share and that they mismatch on (two objects mis-
match on a property when a property is asserted as “is true” about one
and as “is false” about the other). The contribution of each property
to the total similarity score is weighted by this property’s frequency
in the entire knowledge base, with matches of rare properties receiving
greater weight. The detailed formulas are given below.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, up to ten most similar objects are se-
lected. Prior to returning the objects, however, there is some additional
filtering. No objects that are more general than the target object are
returned. When there is more than one object that shares at least
two properties with the target object, no objects that share only one
property are returned. The specifics of these filters and the detailed ra-
tionale for them, as well as the exact formulas for computing similarity
are given below.
The pseudocode in Figure 4.5 presents Select-NN formally. The
pseudocode refers to a two-argument predicate WNisa, which is defined
as follows:
The subsumption relationship “WordNet is-a” holds between ob-
jects O1 and O2 (denoted WNisa(O1, O2)) if there is a chain of “is-a”
assertions in WordNet that leads from first WordNet sense of O1 to the
first or second WordNet senses of O2. This definition has been selected
empirically. Section 4.3.1 describes WordNet, WordNet senses, and the
motivation for introducing WNisa and associated with it filtering in
greater detail.
For ease of reference, all the steps of Select-NN are illustrated to-
gether in Figure 4.4. Computation of similarity in Select-NN in based
on a generalization of Tversky’s contrast model of similarity. The model
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Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 4.3: Select-NN: Using properties of “newspaper,” its nearest
neighbors (the most similar objects) are identified. Up to ten are used
similar objects are returned; here only two (“book” and “magazine”)
are shown.
is formulated as:
SimTversky(O,O′) = θf(FO ∩ FO′)− αf(FO \ FO′)− βf(FO′ \ FO)
where FO represents the set of features that an object O possesses,
FO\FO′ denotes the set difference of the sets FO and FO′ (i.e., features
of O that O′ does not have). The function f is typically assumed to
be additive (simply returning the size of the set to which it is applied),
and θ, α, and β are non-negative weights. Section 4.4 presents more
details about adapting this model to domains in which some features are
unknown, as well as incorporating into the model of some information-
theoretic observations about semantic similarity made independently
by Resnik and by Lin (Resnik, 1995, 1999; Lin, 1998).
The exact formulas used in Select-NN are as follows. Recall that
Tv(O,P ) stands for the truth value of the assertion A(O,P ); “is true”
assertions have Tv = 1 and “is false” assertions have Tv = 0.
Let OP be the set {O : Tv(O,P ) = 1}, i.e., the set of all objects O
for which the property P has been asserted to be true, and ‖OP ‖ be
the number of such objects. Then the frequency weight of P , denoted
FreqWt(P ), can be defined as follows:
FreqWt(P ) =
{
2 if OP = ∅,
1 + 1/ log2(‖OP ‖+ 1) otherwise.
(4.1)
Note that the FreqWt ranges between 1 and 2, FreqWt(P ) ∈ [1, 2],
with larger values corresponding to properties that are true of fewer
objects. The inverse of the logarithm is taken to make FreqWt de-
crease as ‖OP ‖ increases. The motivation for assigning lower weight to
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Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
(a) Preparing to formulate questions about “newspaper.” Properties already
known about “newspaper” are identified.
Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
(b) All known properties of “newspaper” are used to look for similar objects.
Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
(c) The most similar objects are identified (up to ten are used).
Figure 4.4: Select-NN: All steps together, for the example of
“newspaper.” For clarity, only “is true” properties are shown, marked
with ‘x’. Blank cells mean that nothing has been asserted.
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Select-NN:
// ∃A(O,P ) denotes “O has property P” or “O does not have
property P”
// has been asserted
// initialize scores to 0:
forall Osrc do
Score(Osrc)← 0;
end
forall P : ∃A(Otarget , P ) do
forall Osrc : ∃A(Osrc , P ), Osrc 6= Otarget do
Score(Osrc)← Score(Osrc) + Wt(Tv(Otarget , P ),Tv(Osrc , P ), P );
end
end
// If WordNet category is known, disallow objects with
non-overlapping
// categories
// Always disallow objects subsuming Otarget
// (see Section 4.2.3)
if WordNetCateg(Otarget) = ∅ then
let Candidate set C ← {O : Score(O) > 0 ∧ ¬WNisa(Otarget , O)};
else
let C ← {O : Score(O) > 0 ∧ ¬WNisa(Otarget , O)
∧ WordNetCateg(O) ∩WordNetCateg(Otarget) 6= ∅};
let C2 ← {O : O ∈ C ∧ Score(O) ≥ 2};
// return only highest scoring objects
if ‖C2‖ < 2 then
if ‖C‖ < 10 then
return C (with scores);
else
//return up to ten highest-scoring objects
return O (with scores) :
(‖O‖ = 10 ∧ ∀Osrc , O¬src : Osrc ∈ O, O¬src 6∈ O,
Score(Osrc) ≥ Score(O¬src));
else
if ‖C2‖ < 10 then
return C2 (with scores);
else
return O (with scores) :
(‖O‖ = 10 ∧ ∀Osrc , O¬src : Osrc ∈ O, O¬src 6∈ O,
Score(Osrc) ≥ Score(O¬src));
Figure 4.5: Select-NN: Algorithm for selecting nearest neighbors.
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more common shared properties is that, other things being equal, two
objects sharing a very rare property are probably more similar than
two objects sharing a very common one.2 Giving greater weight to the
rare features is consistent to prior approaches to measuring semantic
similarity (Resnik, 1995; Lin, 1998). The motivation for FreqWt is fur-
ther discussed in Section 4.4 in light of the contrast model of similarity
and other prior work.
The amount by which the score of each object is updated is given
by the function
Wt(Tv(Otarget , P ),Tv(Osrc , P ), P ),
computed as follows:
Wt(Tv1,Tv2, P )=

FreqWt(P ) if (Tv1,Tv2) = (1, 1),
−1.5 if (Tv1,Tv2) = (1, 0) or (0, 1) ,
0 if (Tv1,Tv2) = (0, 0).
(4.2)
The “punishment for mismatch” weight applied when (Tv1,Tv2) =
(1, 0) or (0, 1) has been selected to be -1.5 as the negative of the average
of the extreme values of the “reward for match” values, which are the
range of FreqWt(P ) (recall that FreqWt(P ) ∈ [1, 2]). The motivation
for making the weight the same for the two cases (Tv1,Tv2) = (1, 0)
and (Tv1,Tv2) = (0, 1) is discussed further in Section 4.4.
Because a property of both the source and the target object could
have been asserted to be true (Tv of 1) or false (Tv of 0), several cases
arise in Eq. 4.2. (Recall that assertions other than “is true” and “is
false” are not used in computing the similarity score). When both Osrc
and Otarget share a property P (both truth values are 1), their similarity
is incremented by FreqWt(P ), a weight that ranges between 1 and 2, as
is detailed below. When the objects mismatch on this property (i.e. Tv
is 1 for one object and 0 for the other), then their similarity is reduced
by a constant 1.5. Finally, when both Tvs are zero, the similarity is not
adjusted, the rationale being that two objects not having a property
does not necessarily indicate much about their similarity. For example,
neither a “newspaper” nor “ice” “can sing,” but that does not make
them any more similar.
The total similarity score is computed for every object whose score
was updated. After some filtering that removes already known ques-
tions and questions that are taxonomically inferable (the filtering is also
2‖OP ‖ is incremented by one to avoid division by zero (from 1/ log2(1)) when
‖OP ‖ is 1.
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detailed in Figure 4.5 and in Section 4.2.3), up to ten highest-scoring
objects are selected and returned together with their scores, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.3. The reason behind forming the set C2 in Select-NN
and looking at its cardinality is to avoid returning very weakly similar
objects when a sufficient number of more similar objects are available.
The score threshold of 2 ensures that at least two properties are shared;
the threshold of 2 on cardinality of C2 has been chosen empirically.
4.2.2 Map-Props
The output of Select-NN — the source objects Osrci paired with scored
indicating their respective similarity to Otarget — are passed to Map-
Props, which proceeds as follows (pseudocode for Map-Props is given
in Figure 4.8 and the formulae involved are presented later on in the
text).
First, for every source object, Map-Props retrieves all properties
asserted about this object. Both “is true” and “is false” assertions are
included. For the target object “newspaper,” the set of source objects
may include “book” and “magazine,” as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 4.6: Map-Props: All known properties of the similar objects
are selected.
Next, each mentioned property is mapped back onto the target ob-
ject, with the total score of the mapping depending on the similarity
scores of the relevant source objects and the kind of property being
mapped (subj, obj, or pp). Already known properties of the target
object (“newspaper,” in our case) are filtered out, as are properties
that “newspaper” can be expected to have by taxonomic reasoning.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the mapping of properties not yet known about
“newspaper” back onto “newspaper.”
The pseudocode for the Map-Props is presented in Figure 4.8. The
specific formulae used in calculating the scores of the mapped properties
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Objects Properties
(with simplified form)
contains knowledge has pages is cold is for reading
. . . contain knowledge have page be cold be read . . .
...
...
...
...
...
book . . . x x x . . .
ice . . . x . . .
newspaper . . . ??? x x . . .
magazine . . . x x x . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Figure 4.7: Map-Props: Properties (such as “contains knowledge”)
known about similar topics but not known about “newspaper” are for-
mulated as questions about “newspaper” for presenting to contributors.
Map-Props:
// Osrc denotes the set of objects given as input
// SimSc(O) denotes the similarity score of an object O (to Otarget)
// PropClass(P ) denotes the property class of P (one of subj, obj,
pp)
forall Osrc : Osrc ∈ Osrc do
forall P : ∃A(Osrc , P ) do
Score(P )←
Score(P ) + SimWt(SimSc(O)) · PropClassWt(PropClass(P ))
·TvWt(Tv(O,P ));
end
end
// select 100 properties with highest scores for further filtering
let P ← {P : Score(P ) > 0 ∧ ¬∃A(Otarget , P )}
if ‖P‖ < 100 then
return P (with scores)
else
return P ′ (with scores) : {‖P ′‖ = 100 ∧ ∀Pi, Pj : Pi ∈ P ′, Pj 6∈ P ′,
Score(Pi) ≥ Score(Pj)};
Figure 4.8: Map-Props: Algorithm for mapping properties from nearest
neighbors onto Otarget
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are as follows. For every source object, the score of every property
known about it is updated, according to the product of three weights:
TvWt(Tv(O,P ))× PropClassWt(PropClass(P ))× SimWt(SimSc(O))
The component weight functions are computed as follows:
TvWt(Tv) =

1 if Tv = 1,
−1 if Tv = 0,
0 otherwise.
(4.3)
PropClassWt(PropClass) =

1.1 if PropClass is subj,
1 if PropClass is obj,
0 otherwise.
(4.4)
and
SimWt(SimSc) = 1 +
ln(SimSc)
4
, (4.5)
where SimSc is the “similarity score” of Osrc to Otarget as returned by
Select-NN. The equation for TvWt simply ensures that the votes “for”
and “against” this property holding for the target object are summed
with the correct sign.
Note from Eq. 4.4 that PropClassWt gives slight preference to sub-
ject assertions over object assertions, and does not increment the score
of pp assertions at all, largely because of difficulties that arise with
prepositions when the noun phrase is altered.3 Also, PropClassWt en-
sures that preference is given to statements which are perceived to be
“about” the current topic Otarget .
The equation for SimWt (Eq. 4.5) ensures that the most similar
objects in the set (according to Select-NN) have the greatest impact
on the overall scores. The function has been chosen chosen after trying
(informally) several alternatives; it is highly sublinear to prevent over-
emphasizing any given object, and to produce a truly “cumulative”
analogy.
Once the total scores for each property are computed, properties
already asserted about Otarget are eliminated, and up to 100 of the
highest scoring remaining properties are returned for further filtering.
In practice, the computationally intensive work is not the computing
3For example, one normally says “sit at a desk,” but “sit on a bed”; changing the
noun in the prepositional phrase would in a number of cases require an additional
mechanism to modify the preposition to agree with the new noun.
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of scores that has taken place up to this point; it is the linguistic pro-
cessing of a sentence that happens at later stages. Thus it is important
for performance reasons that this elimination happen at this stage and
not later. The phenomenon of speed optimization causing propagation
of some functionality from the tests into the generator is a common-
place feature of generate and test architectures. The properties with
large negative scores (when such are present) are currently dropped,
although they represent good hypothesis about what is not true about
Otarget .
4.2.3 Refinements in Select-NN
Refinements to Select-NN use taxonomic and semantic category infor-
mation present in WordNet, a lexical database, as well as the taxonomic
knowledge that Learner gathers. Extending Learner’s taxonomy
will override the information derived from WordNet. In this section, I
briefly introduce WordNet’s taxonomic handling of nouns and describe
the implemented refinement to Select-NN which uses this information.
WordNet has approximately 80,000 noun word forms organized into
approximately 60,000 synsets (for “synonym sets”) (Miller, 1998). A
concept may have multiple senses (e.g. “table” can mean a data table
with rows and columns and a kind of furniture). The senses are num-
bered in order of decreasing frequency as they occurred in a manually
tagged corpus, so that the first sense is the most common one in the
corpus which was used to calculate the frequency data.
WordNet also provides taxonomic and other links (“is-part-of” and
so on) between synsets. The taxonomic information states, for example,
that the first sense of “cat” is a kind of the first sense of “animal.” See
Miller (1998) for more information on how WordNet organizes nouns
and their senses.
Furthermore, WordNet organizes all senses of nouns into high level
categories. For example, for the two senses of “table” mentioned
above, the table with rows and columns is in the category “group,”
and table that is furniture is in the category artifact.
In all, there are 26 such categories: act, animal, artifact,
attribute, body, cognition, communication, event, feeling,
food, group, location, motive, object, person, phenomenon,
plant, possession, process, quantity, relation, shape, state,
substance, time, tops. The tops category contains the concepts at
the top of the hierarchy.
The refinement relating to WordNet categories (as detailed in Fig-
ure 4.5) is meant to remedy occasional generation of strange similarities
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when the system has insufficient knowledge. For example, two very dif-
ferent objects, such as a “mechanic” and “oil” can be similar to each
other if little is known about each. If all that is known about both
“mechanic” and “oil” is that both “can lubricate something,”
they will be judged to be similar by the system prior to WordNet fil-
tering. The filtering based on WordNet categories will exclude “oil”
from the set of objects similar to a “mechanic”, because WordNet cat-
egories of senses of the noun “mechanic” do not intersect with any of
the WordNet categories of senses of the noun “oil”.
More specifically, to compute the set of WordNet categories for a
topic O, the sense categories of the three most common WordNet senses
of O are looked up (or, if there are fewer than three senses, categories
of all the senses). For example, the noun “mechanic” has the single
category person, and the noun “oil” has categories artifact and
substance.
Another filter is the filter of taxonomic parents. It is implemented
as follows. Recall the definition of the predicate WNisa:
The subsumption relationship “WordNet is-a” holds between ob-
jects O1 and O2 (denoted WNisa(O1, O2)), if there is a chain of “is-a”
assertions in WordNet that leads from first WordNet sense of O1 to the
first or second WordNet senses of O2.
Additionally, such statements as “a cat is a pet,” “cats are pets,”
and “a cat is not a bird” in Learner’s knowledge base are recognized
as expressing presence and absence taxonomic relationships between
the subject and the object of the assertion. I denote these extracted
relationships LearnerIsA and LearnerIsNotA. Given a target object
Otgt , all objects O such that
LearnerIsA(Otgt , O) ∨ (¬LearnerIsNotA(Otgt , O) ∧WNisa(Otgt , O))
are removed from the output of Select-NN.
4.2.4 Questions posed by cumulative analogy im-
prove with acquisition of more knowledge
Importantly, knowledge acquisition by cumulative analogy exhibits
bootstrapping qualities. The replies to the knowledge acquisition ques-
tions formulated by analogy are immediately added to the knowledge
base, affecting the measure of similarity. If Select-NN incorrectly rates
a non-similar object as too similar, many knowledge acquisition ques-
tions posed with the contribution of this object are likely to be answered
“no,” decreasing its similarity score in the future.
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Even answering questions affirmatively is likely to strengthen the
similarity scores of topics that are more similar, while leaving scores
of other topics in the set of similar topics unchanged. This process is
also likely to improve the quality of future questions. Here is an exam-
ple: when starting with the seed knowledge base and teaching about
“newspapers,” the similar topics, together with their similarity scores,
are: “book” (6.72), “map” (2.76) “magazine” (2.67), and “bag” (2.51).
The three highest-scoring knowledge acquisition questions posed are
“newspapers contain information?”, “all newspapers have pages?” and
“newspapers are for reading?” If these questions are answered affirma-
tively and the answers are submitted to the system, set of the similar
objects remains the same, but their scores become: “book” (10.94),
“map” (5.53) “magazine” (4.12), and “bag” (2.51). As can be seen from
the change in similarity scores, the less similar topic (“bag”) became
less influential in creating knowledge acquisition questions relative to
others. This should lead to questions posed by Learner being more
focused.
Conversely, as more “is true” assertions are added, similar objects
that also share those properties but were not previously in the top ten
most similar object will join that group.
4.2.5 Other merits of cumulative analogy
In this section, I discuss some important merits of the concept of cu-
mulative analogy. The specific algorithmic implementation of cumu-
lative analogy and some of its shortcomings are addressed following a
detailed evaluation, in Section 8.5.1. My approach to measuring simi-
larity is motivated and compared to other approaches in the literature
in Section 4.4.
First, cumulative analogy is noise tolerant at all stages. Select-NN
sums evidence for similarity from many individual properties, limiting
the effects of spurious matches. Map-Props then sums evidence for each
property from up to ten similar objects, further limiting the effect of any
residual noise in Select-NN’s output. Noise tolerance is of particular
importance when the system is forced to pose questions when it knows
very little about the topic at hand.
An example of cumulative analogy exhibiting noise tolerance in the
step of creating a set of knowledge acquisition questions from the sim-
ilar objects returned by Select-NN is as follows. Consider the similar
objects to the object “tool” in the seed knowledge base, presented in
Table 4.1.
Arguably, the similar topic “fire” (and perhaps the similar topic
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computer 7.61
machine 5.39
horseshoe 5.26
fire 3.92
knife 3.90
car 3.90
wrench 3.76
musical instrument 3.06
fan 2.71
weapon 2.45
Table 4.1: Objects similar to “tool” in the seed knowledge base.
“horseshoe”) are spurious. “Tool” was judged to be similar to “fire”
because of the following pairs of assertions: “Humans use tools/fire”,
“A tool can help a person/Fire can help people”, and “Tools are use-
ful/Fires can be useful”. Despite these matches, the top five questions
posed about “tools” as follows (shown together with the similar topics
from which they are mapped):
• tools can run on electricity? (computer, machine, fan)
• tools are machines? (computer, car, fan)
• a tool can hurt a person? (fire, car, weapon)
• tools are man-made? (computer, machine)
• tools are complicated? (computer, car)
In this particular case, only the third question was mapped with par-
ticipation of “fire,” and this question had additional support from the
objects “car” and “weapon.” Other, irrelevant properties of “fire”
present in the knowledge base (such as “a fire is hot”, “fire consumes
oxygen”, “fire can burn a house”) are not posed as knowledge acquisi-
tion questions.
I refer to to this ability of cumulative analogy to focus in on the
more relevant properties under the general term “noise tolerance.” It
is important that the “noise” that cumulative analogy tolerates has
many sources. One source is spurious matches that arise from insuf-
ficient knowledge (for example, a “tool” and a “fire” were similar
because of such assertions as “Humans use tools/fire” and no knowl-
edge that would state how a “tool” is different from a “fire” was
present. Another source is lexical ambiguity, which may cause seman-
tically different assertions to be judged to be similar by Learner (as
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discussed further in Chapter 6). Finally, another source of noise may
be some unintentional or malicious misinformation of the system by
a contributor. As long as the total amount of “noise” from all of the
possible sources does not overwhelm cumulative analogy’s ability to
tolerate noise, cumulative analogy will still pose reasonable questions
even when forced to operate over such “noisy” data.
Second, the knowledge collected by Learner tends to be syntac-
tically uniform. By virtue of the algorithm (contributors are encour-
aged to confirm, deny, or correct statements mapped from other similar
statements), syntactic variation is kept low, simplifying further process-
ing and enabling the analogy mechanism to work well on consequent
iterations.
Finally, the approach conforms to the guiding principle of trans-
parency put forth in Section 4.1. Contributors can immediately see the
impact of their contribution on the system’s beliefs about similarity of
objects. The impact is shown by presenting the current beliefs about
similarity, the pairs of assertions that support the current beliefs about
the similarity, and the changes in the similarity caused by the knowl-
edge just added by the contributor are all presented or made available
to the contributor, as detailed in Section 5.1.
4.3 Filtering questions with critics
Generation of knowledge acquisition questions in Learner consists of
two components: the generation component and the filter, or critic
component. Critics are the part of the architecture that implements
some commonsense requirements on the knowledge acquisition ques-
tions. A good set of critics oﬄoads this functionality from the gener-
ators, allowing the generators to be simpler and easier to implement.
Also, because critics implement commonsense requirements on ques-
tions, they are more fixed in their nature than generators, which have
a much broader charter of “generating plausible assertions” (to be con-
verted into questions).
In the implemented system, critics receive and process assertions
consisting of the object Otarget , some property P and the assertion’s
score as computed by Map-Props. These assertions are later converted
into natural language. Although in the envisioned architecture critics
are allowed to combine and modify their inputs, the implemented critics
do not modify the assertions or their scores. They are only allowed to
“veto” (filter) some of them, passing the filtered set to the natural
language generation component and on to the interface.
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The implemented critics embody the following principles:
• Do not ask what you already know.
• Do not ask things that can be inferred with high confidence (only
taxonomic inference has been implemented).
• Do not ask what you can not understand (do not pose non-
parsable questions).
Several of the above principles can be seen as instantiations of
an even more general information-theoretic principle that the system
should pose the questions that will yield the most information (see
Chklovski (1998) for an example of applying this principle to selecting
a recognition “question” in a simplified object recognition task). The
implementation of the principle “do not ask what is already known”
is straightforward, as is implementation of “do not ask what you can
not understand” (the new sentences that cannot be parsed are filtered
out). The next section details filtering out assertions inferable with a
simple inference mechanism.
4.3.1 Using a taxonomy to filter questions
The core question-posing algorithm operates on correlations in the sup-
plied knowledge base. It requires no additional sources of information,
and does not have a deep understanding of what the natural language
assertions mean or how they relate to each other semantically.
Such a lightweight approach has the advantage of simplicity. How-
ever, it has some limitations. Namely, if a property holds for many
taxonomically close objects, the algorithm will never really “get it,”
and will pose the same question about many objects. For example,
when told that “animals have body parts,” the generation component
may, in generating questions for various topics, ask whether “monkeys
have body parts,” “cats have body parts,” “dogs have body parts,” and
so on.
In this section, I present an implemented critic that adds aware-
ness of taxonomic relationships and taxonomic inferences, and includes
handling of quantifiers such as “some.”
This filter is used only on subject-assertions. Other assertions are
permitted by this critic without evaluation. The reason is that in in-
terpreting natural language statements, the syntactic subjects of the
sentences are by default scoped universally, while syntactic objects are
not. For a discussion of quantifiers in first-order predicate calculus
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expressions generated by interpreting natural language assertions, see
Jurafsky and Martin (2000, p. 558) and Alshawi, Carter, van Eijck,
Gamba¨ck, Moore, Moran, Pereira, Pulman, Rayner and Smith (1992).
The sources present examples of syntactically identical sentences that
have different quantifier assignments when interpreted semantically.
The second source describes a set of heuristics that in some (but not all)
cases make the correct quantifier choices. For example, in the sentence
“people have body parts” the subject “people” is universally quanti-
fied, while the object “body parts” is not (that is, the statement does
not assert that people have every possible body part, such as wings).
Recall the two-argument predicate WNisa(O1, O2) described in Sec-
tion 4.2.3. The predicate computes whether O1 is a kind of O2 accord-
ing to the taxonomic information about word senses in WordNet.
The taxonomy-based critic of assertions works as follows. For each
property P returned by Map-Props, the critic evaluates whether to
filter the assertion A(Otarget , P ). The critic looks for the maximally
specific generalization of Otarget , Osup , such that truth or falsehood
of P is asserted about Osup . That is, the critic looks for the most
specific Osup such that WNisa(Otarget , Osup) and ∃A(Osup , P ). If no
such Osup exists, A(Otarget , P ) is not filtered. Otherwise, the natural
language sentence that gave rise to A(Osup , P ) is analyzed. The asser-
tion is not filtered if the subject noun phrase is quantified with any of
the determiners “most,” “many,” “some,” “several,” or “few.” Other-
wise, A(Otarget , P ) is filtered, and no question about Otarget having the
property P will be posed.
To work in conjunction with this critic, Select-NN also includes a
step that removes objects subsuming Otarget from the set of objects it
returns. The motivation for this filter is the later filtering of properties
that can be computed to be inherited from a more general object,
described in Section 4.3.1. If Select-NN did not filter objects subsuming
Otarget , consequent application of Map-Props to these objects would
have generated many questions that would be immediately filtered out
again by the taxonomic critic.
4.4 Measuring semantic similarity
In this section, I place the computations of similarity used in Learner
in the context of research on human judgments of semantic similarity
and discuss prior approaches to generating machine semantic similarity
judgments. In addition to this discussion, Section 7.5 further expands
my discussion of semantic similarity. Additional topics include lin-
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guistic and world phenomena that give rise to semantic similarity, the
importance of dissimilarity between similar categories, and human bias
in selection of features that define similarity (related to the theorem of
the Ugly Duckling, which states that in the absolute absence of bias
any two categories of objects are equally similar).
Assessment of semantic similarity is essential to a variety of NLP
tasks (Montemagni and Pirelli, 1998). Typically, the notion of sim-
ilarity is approached via the notion of distance. Introducing a way
to measure distance between any two objects allows identification of
objects that are near each other as the most similar.
The intuition of a well-behaved distance measure is captured in a
notion of a metric. In order for distance measure D, defined over a set
of objects O to be a metric, the following conditions must hold for any
three objects O, O′ and O′′ in O:
non-negativity: D(O,O′) ≥ 0,
reflexivity: D(O,O′) = 0 if and only if O = O′,
symmetry: D(O,O′) = D(O′, O),
triangle inequality: D(O,O′) + D(O′, O′′) ≥ D(O,O′′).
Assuming that objects are represented as vectors of real-valued or
binary properties (and assuming the value of each property is known for
each object), objects can be thought of as points in an N dimensional
space, where N is the number of distinct properties. In feature-based
approaches to similarity, a distance metric between objects represented
as feature vectors is often defined using a specific value of r(r > 0) of
the Minkowski metric:
Lr(O,O′) =
(
N∑
k=1
|Ok −O′k|r
) 1
r
where Ok is the value of the kth feature of O (Duda, Hart and Stork,
2000; Goldstone, 1999). L1 (i.e., the above expression for r = 1) is
known as Manhattan or city-block distance and is closely related to
Spearman’s footrule. L2 is the familiar Euclidean distance. The simi-
larity is then defined to be inversely related to the distance measure.
L1 and L2 are the most commonly used in feature-based similarity
measures (Goldstone, 1999).
On the other hand, studies of human similarity judgments indi-
cate that when humans estimate pairwise semantic similarity (or “dis-
tance”) of concepts, they systematically violate all of the above prop-
erties of distance metrics save, perhaps, for non-negativity (Tversky,
1977; Goldstone, 1999).
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Human judgments violate reflexivity because not all pairs of iden-
tical objects are judged to be equally similar. For example, complex
identical objects (such as identical twins) have been empirically ob-
served to be judged more similar than simple objects (such as squares).
Symmetry is violated in the following way: when an object with many
features is compared to one with fewer features, the one with more
features is judged to be less similar to the other one than vice versa.
For example, subjects in the United States judged New York to be less
similar to Tel Aviv than vice versa and China to be less similar to
North Korea than North Korea is to China (Tversky, 1977; Goldstone,
1999). Finally, triangle inequality can be violated when O and O′ and
O′ and O′′ are similar because of different sets of features, and O and
O′′ have little in common. For example, “ball” (O) and “moon” (O′)
are both round, and “moon” (O′) and “lamp” (O′′) both can give off
light, but “ball” and “lamp” are less similar than either of the above
pairs (Tversky and Gati, 1982; Goldstone, 1999).
In choosing measures of distance, there is usually little agreement on
a principled way of selecting one (even if restricted only to metric mea-
sures). For example, Aggarwal et al. state: “In most high dimensional
applications the choice of the distance metric is not obvious; and the
notion for the calculation of similarity is very heuristical” (Aggarwal,
Hinneburg and Keim, 2001).
In light of these observations, I have chosen not to build Lear-
ner’s measure of similarity on a notion of metric distance, but instead
to adopt Tversky’s contrast model of similarity. The contrast model is
formulated as:
SimTversky(O,O′) = θf(FO ∩ FO′)− αf(FO \ FO′)− βf(FO′ \ FO)
where FO represents the set of features that an object O possesses,
FO\FO′ denotes the set difference of the sets FO and FO′ (i.e., features
of O that O′ does not have). The function f is typically assumed to
be additive (simply returning the size of the set to which it is applied),
and θ, α, and β are non-negative weights.
The contrast model is typically applied to domains in which perfect
information is assumed — for a given object any given feature is known
to be either present or absent. On the other hand, by the nature of the
task of knowledge acquisition, Learner manipulates features whose
(binary) values are sometimes unknown. In generalizing the contrast
model to domains with unknown features, I use a slightly different
notation, using PO to denote the set of “is true” properties of O, and
P¬O to denote the set of “is false” properties of O. I have also chosen
a measure that, when measuring similarity between O and O′, is not
56
affected by features unknown about either O or O′. That is, in place
of FO \ FO′ , I use PO ∩ P¬O′ , the set of properties (features) that are
known to be true for O and are known to be false for O′. Similarly, I
use PO′ ∩ P¬O in place of FO′ \ FO.
My approach to measuring similarity also weights individual fea-
tures differently, depending on their frequency, in the term PO ∩ PO′
corresponding to FO ∩FO′ . Features in this term are weighted accord-
ing to Eq. 4.1, reproduced here:
FreqWt(P ) =
{
2 if OP = ∅,
1 + 1/ log2(‖OP ‖+ 1) otherwise.
where OP is the set of objects for which the property P is asserted to
be true. This weighting gives more weight to the features that are rare,
similar to the approach taken by (Resnik, 1995; Lin, 1998). Addition-
ally, this weighting ranges between 1 and 2, FreqWt(P ) ∈ [1, 2], to keep
the contribution of any one feature from dominating the overall sum
and thus remain consistent with the spirit of Tversky’s contrast model.
Operating on the logarithm of the number of features in OP rather
than on the number of features in OP itself, ‖OP ‖, is motivated by
two considerations: (i) as will be presented below, models proposed by
other researchers propose measures that operate on logarithms of fre-
quencies based on information-theoretic considerations (Resnik, 1995;
Lin, 1998); indeed, Resnik points out that this may be an important
commonality of the models (Resnik, 1995, p. 4), and (ii) by taking
the inverse of the logarithm, FreqWt assumes values that are more uni-
formly distributed along the interval [1, 2] for a larger range of values
of ‖OP ‖.
For properties that are “is true” about one object being compared
and are “is false” of the other (i.e., P ∈ PO ∩ P¬O′ or P ∈ PO′ ∩
P¬O), giving greater weight to properties that are rare does not seem
motivated. After all, having opposite truth values on a rare property
should not have greater impact than disagreeing on a more common
one. In light of this, in my model equal weight is given to all properties
in sets PO∩P¬O′ and PO′∩P¬O. The magnitude of the negative weight
was chosen to be the average of the extreme values that the positive
contributions can assume, i.e, 1.5. The resulting measure of similarity
used in this work is:
Sim(O,O′)=
 ∑
P∈PO∩PO′
FreqWt(P )
−1.5×‖PO′∩P¬O‖−1.5×‖PO∩P¬O′‖
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Because I have selected α = β (both are equal to 1.5), symmetry of
distances is preserved in my adaptation of the contrast model, i.e., for
any two objects O and O′, Sim(O,O′) = Sim(O′, O). Note, however,
that Learner’s algorithms are affected only by relative values of simi-
larity to the set of most similar objects being considered. For example,
the measure
Sim ′(O,O′) =
Sim(O,O′)
Sim(O,O)
is equivalent to the measure Sim(O,O′) in terms of the knowledge
acquisition questions it yields, but Sim ′(O,O′) is not symmetric (i.e.,
Sim ′(O,O′) 6= Sim ′(O′, O)), with Sim ′(O,O′) < Sim ′(O′, O) when
more is known about O than O′, as in the above examples cited from
Tversky.
Note that regardless of whether Sim or Sim ′ is used, the triangle
inequality can be violated, and hence neither Sim nor Sim ′ meets the
requirements of being a metric. Because similarity between any two
objects can still be computed, the notion of “nearest neighbors” is still
well-defined. However, I caution the reader that “nearest” in “nearest
neighbors” does not refer to a distance in a metric space.
For completeness, at this point I overview some other approaches to
measuring similarity that have appeared in the literature. A derivation
of a metric measure of similarity from a set of assumptions about its
desired properties can be found in (Lin, 1998). This information-theory
motivated approach can be applied to measure similarity in many set-
tings. When applying it to feature-based semantic similarity judgments
between words, Lin formulates it as:
SimLin(O,O′) =
2× I(FO ∩ FO′)
I(FO) + I(FO′) (4.6)
where I(F) is the amount of information contained in a set of fea-
tures F . Under the assumption of independence of features, I(F) =
−∑f∈F logP (f), where P (f) is the probability of feature f (Lin,
1998). The probability P (f), in turn, can be estimated from frequency
counts of encountering the feature f in the knowledge base.
Another feature-based distance metric is the Tanimoto metric, as
presented, for example, in (Duda et al., 2000, p. 188,541):
DTanimoto(O,O′) =
‖FO‖+ ‖FO′‖ − 2‖FO ∩ FO′‖
‖FO‖+ ‖FO′‖ − ‖FO ∩ FO′‖ (4.7)
which is normalized by the number of features and has the range [0, 1].
As can easily be established by constructing a Venn diagram for FO
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and FO′ , Tanimoto distance can also be written as:
DTanimoto(O,O′) = 1− ‖FO ∩ FO
′‖
‖FO ∪ FO′‖ (4.8)
Note that low distances correspond to high similarity and vice versa.
Also note that if values of some features are unknown, applying this
formula to only the known features can lead to violation of the triangle
inequality (recall the example above involving “ball,” “moon,” and
“lamp”). As stated, neither the Lin nor the Tanimoto approach to
measuring similarity distinguishes between the cases where a feature is
present in O but is either absent or unknown about O′.
Additional prior work introduces similarity metrics based not on
comparing features of objects, but on taxonomic and corpus frequency
information. Lin’s general derivation can be instantiated for taxonomy-
based similarity as:
SimLin−tax(O,O′) =
2× logP (CO,O′)
logP (CO) + logP (CO′)
(4.9)
where CO is the most specific category containing O, CO′ is the most
specific category containing O′, and CO,O′ is the most specific category
containing both O and O′ (assuming the taxonomy is a tree) (Lin,
1998). P (C) denotes the probability of encountering a concept from
category C (including any concept from a category subsumed by C),
which can be estimated from, for example, a textual corpus.
To measure similarity of concepts organized in a multiple inheri-
tance hierarchy Resnik has used the following distance metric:
DResnik (O,O′) = max
CO,O′
[− logP (CO,O′)] (4.10)
where CO,O′ ranges over the set of categories that subsume both O
and O′, and P (C) is the probability of encountering a reference to the
concept O in a corpus (Resnik, 1995). Resnik reports encouraging re-
sults for the ability of this measure to replicate human judgments (with
the correlation r = 0.79, with a benchmark upper bound of r = 0.90
of correlation of similarity judgments by different humans). The sim-
ilarity measure proposed by Lin is reported to perform slightly better
on the same test set (Lin, 1998). For further review and comparison of
various taxonomy-based metrics as well as some results on their ability
to replicate human similarity judgments, see (Resnik, 1999; Lin, 1998).
Overall, there are several properties that are desirable in a similarity
measure. This discussion has focused on the following:
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Property Learner Lin Resnik Tani-
(contrast model) moto
Mimics qualitative features of hu-
man judgments
X
Accounts for differences X *
Feature-based (able to bootstrap) X X *
Is a metric measure X X X
Table 4.2: Summary of properties of the reviewed measures of similar-
ity. The first and the last properties in the table are mutually exclusive.
“Accounts for differences” row indicates whether presence of a feature
with opposite truth values decreases similarity. For a feature known
about an object, Lin’s measure does not distinguish the features being
unknown and known to be false about the other object. “Feature-
based” row indicates whether the model works with features of objects
rather than purely taxonomic information. Resnik’s measure uses tax-
onomic position and corpus frequency. Measures based on features will
tend to improve their accuracy as values of more features are acquired.
• the ability to mimic human judgments,
• the ability to account for differences between objects as well as
for similarities,
• meeting the criteria for being a metric measure.
In the case of incomplete information and in knowledge acquisition
scenarios, I believe an important additional feature is a measure’s abil-
ity to improve as values of more features become known about more
objects. In Table 4.2, I summarize how the measures reviewed in this
section meet the above desiderata. Note that in selecting a measure to
use in the Learner, I considered the potential to mimic empirically
observed human judgments more important than whether the measure
is a metric. The measure actually used in Learner comes out ahead
of others according to the specified evaluation criteria.
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Chapter 5
Interface
In this chapter, I describe the interface, describe how it conforms to the
guiding principles laid out previously, and describe the multiple-choice
answers that Learner admits.
5.1 Interface description
To structure the elicitation, a topic-centric approach is used; that is,
there is always an identified noun phrase that is the topic of the current
acquisition. Given this requirement, there are two high-level issues:
what topic to talk about, and what to ask about that topic.
The topic of acquisition is selected by the user. The system exerts
only a slight influence on the selection of the topic, in the following
way: when the system presents the knowledge acquisition questions, it
also presents similar topics (the output of Select-NN); each of these can
be clicked to become the new topic of acquisition. Refer to Figure 5.1
for an example.
Given a topic, the system takes a mixed-initiative approach to elic-
itation — the contributor is given a chance to select a topic and enter
some assertions about it. Once the system has some knowledge about
a topic, it transitions to active acquisition mode, using the present
knowledge to formulate further knowledge acquisition questions. Be-
cause this “dialogue” is with a device with a display, it is somewhat
different from a verbal dialogue: the system’s top N (currently 20)
questions are presented in a batch, and the contributor reacts to or
ignores each one, pressing a button when done with the batch. The
opportunity to add additional assertions that are not responses to the
system’s questions is also present on every screen.
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Figure 5.1: Screenshot of acquiring knowledge about “newspaper.”
Reproduces Figure 2.1.
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In addition to displaying the similar topics, the system adheres to
the goal of being transparent by providing information about (i) how it
has arrived at the similar topics (ii) how it has arrived at each partic-
ular question, and (iii) which additional questions were filtered in the
process.
The interface provides an ‘[i]’ (‘i’ for “info”) hyperlink next to each
similar topic. Clicking it shows how much each pair of matching signa-
tures between Osrc and Otarget have contributed to the similarity score.
Refer to Figure 5.2 for an example of the system presenting the reasons
for similarity of “newspaper” and “book.”
Figure 5.2: Presenting to the contributor reasons for similarity of
“newspaper” and “book”.
The interface also provides an ‘[i]’ hyperlink next to each knowledge
acquisition question. Clicking it shows what source objects and asser-
tions caused Map-Props to formulate this question. Refer to Figure 5.3
for an example.
The filtering of assertions inferable with taxonomic reasoning (as
described in Section 4.3.1) is reported in gray directly before the pre-
sentation of the questions that passed the filter. For example, the
system may present that the assertion “cats have bones” was filtered
like this:
“animals have bones” prevents asking “cats have bones.”
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Figure 5.3: Presenting to the contributor the reasons for formulating
the question “newspapers contain information?” The question was for-
mulated by analogy from similar topics “book” and “map.”
The principle of transparency manifests itself in one further way
when the system provides contributors with feedback about the effect of
their contribution. When a contributor adds knowledge about a topic
and requests new knowledge acquisition questions from the system,
the system recomputes the set of similar topics, incorporating the new
knowledge, and displays how each new assertion has affected the set
of similar topics. For example, upon learning “newspapers contain
information” the system may display:
Added “newspapers contain a information” (effect: N
book),
indicating that “newspaper” became more similar to “book” as a result
of this addition.
The symbols ‘N’ (in green) and ‘H’ (in red) are also used when
displaying the set of similar topics to indicate the direction of change
in their similarity scores.
5.2 Permitted multiple-choice answers
To generate a knowledge acquisition question, a question mark is simply
appended at the end of an assertion (with other trailing punctuation
removed), and the assertion is presented as a “question.” This question
is presented in an HTML text input field, so that the contributor can
modify the question. (For example, rather than replying “no” to the
question “cars run on steam,” the contributor can alter it to read “cars
run on gasoline,” and assert that by answering “yes”). More often,
however, the contributors leave the question unaltered, merely selecting
one of the available predefined answers:
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• Yes
• No
• Some / Sometimes
• Matter of opinion
• Nonsensical question
This set of allowed answers has been selected as a result of an analysis
of the types of questions posed. Choosing the set of allowed answers is
important because, once fixed, the users have no further control over
these.
The main criterion used in selecting the set of answers was that
the list should be short and should make it easy for the contributor to
answer the questions. In other words, the answers should capture the
options that come up.
Currently, only the answers “yes” and “no” affect the similarity
scores of Select-NN and Map-Props. The other answers are simply
stored with the assertions they correspond to, and the same question
is not re-posed.
The motivation for each type of answer follows. “Yes” and “No” are
clear enough. The need for the answer “some/sometimes” arises when a
system overgeneralizes. Consider needing to answer the question “living
things have gills” (some), or “traffic lights are yellow” (sometimes).
“Matter of opinion” is included to address questions such as: “don-
keys are beautiful,” “there is life after death.” I include this option to
steer users away from answering “yes” or “no” to questions that others
may give a different answer to. This is intended to make the similarities
drawn by Select-NN more acceptable to everyone.
The option “Nonsensical question” is present to help evaluate the
performance of the system. To improve Learner further, knowing
what fraction of questions are nonsensical and what conditions give
rise to nonsensical questions is important. See the discussion in Sec-
tion 8.1 for additional discussion of “nonsense question” answer and
the frequencies of each answer.
Finally, one answer type that was considered but was not added, is
“I (personally) don’t know.” The need for such an answer may arise
when the system poses a question that a contributor believes has an
answer, but the contributor personally does not know it. Consider, for
example, the assertion “Volga is the longest river in Russia.” In my
experience, (perhaps because the system focuses on “commonsense”
knowledge), the need for such an answer is sufficiently rare. Currently,
the contributor, not having a useful answer for Learner, may simply
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skip such questions. The question will then likely be posed to another
contributor.
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Chapter 6
Ambiguity
There is much ambiguity in language. For example, individual words
are ambiguous: the word “mouse,” even when used as a noun, can refer
to both a kind of rodent or a kind of pointing device. Ambiguity exists
at the word, phrase, and assertion level, and can interfere with using
knowledge correctly.
In this chapter, I identify several kinds of ambiguity, discuss which
approaches to processing knowledge are less and more sensitive to pres-
ence of ambiguity in the knowledge, and outline approaches to removing
ambiguity, with emphasis on ambiguity present in the data Learner
collects.
6.1 Kinds of ambiguity
There are many kinds of ambiguity in language one can identify (Juraf-
sky and Martin, 2000, pp. 372–376, 631–646). The kinds most relevant
to Learner are as follows:
Word boundaries and base forms. In some languages, such as
written Chinese, merely establishing word boundaries in a sen-
tence can be a challenge because no special demarcation (such as
a space) is present between symbols comprising different words.
This problem does not normally arise in typed English text. How-
ever, another problem that sometimes does arise in English is
establishing the base forms of words (to form the sentence signa-
tures, for example). Consider determining the base form of the
word “putting”: it may be either “put” or “putt.” Admittedly,
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such cases are rare and Learner makes no effort to handle them
correctly (it will always select “put” in the above example).
Word sense. Also known as lexical ambiguity. Consider the seemingly
simple statement “many computers have a mouse.” “Computers”
are the computing devices, not people who perform calculations,
“have” means “have as part” (as opposed to “have a meal” or
“have a baby”), and “mouse” refers to a pointing device.
In addition to homographs (words of different origins having the
same spelling), sometimes a single word can refer to two or more
related, but distinct concepts. For example, consider the word
“coffee”: it can refer either to the drink made of coffee beans or
the beans themselves. Only the drink is normally liquid, and it
can be important to understand this in order to reason about the
coffee beans.
Structural. Structural ambiguity arises when a sentence can be
parsed in several different ways. Three common kinds of struc-
tural ambiguity are usually identified:
• Attachment ambiguity
• Coordination ambiguity
• Noun-phrase bracketing ambiguity
Attachment ambiguity refers to not knowing how pieces of the
sentence fit together. It often arises with prepositional phrases,
for example:
People can sometimes see the Grand Canyon flying
from LA to New York.
Syntactically, it is unclear whether “flying from LA to New York”
modifies “people” or “the Grand Canyon.”
Another common kind of parsing ambiguity is coordination ambi-
guity. It stems from an interaction of modifiers and conjunctions;
it currently does not arise in Learner because conjunctions are
disallowed (see Section 3.2). I present an example for complete-
ness. Consider:
“Young dogs and cats drink milk.”
Two interpretations are possible:
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“Young dogs and young cats drink milk,” or
“Cats and young dogs drink milk.”
Noun-phrase bracketing ambiguity stems from bareness of form
of noun phrases. For example, “complete peace plan” can be
interpreted as a “plan” for “complete peace,” or a “complete”
“peace plan.”
There are additional, more exotic kinds of structural ambiguity,
often arising from uncertainty about the part of speech of a cer-
tain words. Consider:
“Fruit flies like a banana,”
which can mean either “(fruit flies)subj likeverb a banana,” or
“fruitsubj fliesverb like a banana.”
Currently, Learner collects assertions and uses them in further
knowledge acquisition without taking any specific steps to remove any
of these types of ambiguity. Given the ambiguity present in the seed
knowledge base and in the knowledge being collected, there are two
issues to address: (i) how the ambiguity in the knowledge affects the
acquisition algorithm, and (ii) how the ambiguity in the knowledge
affects the usefulness of the collected knowledge for other efforts and
how the ambiguity in the knowledge may be reduced or eliminated.
The next section discusses the impact of ambiguity on the cumu-
lative analogy algorithm, and the following two sections respectively,
discuss which possible uses of the knowledge base are and are not likely
to be hampered by the ambiguity in the knowledge base and how the
ambiguity may be ameliorated.
6.2 Lexical ambiguity: impact on knowl-
edge acquisition
The assertions collected by Learner are quite simple syntactically.
Conjunctions or disjunctions are not allowed, and complex sentence
structure that could lead to structural ambiguity, such as attachment
ambiguity, is rare. In contrast, the assertions often rely on frequently
used words, which tend to have high polysemy counts (that is, have
large numbers of meanings).
Motivated by this observation, I focus on the lexical ambiguity and
its effect on the acquisition algorithm. My analysis is structured ac-
cording to an observation about the places where lexical ambiguity can
arise in applying cumulative analogy.
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Lexical ambiguity can arise in four different places in the process of
applying cumulative analogy:
• Ambiguous target topic of acquisition Otarget ,
• Ambiguous source topic Osrc ,
• Ambiguous word in a property P being used to calculate similar-
ity of Otarget and Osrc , and
• Ambiguous word in a property P being mapped from Osrc onto
Otarget .
The impact of each of the four conditions on the quality of questions
posed by cumulative analogy is examined in turn.
Ambiguous Otarget . Let us consider an example of acquiring knowl-
edge about an ambiguous topic Otarget , namely “shower.” It has
two senses, one similar to “rainfall” and another similar to “bath-
tub.” Assertions about both senses of “shower” will be used in
finding near neighbors, and as a result Select-NN may retrieve
some near neighbors for each sense.
This selection of near neighbors for more than one sense may im-
pact the acquisition in two ways. One is that fewer near neighbors
will be used per sense, therefore limiting the benefit of the noise-
canceling (“cumulative”) quality of the algorithm. This may lead
to questions with less support, and thus perhaps of lower quality,
to be posed. The second way is that questions posed may be
about different senses of the topic, causing some confusion in the
contributor who has to reinterpret which sense of topic is being
used from question to question. In the worst case, some assertions
may be interpretable for either sense of the topic, but have differ-
ent truth values depending on the sense. In such cases, the col-
lected knowledge needs to be disambiguated (using the methods
discussed in Section 6.4) before the collected truth value becomes
useful.
Ambiguous Osrc. When one or more of the source topics Osrc (the
nearest neighbors) returned by Select-NN is ambiguous, the lack
of discrimination about the sense of Osrc will cause the properties
of the wrong sense to be considered for mapping. For example,
if knowledge acquisition topic is “rainfall,” and one of the near
neighbors is the ambiguous concept “shower,” then the asser-
tion “showers have plumbing” may become a candidate for being
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mapped onto “rainfall.” The preference of the Map-Props algo-
rithm for questions that have multiple support (that is, a prefer-
ence for posing questions that were mapped from multiple near
neighbors) will normally act against such questions being posed.
Ambiguous words in a property used to select near neighbors.
Suppose that a given property of a target object participates in
calculating the similarity of the target object to near neighbors.
Further suppose that this property contains lexical (or struc-
tural) ambiguity. Then, the ambiguous property may give rise to
a spurious match to another object. For example, an assertion
“showers can be hot” may match the assertion “wasabi can be
hot,” even if “hot” was used to mean “high in temperature” in
the first case and “spicy” in the second case.
If the total number of assertions known about the target object
is low, or if several such incorrect matches collude, an irrelevant
nearest neighbor will be returned by Select-NN. If summing evi-
dence in Map-Props does not overcome the presence of the irrel-
evant object in the near neighbors, or if several similar to each
other, but irrelevant near neighbors are present, the system will
formulate some (potentially, many) knowledge acquisition ques-
tions that are not relevant to the target topic. Alternately, pres-
ence of one or more irrelevant objects is likely to bias the system
towards posing questions about more general properties, those
that are asserted even about the less relevant objects.
Ambiguity in the property of an assertion posed as a question.
Suppose that a knowledge acquisition question being posed con-
tains ambiguity (including any of the following: ambiguous words
in the property, ambiguous topic of acquisition, or structural
ambiguity). Then, prior to being able to answer the question,
the contributor has to assign an interpretation to the question
that disambiguates this question. This can make the process
of answering the question more difficult for the contributor,
especially if the contributor is unsure about which interpretation
should be answered.
In some cases, the question may be reasonably interpretable in
more than one way. Furthermore, the assertion may have different
truth values depending on how this assertion is interpreted. For
example, consider the two senses of “shower” mentioned above
and the assertion “showers are outside.” Such cases are particu-
larly difficult because in such cases, the collected knowledge needs
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to be disambiguated (as discussed in Section 6.4) before the col-
lected truth value can be used.
As the consideration of the possible cases shows, ambiguity in both
seed and collected by Learner knowledge certainly can affect whether
cumulative analogy (in the form used in this work) generates questions
that are relevant and easy to answer. In some but not all cases, the “cu-
mulative” nature of the algorithm can prevent ambiguity from having
a deleterious effect on the quality of questions being posed.
The next section aims to provide the reader with some feel about
the impact of presence of ambiguity in the collected knowledge base on
the usability of the knowledge base for a variety of AI and NLP tasks.
I comment on which tasks and approaches are and are not sensitive
to ambiguity and speculate on what may differentiate the two kinds of
tasks and approaches.
6.3 Tasks and methods sensitive to ambi-
guity in the knowledge base
In this section, I overview some tasks in artificial intelligence (AI)
and natural language processing (NLP) that could use a commonsense
knowledge base such as that being collected by Learner. For each
task considered, my review focuses on the task’s need for unambiguous
knowledge. The conclusion I draw is that while innovative algorithms
and novel approaches may be able to take advantage of ambiguous
knowledge, many of the well-known and more straight-forward meth-
ods depend on having access to completely unambiguous knowledge.
The next section discusses how the amount of ambiguity in the knowl-
edge collected by Learner can be reduced.
For a variety of tasks, ambiguity in the knowledge is problematic
to approaches which rely on a single assertion to produce their output.
For such approaches, a single piece of ambiguous knowledge can lead
the system astray.
The classic forward and backward chaining methods of rule-based
inference — typically used by expert systems — require unambiguous
knowledge. For example, a rule that asserts “if X is a mouse, then X
can eat cheese” would lead to incorrect conclusions if the distinction
between “mouse” as an input device and a rodent was not made.
Question answering by retrieving relevant assertions from a textual
corpus is often approached by searching for appropriate text without
performing significant inference (Voorhees, 2000). For this task, the
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approaches in which a single textual match can produce an answer
without regard for context or presence or absence of other (perhaps
partial) textual matches. Such simple approaches again rely on a single
piece of evidence to produce their answer, and lexical ambiguity in this
piece of evidence can lead the system astray.
On the other hand, some tasks require usage and some approaches
take advantage of multiple pieces of evidence in their operation. Such
approaches are less vulnerable to lexical ambiguity in the data.
For example, in question answering, accumulating evidence from
many retrieved pieces of text reduces the chance that a particular phras-
ing in a single source will produce a spurious match.
In language processing tasks such as parsing, statistical corpus-
based approaches have enjoyed some success, even with very limited
amount of knowledge put in apriori. For example, Yuret has demon-
strated that structural ambiguity in sentences can be removed on the
basis of lexical attraction between the particular words in the sentence
as observed in the raw examples in the training corpus (Yuret, 1998).
This approach exemplifies leveraging a multitude of ambiguous state-
ments to improve correctness of parsing.
In information retrieval, query expansion is a technique of improving
relevance of retrieved results by expanding the query with additional,
relevant terms. It has been shown that expanding the query with re-
lated, but not disambiguated (for word sense) terms improves quality
of retrieved information (see, for example, Qiu and Frei (1995)).
Finally, by the evidence-summing nature of cumulative analogy,
Learner itself exemplifies a system that is able to perform its
function (knowledge acquisition) by leveraging a multitude of non-
disambiguated assertions. The system typically tolerates noise intro-
duced by ambiguity because of the noise suppressing nature or the
algorithms Select-NN and Map-props, as discussed in Section 4.2.5.
In summary, across a sampling of tasks, there exist both approaches
whose performance strongly requires disambiguated information and
approaches that can work gracefully in the presence of ambiguity.
I feel that ability to cope with ambiguity is an important and de-
sirable feature of an algorithm or an approach, due to ubiquitousness
of ambiguity and the difficulty of eliminating it fully. However, resolv-
ing ambiguity in the collected knowledge can be an important part of
processing knowledge effectively. The following section discusses the
methods of doing so.
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6.4 Ambiguity of the acquired knowledge
can be reduced later
As discussed in the previous section, a number of Artificial Intelligence
and Natural Language Processing tasks and approaches benefit from
unambiguous knowledge. In this section, I discuss further steps that
could be taken to remove ambiguity from the knowledge collected by
Learner. This discussion is meant to provide a starting point for work
that needs to be performed to use knowledge collected by Learner in
a system that requires unambiguous knowledge.
Broadly, disambiguation of large volumes of ambiguous knowledge
at a low cost can be performed by either computer disambiguation
programs or, in the spirit of Learner and the Open Mind Initiative
(Hearst, Hunson and Stork, 1999), by volunteer human contributors.
Based on the syntactic restriction that sentences collected by Lear-
ner do not contain conjunctions, on rarity of complex grammatical
sentence structures in the knowledge collected by Learner, and my
examination of 500 randomly selected assertions, I believe that the most
significant kind of ambiguity in the knowledge collected by Learner
is currently word sense (lexical) ambiguity. Because of this, I focus the
remaining discussion mainly to word sense ambiguity. Section 6.4.1
describes a relevant project on collecting word sense information from
human contributors and presents some data on the volume and the
quality of word sense tagging collected to date by that ongoing project.
Section 6.4.2 overviews some relevant approaches and results from the
extensive literature on automatic (machine) disambiguation of knowl-
edge.
Section 6.4.1 discusses in greater detail acquiring the information
from human contributors, and Section 6.4.2 discusses fully automatic
approaches that remove ambiguity leveraging both disambiguated and
ambiguous knowledge.
6.4.1 Acquiring word sense information from hu-
man contributors
The most direct approach to disambiguating the collected knowledge
may be to turn once more to volunteer contributors on the web. A
system designed to perform collection of word sense information from
volunteer contributors has been fielded (Chklovski and Mihalcea, 2002).
This collaboration between myself and Mihalcea is called Open Mind
Word Expert (OMWE), and is available at the time of writing at
http://teach-computers.org/word-expert.html.
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The project has been fielded in association with the broader Open
Mind Initiative (Hearst, Hunson and Stork, 1999). Open Mind Word
Expert taps volunteer contributors to assign word senses from Word-
Net to words that appear in text excerpts. To exemplify OMWE,
Figure 6.1 presents a screenshot of OMWE collecting word sense infor-
mation about the noun “child.”
Figure 6.1: Open Mind Word Expert (OMWE): A screenshot of col-
lecting knowledge about “children”
The deployed OMWE system already uses some assertions col-
lected by the Open Mind Commonsense effort (Singh, 2002; Singh,
Lin, Mueller, Lim, Perkins and Zhu, 2002), the same source as was
used in forming the seed knowledge base for Learner. A system such
as OMWE could also be directed at disambiguating the knowledge col-
lected by Learner.
As further motivation of viability of the approach, I present some
statistics about the amount of knowledge collected with OMWE and
the reliability of the knowledge collected. In eight months of opera-
tion, it has collected a total of 84261 tagging actions. For every item,
the system collects redundant tagging — each item is tagged twice by
distinct contributors, and agreement between the taggers is tracked, as
detailed in (Chklovski and Mihalcea, 2002).
To gauge the quality of the tagging, an experiment to replicate with
OMWE some previous tagging of the “interest” corpus has been per-
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formed by Mihalcea (R. Mihalcea, personal communication, November
2002). The original “interest” corpus and its tagging are described in
(Bruce and Wiebe, 1994). The original tagging was in Longman Dic-
tionary of Contemporary English (LDOCE) senses, and the OMWE
tagging was in WordNet senses; the two had to be aligned by produc-
ing a map between the WordNet senses and the LDOCE senses.
Out of the 964 items about the noun “interest” for which two
OMWE contributors agreed on the tagging, 876 (90.8%) of the tags
agreed with the original LDOCE tagging (after the mapping).
This data suggests viability of obtaining some or all of the tagging
from human contributors. It does not provide the final answer on what
the best way to proceed may be. Further research will be necessary
to precisely formulate how such disambiguation should proceed: how
many tags per item should be collected, how it should interact with
fully automatic tagging, and what inventory of word senses should be
used for disambiguation.
One particularly important point to explore is what is the correct
“sense inventory,” the set of senses into which words are disambiguated.
Different dictionaries have distinguish different levels of granularity of
a word. Some of the user feedback about the OMWE project has been
that WordNet is too fine grained a dictionary, making the task of human
annotation too onerous for some volunteers. A viable alternative may
be a proposal by Resnik and Yarowsky (Resnik and Yarowsky, 1997),
who argue that the desired, non-arbitrary level of granularity is the
sense inventory that represent senses that have different lexicalizations
present in at least one of a chosen set of languages. For example, if
one of the languages considered is French and another English, and if
French has two distinct words for what English allows usage of only one
word, the two “French” senses should be distinguished in the English
word.
Another interesting line of attack may be to formulate knowledge
acquisition questions that are less ambiguous in the first place. For
example, this could be possible word the word “mouse” by explic-
itly replacing it in the knowledge acquisition question with “computer
mouse,” or “live mouse.” Although an automatic system may not be
capable of finding an unambiguous rephrasing in every case, oppor-
tunistic use of this technique may be an effective tool in reducing the
amount of ambiguity.
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6.4.2 Automatic word sense disambiguation
In this section, I review some results from automatic disambiguation
literature and relate them to disambiguating knowledge collected by
Learner. Traditionally, approaches to automatic disambiguation are
divided into two categories: supervised or unsupervised.
In supervised approaches, a sense tagged corpus of training data is
leveraged to disambiguate ambiguous examples. The disambiguation of
a word in new text is typically carried out by identifying from the sur-
rounding context a set of features that may be indicative of the sense of
the word, and using the exemplars in the training data to find a sense
based on these features. The methods used to relate an instance to the
training data has ranged from neural networks to naive Bayes classifiers
to case-based reasoning. Prior research on word sense disambiguation
has also explored a variety of features that may be useful indicators
of word sense, and includes surrounding nouns, adjacent (to the am-
biguous word) words, parts of speech of the adjacent words, bigrams
present in the context of the word and so on. A number of approaches
are compared on the word line (Mooney, 1996). Additionally, Mihalcea
presents a system that selects which features (from a wide set of such
features as mentioned above) are useful on a per-word basis (Mihalcea,
2002).
Unsupervised approaches assign senses to a completely untagged
corpus. Typically, information about word senses comes from a dic-
tionary entry for this term in a a machine readable dictionary (Lesk,
1986), or from some other starting point provided by a human user
— for example, several “indicator” word pairs in which an ambiguous
word overwhelmingly assumes a certain sense (Yarowsky, 1995).
The state of the art in word sense disambiguation is reflected by
the Senseval competitions.1 Since 1999, these competitions bring to-
gether and evaluate a variety of word sense disambiguation systems on a
common set of test data (and, for supervised systems, provide a corpus
of training data). The best performing supervised systems, when at-
tempting to disambiguate 100% of the Senseval-2 test data, achieved
64% precision with fine-grained set of senses and 71% precision with a
coarser set of senses. For comparison, trained human lexicographers in
creating the training and test corpus, have agreed with their majority
vote 85.5% of the time (Kilgarriff, 2002).
Arguably, the most important distinctions to make for using knowl-
edge in reasoning and further NLP processing is to distinguishing be-
tween the coarsest senses of polysemous words (word with more than
1http://www.itri.bton.ac.uk/events/senseval/.
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one sense). Yarowsky reports an unsupervised algorithm that achieves
more than 96% accuracy on a task involving disambiguation of words
with two very distinct senses (for example “plant” in the sense “liv-
ing plant” or “factory”) between pairs of different senses of a word
(Yarowsky, 1995). Because of its power and simplicity on this (sim-
pler) binary discrimination task, I briefly describe it here and comment
on how it may apply to the data collected by Learner.
Yarowsky’s algorithm leverages two empirical observations, which I
cite from (Yarowsky, 1995):
One sense per collocation: Nearby words provide strong and con-
sistent clues to the sense of a target word, conditional on relative
distance, order and syntactic relationship.
One sense per discourse: The sense of a target word is highly con-
sistent within any given document.
To leverage these observations, the algorithm starts from a few (for
example, manually) identified seed collocations (e.g. “manufacturing
plant” for the “factory” sense, and “plant life” for the living plant
sense). The algorithm then uses the two above assumptions to boot-
strap from the identified instances to generate new instances, iden-
tifying new collocations in documents where known collocations are
present. The task of disambiguating knowledge collected by Learner
differs in the following way: the collected knowledge is not organized
in larger documents. Rather, it exists in sentences that are similar to
one another. I speculate that similar sentences collected by Learner
could be used to play a role similar to the role of larger documents
in Yarowsky’s algorithm. Clearly, additional investigation would be
necessary to conclusively establish applicability of such methods.
As a closing remark, I point out that delaying disambiguation of
knowledge may reduce the total effort expended. This is because many
imprecise assertions can, together, become more precise, as exemplified,
for example by Yarowsky’s bootstrapping algorithm (Yarowsky, 1995).
Additionally, manual disambiguation may be combined with auto-
matic disambiguation in a manner that makes best use of human effort
for tagging carried out partially manually and partially automatically,
both in terms of the amount of manual effort and the overall precision
of the resultant tagging. To derive better improvement of a supervised
algorithm from human disambiguation effort, a kind of active learning
can be employed (Dagan and Engelson, 1995). Specifically, the ma-
chine learning algorithm could identify the data that would be most
useful to learning and request human tagging of such data, a method
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that has been applied in Open Mind Word Expert (Chklovski and Mi-
halcea, 2002). If the automatic disambiguation algorithm is capable of
not providing an answer on instances that are most likely to be tagged
incorrectly by the algorithm, human effort could be directed to those,
raising overall precision. In light of the extensive prior work in the
field of automatic word sense disambiguation, combined with the pos-
sibility of attaining large amounts of human tagging from volunteer
contributors, I believe the prospects for disambiguating the collected
knowledge are good, even though additional work is required to reduce
these observations to practice in a single disambiguation approach.
79
Chapter 7
The Correlated
Universe, or Why
Reasoning by Analogy
Works
A lot of the knowledge acquisition power in this thesis comes from
posing questions by analogy. But why should analogy allow for useful
mappings of properties?
Fundamentally, the underlying assumption behind reasoning by
analogy is that properties of objects in the world (as reported by hu-
mans) are correlated. That is, for any given object O there will likely
exist some objects Os1 . . . Osi that share more properties with can be
expected by chance. For example, both a “dog” and a “cat” have
the following asserted about them: “has a tail,” “eats meat,” “is
a pet.” Under Learner’s criteria for similarity, which will be ex-
plained below, “dog” and “cat” share 42 properties in the knowledge
base, whereas by chance they can only be expected to share 6. Note
that human cognition introduces a bias as to what set of properties
is used to compare objects. The influence if this factor is discussed
further in Section 7.5.
In this chapter, I investigate similarity, analogy, and amount of
correlation quantitatively. This investigation allows us to better gauge
the power of the class of algorithms based on cumulative analogy. Three
methods of analysis are introduced, each characterizing the knowledge
base and the effectiveness of cumulative analogy from a different angle.
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This investigation:
• quantifies the amount of similarity in the knowledge base;
• derives evidence that reasoning by analogy is a well-motivated
knowledge acquisition approach;
• derives a lower bound on how much analogy can accomplish;
• points out limitations of reasoning by analogy.
To establish these results, three methods will be used:
Average similarity histogram This analysis calculates with how
many objects, on average, a given object shares one property,
with how many it shares two, and so on.
Reach of analogy This analysis looks at how far analogy can get us.
That is, if a single property in the knowledge base is held out, in
what percentage of cases can it be established by analogy, mak-
ing specific choices about values of parameters that a simplified
analogy algorithm (without the elaborate weighting of properties
used in Select-NN) would take as inputs.
Nearest-neighbor distance This analysis studies nearest-neighbor
distance. It measures, for each object, how similar the most sim-
ilar object is.
All three analyses shed light on the amount of correlation in the
knowledge base and on the expected applicability of reasoning by anal-
ogy. The first and second analyses only look at assertions of the “is
true” variety. The third analysis also accounts for the “is false” asser-
tions.
Additionally, the analogy-based approach can be used not only to
pose knowledge acquisition questions, but also as a reasoning method
— guesses about the truth or falsehood of an assertion can be made
using the same analogical reasoning. The third analysis speaks to the
correctness of the predictions made by reasoning by analogy.
7.1 Overview of the knowledge base
Recall that Chapter 3 described the way knowledge is represented in
Learner internally. Before delving into the subject of correlation
deeper, I provide some statistics about the knowledge base being ana-
lyzed (the “seed knowledge base,” as is explained below).
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In analyzing applicability of reasoning by analogy to the seed knowl-
edge base, some simplifying assumptions are made.
The chief simplifying assumption made in my analysis is that each
sentence is considered here only as a subj-assertion (i.e. an assertion
about the sentence’s syntactic subject having a property). For example,
“cats have tails” is, for the sake of my analysis, treated as the object
“cat” having the property “have tail.” Doing so allows us to avoid
some thorny issues about double-counting assertions derived from the
same sentence.1
The other difference between the analysis and the algorithm is that
the analysis is performed only on the seed knowledge base (the knowl-
edge gathered without using analogical reasoning by another project,
and that served as the starting point for Learner).
The seed knowledge base was created primarily by asking contrib-
utors to state something, or to fill in the blank by an effort predating
Learner and without my participation (Singh, 2002). Contributors
were never asked to specify a truth value. Only later linguistic process-
ing of assertions such as “birds can fly” and “a worm does not have legs”
interpreted them as A(bird , can fly) and ¬A(worm, have leg).Recall
that I denote that the object Oi has the property Pj by writing
A(Oi, Pj), with A signifying “assertion.”
Because of the approach to knowledge base collection, the over-
whelming majority of the assertions (96.0%) are “is true” assertions.
Note that when several statements map to the same assertion (for exam-
ple, “a cat has a tail” and “cats have tails”), only one of the statements
was automatically selected for inclusion in the analysis.
The essential statistics, including the number of distinct objects,
properties, “is true” assertions and more are presented in Table 7.1.
The analysis focuses on “is true” assertions, returning to the “is false”
assertions in Section 7.4.
There are several things to note about Table 7.1. One observation is
that for 65% of the objects present, only one property is known about
each such object. The assertions about objects with only one property
constitute 17% of all of the assertions. Similarly, 60% of the assertions
are asserted about only one object (and thus cannot, for example, be
expected to be mapped from more than one near neighbor).
These numbers suggest that a fairly large part of the seed knowledge
base is sparsely populated with assertions. More specifically, the seed
KB has a densely populated “core,” tapering off to large sparsely pop-
ulated regions. At the same time, cumulative analogy is a method that
1See Chapter 3 (Representation) for a description of different kinds of assertions
and how they are computed.
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Columns (Properties)
with ≥ 10 with ≥ 2 with one Total
entries entries entry
291 4905 28070 32975
1% 15% 85% 100%
with ≥ 10 723 2108 9282 17119 26401
entries 6% 4% 20% 36% 56%
with ≥ 2 4277 4091 15252 23846 39098
Rows entries 35% 9% 32% 51% 83%
(Objects) with one 8049 1499 3825 4224 8049
entry 65% 3% 8% 9% 17%
Total 12326 5590 19077 28070 47147
100% 13% 40% 60% 100%︸ ︷︷ ︸
#Entries(Assertions)
Table 7.1: Summary of the seed knowledge base. Total numbers of ob-
jects (rows), properties (columns) and entries (assertions) are in bold.
Other counts are for rows, columns and entries when only indicated
subsets of rows of columns are considered. For example, there are 723
objects with at least 10 properties, and 26,401 assertions about these
objects. For clarity, the “is false” entries are not included in these
results.
requires a significant amount of priming, and, as is, it will meaning-
fully apply only on a fraction of the objects in the knowledge base. For
instance, the result of applying cumulative analogy to objects about
which only one property is known is not likely to yield good results.
At the same time, the applicability of cumulative analogy to any given
object about which little is known should be improved by specifying
more about such an object. Specifying approximately ten additional
properties about an object about which little is already known is, in
my experience, quite easy and is supported by the Learner interface.
To further characterize the distribution of knowledge in the seed
knowledge base across objects, Figure 7.1 presents a log-log plot of
the numbers of objects with one, two, and so on properties known
about each object. The values were fitted by an expression of the form
f(x) = Cxp. The values of the two parameters, C (C = 6789) and
p (p = −1.9483) were chosen by fitting the data for 1 ≤ N ≤ 50
to minimize the sum square difference of logarithms of real and fitted
values. The fact that p ≈ −2 suggests that the distribution fits Lotka’s
law (Lotka, 1926). This approximation for the number of objects with
n properties, related to Lotka’s law, is also used in Appendix D.
Lotka has found that the number of authors making n contributions
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in chemistry is approximately 1/n2 of the number of authors making 1
contribution. This observation has consequently been found to apply
in a number of other fields — for example, the number of incoming and
outgoing links of web documents. Lotka’s law is also closely related to
Zipf’s law (Ye-Sho Chen, 1986).
Zipf’s law2 (Zipf, 1949) is the observation that for a variety of phe-
nomena from frequencies of words in a text to populations of cities,
the frequency of an event P can be expressed as a function of its rank
i according to the power-law function Pi ≈ 1/ia with the exponent a
close to 1. Note that while Lotka’s law addresses the number of au-
thors with one, two, and so on publications (or objects with one, two
and so on properties), Zipf’s law addresses the number of properties
of an object with the most properties, the number of properties of the
second-ranking (by number of properties) object, and so on.
7.2 Amount of similarity
How much correlation is present in the seed knowledge base? To the
extent that the seed knowledge base is a collection of assertions that
people hold to be important about objects in the world, the amount
of correlation in the knowledge base reflects how correlated a world is
being described in it. One can imagine both a very correlated world
in which knowing just a few properties of an object enables predicting
very much about it. Conversely, one can imagine a chaotic world where
very little can be derived by analogy. Where on this spectrum does the
seed knowledge base lie?
To make progress on the issue of correlatedness, the question can
be reformulated more concretely:
If an object is selected at random, with how many other
objects would it share one, two, three, . . . , twenty prop-
erties?
Figure 7.2 presents, for N from 1 to 20, a histogram of the num-
ber of objects with which given object, on average, will share exactly
N properties. As a baseline, a histogram is provided for an artificially
generated “uncorrelated world” with the same number of objects, prop-
erties and with the properties obeying the same frequency distribution
as in the real knowledge base.
2See http://linkage.rockefeller.edu/wli/zipf/ for an extensive list of resources
concerning Zipf’s law.
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Figure 7.1: Numbers of objects with N properties in the seed knowledge
base on a log-log scale. The solid line is an expression f(x) = Cxp. C
(C = 6789) and p (p = −1.9483) were chosen by fitting the data for
1 ≤ N ≤ 50 to minimize the sum square difference of logarithms of
real and fitted values. The fact that p ≈ −2 suggests that the data fits
Lotka’s law (Lotka, 1926), which is closely related to Zipf’s law (Zipf,
1949).
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Figure 7.2: Average correlation histogram for the seed knowledge base.
Expected number of objects sharing one, two, and so on properties with
a given object the amount in the real and synthetic, (uncorrelated) case
with the same frequency distribution is shown. The histogram plots,
for different values of N along the X-axis, the number of objects with
which a given object is expected to share N properties (on the log-
scale Y-axis). The data represents the average for 12,326 objects in the
knowledge base.
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Figure 7.3: Similar to Fig. 7.2, calculated only over objects with 10
or more properties. Y-axis is, again, logarithmic. For each of such
723 objects, similarity with all 12,326 objects was measured. Notice
that the number of similar objects decays more slowly in the real case
compared to the “no correlation” case.
Note that Appendix D derives a closed-form approximation for the
“uncorrelated” case. However, deriving the approximation has required
making simplifying assumptions about the number of objects with one,
two and so on properties. Here, I instead present the results for the
decorrelated baseline case derived by simulation, as follows: for each
object Oi, the properties it contains were “decorrelated.” That is, if a
property Pj held for fifty other objects, fifty objects from all the known
objects were selected at random under a uniform probability distribu-
tion and counted as having this property. Then, the same calculation
as for the original case (how many objects it shares N properties with,
for different values of N) was performed. In both the decorrelated and
the original cases, a histogram was computed by averaging across all
objects.
The result is presented in Figure 7.2 (the Y-axis is on a log scale).
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The histogram shows that on average, each object has more similar
objects than can be expected by chance. On average, sharing two
properties is eight and three properties is fifty times more likely than
chance. Because the properties are correlated with each other, the
average number of objects with which exactly one property is shared is
actually lower than could be expected by chance. On average there are
approximately 13.6 such objects rather than the expected by chance
15.6 (note that the lines in Figure 7.2 cross over between one and two,
almost at one). Also note that, on average, there is less than one
object sharing more than two properties with a given object. This
phenomenon is due in part to many objects in the seed KB having only
one property. The amount of correlation that exists for objects about
which more is known is addressed by the following analysis.
As mentioned above, cumulative analogy is a method that needs
sufficient priming to apply. To better illustrate the average similarity
of objects with many properties already known about them, objects
with ten or more properties are analyzed.3 Figure 7.3 presents results
of computing the average similarity histogram ranging over objects with
ten or more properties.
In this case, the amount of similarity between objects is even more
pronounced. For each object of interest one can expect, on average,
to have 1.6 objects that share three properties, on average at least one
object that shares four or more properties with a given object. These
numbers suggest that, for objects about which ten or more properties
are already known, cumulative analogy is likely to find at least some
similar objects from which to map properties meaningfully.
7.3 Reach of analogy
In this section, I quantify what percentage of knowledge can be estab-
lished by generalization by analogy.
Reasoning by analogy can be viewed as mapping properties from
similar objects onto a given object. The absolutely simplest case of
analogy is two objects sharing a property, giving us grounds (however
small) to map other properties of one object onto the other.
This observation inspires a definition. Let’s call property P of object
O1 directly acquirable by analogy on K properties if (i) there is an object
O2 that also has property P , and (ii) O1 and O2 share at least K other
properties.
3The specific threshold of ten used to have special significance in earlier versions
of the system, but currently does not.
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Note that the set of assertions potentially acquirable by analogy
is the superset of the directly acquirable assertions. This is because
acquiring assertions about an object O1 by analogy with some O2 can
cause O1 to become sufficiently similar to some other O3 to permit
additional analogies. I obtain a lower bound on potential acquirability
by calculating direct acquirability.
The question addressed is: what percentage of assertions are di-
rectly acquirable by analogy? That is, if one assertion is held out at
random, for what percentage of cases is it directly acquirable (i.e., for
what percentage of assertions will the algorithm inquire about their
truth)?
Some preliminary observations will help us frame this question cor-
rectly. In a growing knowledge base, some properties will be known
about only one object. Note that these properties could never be ac-
quired if held out, because holding them out removes any trace of their
existence. Some examples of properties that hold for only one object
are as follows:
• “a caterpillar will turn into a butterfly”
• “heart is responsible for pumping blood”
• “typewriters have been mostly replaced by computers”
• “Frascati is an Italian wine”
• “San Francisco is west of Texas”
The above examples suggest that some singleton properties (such
as “will turn into a butterfly”) would not be acquirable by direct
analogy from other assertions by being mapped verbatim from other
objects (because no other objects turn into butterflies), while other
properties such as “is an Italian wine” are probably known about
only one object in the seed knowledge base due to incompleteness in
its coverage.
In the seed knowledge base, there are 28,070 (60%) such assertions.
All calculations in this section are restricted to the remaining 40% of
assertions — those that would be directly analogizable in a knowledge
base describing a fully correlated world.
Furthermore, analogy cannot be expected to apply to objects about
which only one property is known. Restricting attention to objects with
two or more properties, and asking what is the direct acquirability
by analogy on one property, it turns out that 58.8% of 15252 such
assertions are directly acquirable. Using the notation of Reach(N ,M )
to denote the percentage of directly acquirable assertions about objects
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with at least N properties by analogy on M or more properties, the
above can be written as:
Reach(2, 1) = 58.8% (7.1)
Let us investigate some variants of reachability. Restricting atten-
tion only to objects with at least 10 (possibly unique) properties, and
asking questions by analogy based on two properties being shared (di-
rect acquirability by analogy on two properties) results in a universe of
9282 assertions being considered for direct acquirability. It turns out
that 5239 (56.4%) of these assertions are directly acquirable. To put it
another way,
Reach(10, 2) = 56.4%. (7.2)
Note that objects with any number of properties are permitted to serve
as sources of analogy in this analysis.
Considering only objects with at least 20 properties,
Reach(20, 2) = 64.7% (7.3)
of the total of 6958 such assertions are directly acquirable.
Even requiring the source and target of analogy to share at least 4
properties, it turns out that
Reach(20, 4) = 45.9% (7.4)
of these assertions are reachable.
Adopting datamining terminology (Agrawal, Imielinski and Swami,
1993), so far the data has concerned assertions reachable with support
of one (that is, the model was that having just one object of sufficient
similarity was assumed to warrant posing a question). An alternative is
to require that there be at least k objects sharing M properties to war-
rant posing a question. Let us use the notation MultiReach(N,M, k) to
denote the percentage of existing assertions about objects with at least
N properties which are reachable by analogy on M properties from at
least k objects. Given this definition, Reach can be viewed as a special
case of MultiReach, with MultiReach(N,M, 1) = Reach(N,M).
Considering a property of an object O1 reachable only if there are
at least two objects O2 and O3, each sharing at least one other property
with O1, and looking at objects with at least 10 properties, it turns out
that 38.3% of properties are reachable under this definition. To put it
another way,
MultiReach(10, 1, 2) = 38.3% (7.5)
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Overall, reachability between 38.3% and 64.7% has been observed
for different strictnesses and scopes of reachability. Note that the anal-
ysis was restricted to the objects with sufficient number of properties,
with the threshold for the minimum number of properties known vary-
ing between 2 and 20. It seems that the degree of similarity between
objects (presented in the histograms of Section 7.2) does indeed bear
out in the analysis of reach of analogy, allowing the analogical approach
to achieve the reported degree of reach in a real knowledge base. The
results of the above three methods of analysis suggest that acquisition
by analogy from several nearest neighbors is likely to be successful given
a fairly large and correlated knowledge base as a “seed knowledge base”
(such as the seed KB analyzed here). Chapter 8 reports on the results
of an empirical verification of this claim.
It must be noted that this analysis excluded a relatively large set
of properties that hold about only one object. The inability to acquire
by analogy properties mentioned zero times is an important limitation
of the approach.
One extension that I believe can be a powerful next step beyond
direct analogy and can satisfactorily address this issue is discussed in
Chapter 9.2 (Future Work). The proposed extension would formulate
knowledge acquisition questions using the current algorithm, but run
it over a more abstract representation of the assertions present. For
example, recognizing that “sugar is sweet” as asserting “has a (specific
value of) taste” and “Tabasco sauce is spicy” as stating that “has a
(specific value of) taste” could lead the system to infer by the current
mechanism that, for example “salt” or “pepper” also have specific
values of taste. The system could then ask what that value is (i.e. ask
how salt or pepper taste). This would allow Learner to tap related,
not only identical properties in posing its questions.
7.4 Similarity of most similar
Another way to characterize the amount of correlation in the world (as
it is reflected in the knowledge base) is by looking, for each object, at
its similarity to the object most similar to it.
The analysis of similarity of the most similar allows us to study
more rigorously the expected performance of a simple analogy algo-
rithm based on the single nearest neighbor. This complements the
previous section’s more theoretical study of analogy by studying its
direct reach. Also, this analysis will allow us to address the “is false”
assertions.
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Figure 7.4: Nearest neighbor analysis. For each object, the percentage
of “is true” properties shared with its nearest neighbor in the seed
knowledge base has been measured. The X-axis represents the number
of properties of an object (results for objects with same number of
properties have been averaged), so the values for objects with different
numbers of properties can be observed.
First, a bit of notation: objects O1, O2 are said to share a property
P if A(O1, P )∧A(O2, P ). Objects are said to mismatch on a property
P if (¬A(O1, P ) ∧A(O2, P )) ∨ (A(O1, P ) ∧ ¬A(O2, P )).
The number of properties shared with nearest neighbor in the seed
knowledge base is presented in Figure 7.4. This figure plots average
results for objects with 2,3,. . ., 25 properties along the X axis. The
Y axis represents the percentage of properties shared with the nearest
neighbor. Error bars of one standard deviation in either direction are
also plotted. The nearest neighbor for a given object was computed by
selecting the object that shares the most “is true” properties, breaking
ties deterministically.
The histogram shows that for objects with more than five proper-
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ties, an object can be expected to share about 20% of its properties
with its nearest neighbor. Note that unique properties are included in
the denominator in this analysis. The figure also shows that 68% of
such objects (those within one standard deviation of the mean) share
between 10% and 30% of their properties with their nearest neighbor.
The general pattern is violated by objects with twenty-four properties,
which may be attributable to scarcity of the data.
Recall that 60% of the assertions in the seed knowledge base assert
a property that holds for only one object. These assertions clearly will
not be shared with the nearest neighbor. When these are excluded
from consideration, it turns out that there are 19,077 assertions that
assert properties that hold for more than one object (see Table 7.1), and
11,190 (58.6%) of these assertions are shared with the nearest neighbor.
Once again, this points to presence of strong correlations in the data,
and motivates application of nearest neighbor based techniques to such
knowledge acquisition tags.
7.4.1 Mismatches
In this section, I examine the number of mismatches of truth values
of identical properties that an object has with its nearest neighbor.
For the purposes of this analysis, nearest neighbors are computed by
attending solely to “is true” assertions.
As mentioned above, objects share a total of 11,190 “is true” prop-
erties with their nearest neighbors (of a total of 47,147 assertions in the
seed knowledge base). They also agree with the nearest neighbor on
an “is false” property for 170 properties (of a total of 2,482 “is false”
properties in the seed knowledge base). Finally, they mismatch on a
property in 593 cases, 257 of them being the nearest neighbor having
an “is false” and the object itself having an “is true” property.
This information allows us to answer an interesting question.
Namely, if the nearest neighbor is used to predict properties of an
object, how often would the prediction be correct? (Disregarding the
effect that holding out an “is true” property could change the nearest
neighbor). This analysis allows some insight into expected success of
using nearest neighbors not only to posing questions, but to actually
use them in analogical reasoning to predict what is and is not true.
If a single nearest neighbor is determined using all properties of the
object, and then truth values of its properties are used in lieu of the
known truth values of properties asserted about the target object, the
truth value of an “is true” property would be predicted correctly in
11,689 cases, and incorrectly in 257 (correct 97.8% of the time). The
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truth value “is false” would be correctly predicted in 170 cases and
incorrectly in 336 cases (correct 33.5% of the time). Overall, we’ll be
correct in 95.2% of the cases. Note that these numbers, including the
correctness overall, are affected by the dominance of “is true” asser-
tions in the knowledge base. The baseline strategy of always guessing
“is true” for every assertion would correctly guess 100% of “is true”
and 0% of “is false” assertions, being correct in 95.9% of the cases. In
effect, predicting from the single nearest neighbor has traded off cor-
rectly predicting 170 truth values of “is false” assertions for incorrectly
predicting 257 “is true” assertions. These numbers point to the bias
that exists (and perhaps the limitation of the “single nearest neigh-
bor” strategy examined) in the case of a knowledge base unbalanced
in terms of proportion of “is true” and “is false” assertions. It would
be interesting to see what the picture looks like in a more balanced
knowledge base which has not been biased by using analogy to extend
it.
In practice, a hypothesis can be formed by combining evidence from
several near neighbors (as the implemented KA algorithm does), which
should have both higher coverage and more accurate predictions.
Discovering exceptions in truth values (such as “penguins can fly”
is false) is part of an accurate description of the world and hence is part
of the desired set of the assertions to acquire. I expect that acquisition
using nearest neighbors to uncover many “near miss” (Winston, 1972)
mismatches in truth values that were not elicited by the methodology
used to construct the seed knowledge base, which contains predomi-
nantly “is true” assertions.
7.5 On the origin of similarity
In the previous sections, I have addressed the amount of similarity. In
this section, I focus on the epistemological sources of similarity.
What are the origins of similar assertions being made about sim-
ilar objects? It seems that at least two sources of similarity can be
identified.
Synonymy Similar things will be stated about “car” and
“automobile.” The origin of this correlation is lexical. (How-
ever, note that the word “car” has usages which “automobile”
does not — for example, the seed knowledge base contains the
assertion “trains pull cars,” referring to the “railroad car” sense
of car).
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Taxonomic proximity This is probably the most familiar kind of
similarity. A “cat” and a “dog” are both “pets” and “animals”,
“TV” and “radio” are both “consumer electronics,” and
“apple” and “pear” are both “fruit.” Some objects in the
world (animals, plants) are similar for evolutionary reasons, and
other, man-made objects are similar because they were manufac-
tured to serve similar functions in our lives.
In addition to similarity between objects (two objects sharing many
properties), there is also a dual situation of a pair of properties being
correlated across many objects. The correlation between properties
seems to be classifiable into three classes. Two of these classes paral-
lel the causes for similarity between objects: they are synonymy and
taxonomic proximity between terms used in properties.
Similarity of properties due to synonymy is exemplified by the fol-
lowing: the verb “hold” can mean the same as “contain,” which gives
rise to pairs of correlated properties such as “can hold water” and
“sometimes contain water”, which are both true of “cups,” “bot-
tles,” and “bathtubs,” and are both false of “books,” “keys,” and
“knives.” Taxonomic similarity of properties is exemplified by the fol-
lowing: “rivers” and “seas” are both kinds of a large body of water, giv-
ing rise to correlated assertions “(fish) live in the river/sea”, “(yachts)
sail on rivers/seas”, “(a person) can go swimming in a river/sea”.
Unlike objects, however, a property asserts something about an ob-
ject. Because of this greater complexity, there is an additional feature of
properties. They can be correlated because one semantically implies the
other. For example, “have wings” and “can fly” are correlated. Some-
times properties are correlated because they have a common cause, as
in this example: for comfort, most enclosures made for humans typ-
ically require both a way to enter and exit the enclosure, and a way
to observe the outside. Hence, enclosures that “have doors” (such as
houses, cars, airplanes), usually “have windows” as well.
Based on the observation that there is property-based correlation
in addition to object-based correlation, it should be possible to pose
questions by similarity of properties rather than objects. For simplicity,
similarity of two properties can be measured by the number of objects
that they are both asserted about. It turns out that while there are
more properties than objects, direct acquirability from correlation of
properties can be as high as direct acquirability from correlation of
objects.
For example, restricting to objects with 10 or more properties and
properties that hold for 10 or more objects, direct acquirability by
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analogy on two properties (based on object similarity) is 68.7% (1448
of 2108 assertions). Under the same restrictions, the direct acquirability
by two objects (based on similarity of properties) is 69.4% (1462 of 2108
assertions). Considering the similarity by four rather than by two on
the same set of assertions results in direct acquirability of 37.3% and
34.0% for the “by objects” and “by properties” cases, respectively.
It is possible that combining these two methods would yield bet-
ter question quality than each method alone. Even more importantly,
presence of the observed degree of correlation between properties indi-
cates that it may be possible to eliminate posing “redundant” (highly
correlated) questions about an object in the knowledge acquisition in-
terface.
Overall, it seems that similarity stemming from all of the described
causes is present in the knowledge base. The knowledge base exhibits a
degree of similarity that justifies approaching knowledge acquisition via
nearest neighbor methods. Similarity stems from semantic relationships
between pairs of objects and between pairs of properties, and exploiting
both may yield more effective knowledge acquisition methods.
When two categories of objects share many properties, such cat-
egories are similar. However, to the extent that these categories do
not describe the same objects, there will also necessarily be differences
between the categories. The need to discern the differences (to reason
correctly about a given category or situation) is what gives rise to the
categories in human descriptions of the world in the first place. As has
been explored by Winston (1978), when a category is used as a source
in a metaphor (an analogy), the features being transfered are likely to
be those that differentiate the source category from the similar to it
categories. For example, when the term “fox” is used in the assertion
“Robbie is like a fox,” what is meant is probably that “Robbie” has
the features that distinguish a “fox” from other animals. That is, given
some conventional knowledge about foxes, Robbie may be particularly
clever or cunning.
Because differences between categories are innate to the notion of
categorization, it can be expected that every pair of categories should
have some mismatching features and that most categories should have
characteristic features.
Having discussed the origins of similarity and presence of differ-
ences, I examine the issue of similarity judgments being dependent on
the set of features chosen to describe the objects being compared. It
seems that the choice of features, even when it expresses equivalent
information, can affect which objects are considered similar and which
are not.
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Consider the following:
Suppose we use the two features blind-in-left-eye and
blind-in-right-eye. Then the four possible objects are
{0, 0}, {0, 1}, {1, 0}, and {1, 1}, with their obvious inter-
pretations. Suppose Alan is blind in his left eye only {1, 0},
Bob blind in his right eye only {0, 1}, and Charlie blind in
both eyes {1, 1}. Then Alan and Bob are equally dissim-
ilar to Charlie (according to [Learner’s similarity] mea-
sure). But suppose instead we employ an equivalent rep-
resentation: blind-in-left-eye and same-in-both-eyes.
In this second representation the four objects above are rep-
resented: {0, 1}, {0, 0}, {1, 1} and {1, 0}. Now Alan {1, 0}
and Bob {0, 0} are not equally dissimilar to Charlie {1, 1}
(personal communication, D. Stork, 2002). See also Duda,
Hart and Stork (2000, pp. 458–461).
This issue is related to the well known “theorem of the ugly duck-
ling” (Watanabe, 1969) which states that, given a set of objects and a
set of features that allows any two objects being compared to be distin-
guished, in the absolute absence of bias any two objects share the same
number of predicates defined over the set of features. The theorem de-
rives its somewhat fanciful name from the counterintuitive illustrative
example that, in the absence of bias, given two ducks and one “ugly
duckling,” the two ducks are equally dissimilar from each other as each
one is from the “ugly duckling.”
The approach adopted in this work, however, does introduce a
strong bias. Similarity is measured by computing (weighted) sums of
the number of matching features and subtracting an (also weighted)
number of mismatching features. By counting the number of match-
ing features rather than the number of all predicates formed from the
features, comparisons are made according to the simple constructs (fea-
tures) that the human contributors have formulated.
The issue of using slightly different features resulting in different
similarity judgments has a more direct relevance to Learner’s sim-
ilarity judgments. Indeed, it seems that in some cases the exact set
of features can make some pairs of objects more and some less similar.
However, the investigation in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 has provided a prima
facie argument that similarity between the collected sets of features can
be used to successfully predict presence of other features.
Overall, in this work, I take a descriptive approach to common
sense, seeking to collect salient elicitable knowledge about concepts,
rather than, for example, treat concepts as predicates which need to
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be minimally defined in terms of other predicates to be distinguishable
from other concepts. By taking the more descriptive stance in this
work, I collect descriptive knowledge thought to be the correct level
of description in the naive semantics tradition. Naive semantics is
further contrasted with formal logic and some “semantic primitives”
approaches in Dahlgren et al. (1989).
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Chapter 8
Results
In this chapter, I (i) present evidence that Learner’s knowledge ac-
quisition power indeed stems from reasoning by analogy from similar
objects, and (ii) present the results of running the Learner on a public
web site
http://teach-computers.org/learner.html
over the course of two months.
Specifically, the following data is presented:
• How the quality of the questions compares with the quality of
questions generated by an ablated version of the algorithm that
poses questions without using any notion of similarity,
• The amount and kinds of knowledge collected, (percentage of tax-
onomic statements, part-of statements, etc.), and how it compares
with data available for other wide coverage knowledge bases,
• Overall statistics of contributor behavior (average amount con-
tributed in one visit, number of repeat visits from the same com-
puter, and so on).
• The contributor feedback that was gathered as the system was
run,
• My own impressions (with discussion) of the system’s current
limitations.
In my approach to evaluating knowledge acquisition, some prior
work has served as an inspiration. A relatively recent discussion of
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methodology for evaluating knowledge acquisition by Tallis et al. can
be found in (Tallis, Kim and Gil, 1999). Prior investigations by Cohen
et al. and by Gaines (on different knowledge bases) have quantitatively
studied the usefulness of prior knowledge for knowledge acquisition (see
(Cohen, Chaudhri, Pease and Schrag, 1999; Gaines, 1989)). Effective-
ness of knowledge acquisition has also been studied specifically for Ex-
pect (Kim and Gil, 2000), Soar (Yost, 1993), and Prote´ge´-2000 (Noy,
Grosso and Musen, 2000).
8.1 Quality of questions: cumulative anal-
ogy vs. a baseline
A central contribution of the thesis is a demonstration of power of
surface-level cumulative analogy for knowledge acquisition. In this sec-
tion, I present evidence that the performance of the system indeed
comes from analogical reasoning from similar objects.
To quantify the benefit of analogy from similar objects, I have con-
ducted an evaluation comparing full analogy as described in Section 4.2
against an ablated (control) version which, instead of formulating ques-
tions by mapping properties from similar objects Osrci , formulated
questions by mapping properties from random objects in the knowl-
edge base.
Specifically, the following experiment was performed:
• A test mode was introduced into the interface. The test mode
was subdivided into two test conditions:
– Normal condition, in which similar topics are chosen as
they normally are, and
– Random-sources (control) condition, in which 10 sources
for analogy are chosen not based on their similarity, but at
random with equal probability among the the objects in the
knowledge base. In other words, Select-NN (Figure 4.5)
was replaced with a simple stub, but Map-Props (Fig-
ure 4.8) and all the consequent filtering mechanisms were
left intact.
The contributor was informed that the page presented is in “test
mode,” but was not told which condition they are seeing. The
exact message presented in red on the page was as follows:
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This page has been generated in TEST mode. The questions
generated may differ in quality from the normal mode. At
present, we are injecting TEST mode pages at random to as-
sess what factors affect quality of questions. Please answer the
questions as you normally would.
The “test mode” pages were injected at random in place of normal
pages with probability 0.3.
• The test condition (“normal” or “random-sources,” the user re-
sponses, and whether the question was altered was logged (recall
that users may alter the question if they wish). Only replies to
the unaltered questions were considered. The rates of alteration
of questions in either condition were too low to draw statistical
conclusions about them.
• The logs were analyzed by taking, for each test condition, the first
1000 replies to unmodified questions and counting the number of
questions answered “yes,” “no” and so on.
I propose that the system that poses fewer nonsensical questions,
as well as does not have a very high rate of “no” answers, with other
factors being equal, is better at knowledge acquisition. The reason for
valuing “is true” assertions more than “is false” has to do with the fact
that, in a sense, there are many more false assertions than true ones.
Another way of putting it is that many “nonsense” statements admit
the “is false” answer, as will be shown in examples below.
The results are presented in Figure 8.1. The confidence intervals
for the values reported were calculated under the assumption that the
responses in each condition follow a multinomial distribution. The
confidence intervals for any value do not exceed ±3.1%, and are smaller
than ±2% for values less than 10%.
Of questions generated by analogy, 45% were answered “yes”; the
fraction for questions generated from random sources (the control
group) was 8%. At the same time, 13% of the questions generated
by analogy were ranked as “nonsense,” compared with the rate of 26%
for the control group. Finally, 28% of those generated by analogy versus
60% of those in the control group were answered “no.”
The prevalence of the answer “no” (rather than the answer “non-
sense”) in the random sources (control) group may seem surprising. In
fact, many of the questions answered “no” are very unusual, but can be
answered “no.” Here are some examples from the data collected in the
random-sources condition. All of the following were answered “no”:
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(a) No similarity used (control).
(b) Full similarity used.
Figure 8.1: Answers to questions generated by analogy from (a) ran-
domly selected and (b) most similar topics.
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• “a tea is used to store money”
• “a keyboard is an ear”
• “insects exist to sing”
• “corn is a cigarette”
In all, results indicate that eliminating similarity reduces the qual-
ity of the questions posed, shifting an additional 45% of all answered
questions into categories “nonsense” or “no.”
8.2 Comparison of the resultant knowl-
edge base to the seed knowledge base
In this section, I present the changes in the knowledge base as a result
of collecting knowledge with the Learner. The analyses presented
roughly follow the analyses of the seed knowledge base in Section 7. The
figures summarizing the seed knowledge base are reproduced here from
Section 7; these figures are presented together with equivalent figures
summarizing the resultant knowledge base. Additional comparison by
the kinds of knowledge collected (classifying the knowledge in the seed
and resultant knowledge bases into ontological, meronymical (part-of),
and so on) is presented in Section 8.3.
Tables 8.1(a) and 8.1(b) present the gross picture of how the distri-
bution of “is true” assertions in the seed and the resultant knowledge
bases.
Figures 8.2(a) and 8.2(b) present, on a log-log scale, the numbers
of objects with one, two, and so on properties in the seed and resultant
knowledge bases, respectively. They also fit power law curves (which
are straight lines in log-log plots) to the data. Note that in the resul-
tant knowledge base, the power has decreased in magnitude from 1.95
to 1.80. One speculation as to the mechanism effecting this change is
that more has been learned about “popular” objects — those about
which several properties were already known, while very few new ob-
jects (which would have few properties) were introduced.
Figures 8.3(a) and 8.3(b) present the average similarity data for seed
and resultant knowledge bases, respectively. Refer to Section 7.2 for an
explanation. Note that in the resultant knowledge base, the number
of objects sharing two properties is at the level expected by chance.
One possible interpretation of this data is that the similarity in the
resultant knowledge base has been “pushed out” to greater number of
properties. That is, instead of a higher than expected number of objects
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Columns (Properties)
with ≥ 10 with ≥ 2 with one Total
entries entries entry
291 4905 28070 32975
1% 15% 85% 100%
with ≥ 10 723 2108 9282 17119 26401
entries 6% 4% 20% 36% 56%
with ≥ 2 4277 4091 15252 23846 39098
Rows entries 35% 9% 32% 51% 83%
(Objects) with one 8049 1499 3825 4224 8049
entry 65% 3% 8% 9% 17%
Total 12326 5590 19077 28070 47147
100% 13% 40% 60% 100%︸ ︷︷ ︸
#Entries(Assertions)
(a) Summary of the seed knowledge base, reproduced from Table 7.1.
Columns (Properties)
with ≥ 10 with ≥ 2 with one Total
entries entries entry
718 7870 30686 38556
2% 20% 80% 100%
with ≥ 10 982 11538 26888 19958 46846
entries 8% 17% 39% 29% 69%
with ≥ 2 4633 13988 33472 26432 59904
Rows entries 36% 21% 49% 39% 88%
(Objects) with one 8191 1674 3937 4254 8191
entry 64% 2% 6% 6% 12%
Total 12824 15662 37409 30686 68095
100% 23% 55% 45% 100%︸ ︷︷ ︸
#Entries(Assertions)
(b) Summary of the resultant knowledge base.
Table 8.1: Summaries of the seed and resultant knowledge bases. Total
numbers of objects (rows), properties (columns) and entries (assertions)
are in bold. Other counts are for rows, columns and entries when only
indicated subsets of rows and columns are considered. For example,
in the resultant knowledge base there are 982 objects with at least 10
properties, and 46,846 assertions about these objects. For clarity, the
“is false” entries are not included in these results.
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(a) Seed knowledge base. The solid line is the fitted ex-
pression f(x) = Cxp with C = 6, 789 and p = −1.9483.
This figure reproduces Figure 7.1. The values seem to fit
Lotka’s law.
(b) Resultant knowledge base. The solid line is the fitted
expression f(x) = Cxp, with C = 5, 545 and p = −1.7957.
Figure 8.2: Number of objects with N properties in the seed and
resultant knowledge bases and a power law fits of the data (log-log
plots). In both cases, the power law fit is given by an expression of the
form f(x) = Cxp. Values for C and p were chosen by fitting the data
for 1 ≤ N ≤ 50 to minimize the sum square difference of logarithms of
real and fitted values.
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sharing only two properties, similar objects now tend to share three
or more properties. Learner poses up to 20 knowledge acquisition
questions per one acquisition screen. Usually, it can be expected that
the contributor will answer many of those affirmatively. A similar result
can be observed when only objects with ten or more properties are
evaluated for presence of similar objects, as presented in Figures 8.4(a)
and 8.4(b).
Finally, Figures 8.5(a) and 8.5(b) present the percentage of all prop-
erties (including unique properties — those that hold for only one ob-
ject) shared with the nearest neighbors in the seed and the resultant
knowledge bases, respectively. The number of properties shared with
the nearest neighbor has indeed grown for almost all categories consid-
ered, with larger percentage gains for objects with more properties.
8.3 Classes of knowledge acquired
In this section, I examine in greater depth the kinds of knowledge ac-
quired by Learner. I introduce a classification scheme for the collected
assertions, report on the total and per-class numbers of assertions col-
lected, and, for comparison purposes, report statistics on some existing
knowledge bases.
8.3.1 Knowledge classification scheme
There currently does not seem to be an agreed upon classification
scheme for assertions. Some existing approaches to classifying knowl-
edge (together with the data for some knowledge bases) are reported
in Section 8.3.3.
I introduce a slightly different classification scheme with thirteen
classes, which captures the most common classes of assertions referred
to in other literature. The scheme I adopt implemented a set of simple
recognizers that has access to the (Link Grammar Parser) parsing of an
assertion, parts of speech of individual lexical items, and conjugation
information for verbs and nouns. The classes, with examples and fea-
tures used for classification, are presented in Table 8.2. Each assertion
is assigned to exactly one class by the automatic classifier; assertions
that are not assignable to any class are placed in the fourteenth, “UNK”
(unknown) class.
The fact that the linguistically expressed by contributors knowledge
can be classified in these categories deserves further attention. While
at the end of Section 3.2 I briefly discuss the kinds of commonsense
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(a) Seed knowledge base. This figure reproduces Figure 7.2.
(b) Resultant knowledge base.
Figure 8.3: Average correlation histograms for the (a) seed and (b)
resultant knowledge bases. Average amount of correlation in the real
and synthetic, (uncorrelated) cases with same frequency distributions
are shown. The histograms plots, for different values of N along the
X-axis, the number of objects with which a given object is expected to
share N properties (on a log-scale Y-axis).
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(a) Average correlation histogram for objects with ≥ 10 prop-
erties in seed KB. Reproduces Figure 7.3.
(b) Average correlation histogram for objects with ≥ 10 properties in
resultant KB.
Figure 8.4: Average correlation histograms for objects in the (a) seed
and (b) resultant knowledge bases with ≥ 10 properties. Average
amount of correlation in the real and synthetic, (uncorrelated) case
with same frequency distribution is shown. The histograms plot, for
different values of N along the X-axis, the number of objects with which
a given object is expected to share N properties (on the log-scale Y-
axis). 108
(a) Seed knowledge base. Reproduces Figure 7.4.
(b) Resultant knowledge base.
Figure 8.5: Nearest neighbor analysis for (a) seed and (b) resultant
knowledge bases. For each object, the percentage of “is true” properties
shared with its nearest neighbor in the resultant knowledge base has
been measured. The X-axis represents the number of properties of an
object (results for objects with same number of properties have been
averaged), so the values for objects with different numbers of properties
can be observed.
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Name Example(s)
ISA a cat isbe an animalnoun,
horses arebe quadrupedsnoun,
an armchair is a kind of chair.
QUALIFIED-ISA swans arebe whiteadj birdsnoun.
DEFINITION phones arebe devices (for making calls)prep-phrase.
ACTION cats eatverb mice.
QUALIFIED-ACTION kangaroos jumpverb (very high)prep-phrase,
kangaroos can jumpverb (over fences)prep-phrase.
ACTION-ON horses can bebe riddenpast-part,
PROPERTY a swan isbe whiteadj,
airplanes arebe aerodynamicadj.
COMPARATIVE horses are faster than people,
horses eat more than people.
FUNCTION horses are used (for transportation)prep-phrase.
MADE-OF a window is made of glass,
audiences consist of people.
PART-OF a wheel isbe part of a car,
a kitchen isbe in a house.
REQUIRES writing requires literacy,
success requires extra effort.
POSSIBLE-STATE horses can bebe runningpres-part,
water can bebe boilingpres-part.
Table 8.2: Categories of assertions (with examples). Italicized words
and syntactic subscripts in examples are cues used by the classifier to
classify this example. “be” stands for a form of the verb “be”; “prep-
phrase” stands for “prepositional phrase,” “past-part” stands for a verb
in the “past participle” tense and “pres-part” stands for a verb in the
“present participle” tense.
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knowledge that lies beyond stating properties of objects, in this section
I presented a categorization of assertions about properties of objects.
While many classifications are possible, the above classification maps
out some of the territory. This classification scheme suggests, for ex-
ample, that if contributors are to be queried for particular kinds of
knowledge, the contributors should be queried for all of the strongly
populated categories to acquire a significant fraction of the possible
assertions about objects and their properties.
8.3.2 Knowledge collected
Over a two month period of collecting knowledge, a total of 42,659
assertions were collected. The distribution by the answer received is
presented in Table 8.3. In all, 20,315 (47.6%) were “is true” asser-
tions, 10,857 were (25.5%) “is false” and 3,842 (9.0%) were ranked as
“nonsensical question.”
For comparison, consider that the seed knowledge base contained
about 53,447 assertions, of which 96% were “is true” assertions. If
only the “is true” and “is false” assertions are considered, the total
knowledge base has been grown by 31,172 assertions, or 58.3%, in two
months.
Answer Num Entries % of Total
Yes 20,315 47.6%
No 10,857 25.5%
Some/Sometimes 5,487 12.9%
Matter of Opinion 2,158 5.1%
Nonsensical Question 3,842 9.0%
Total: 42,659 100.0%
Table 8.3: Number of assertions collected, by answer received.
The distribution of knowledge by kind of knowledge in both seed
and resultant knowledge bases are presented in Table 8.4. The pro-
portions of kinds of knowledge in the seed knowledge base may be in-
dicative of what human contributors spontaneously volunteer, but also
reflect the bias of the specific knowledge acquisition templates used
in the construction of Open Mind Common Sense(Singh, 2002; Singh,
Lin, Mueller, Lim, Perkins and Zhu, 2002), from which the seed knowl-
edge base used in this work has been extracted. Approximately 5.5%
of all assertions could not be classified because they used the highly
ambiguous verb “have” to connect the syntactic subject and object of
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the assertion. By manually disambiguating two hundred cases with the
verb “have” in the resultant knowledge base, I estimate that the verb
is used to mean “part of,” in approximately 60% of the cases. Some
examples of such usage are “horses have manes” and “cups have han-
dles.” Such assertions were not included in the percentage of “part of”
assertions because they were ambiguous. The main verb “have” can
also mean “owns” as in “people sometimes have cars”, or something
else: “children have parents,” “every state has a state flower,” “a dog
can have a litter of puppies,” “people have breakfast in the morning.”
Overall, the distribution of the acquired knowledge closely tracks
that of the knowledge in the original knowledge base. More than one
explanation is possible for this phenomenon: the distribution of the
knowledge acquired by Learner may follow the distribution of the
knowledge in the seed knowledge base, or both the acquired and the
seed knowledge may reflect a “natural” distribution of assertions that
arises in collection from human contributors. Although it is difficult to
differentiate without further experimentation, knowledge of how Lear-
ner operates may favor the former explanation — for example, if the
seed knowledge base was heavily skewed towards taxonomic knowl-
edge, the collection process would presumably also pose many ques-
tions about taxonomic relationships. If the collection process indeed
follows the biases in the seed knowledge base, this property of knowl-
edge acquisition by analogy may be exploited in future work to collect
the kinds of knowledge which are most useful.
8.3.3 Other knowledge bases
In this section, I compare the kinds of knowledge collected by Learner
with the kinds of knowledge aggregated in other knowledge bases.
There are several prior commonsense knowledge bases. The pur-
poses of their construction have varied from primarily enabling ma-
chine translation and story understanding (MindNet (Dolan, Vander-
wende and Richardson, 1993; Richardson, Vanderwende and Dolan,
1993) and ThoughtTreasure, (Mueller, 2000)) to, more broadly, being
a linguistic database (WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998; Miller, 1998)) and en-
abling reasoning via resolution theorem proving (CYC and OpenCyc,
(Guha and Lenat, 1994; OpenCyc, 2001)). The methods of construc-
tion for the knowledge bases have varied from hand-coding by experts
(e.g. WordNet, ThoughtTreasure, CYC) to automatic extraction from
machine-readable dictionaries (MindNet).
Constructing a sufficiently large knowledge base is by no means a
simple endeavor, and even the largest of these are by no means com-
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Assertion Type Num in % in Num % Num in % in
Seed KB Seed KB acqrd acqrd Rslt KB Rslt KB
ACTION 16250 30.4% 9696 30.7% 25946 30.5%
QUALIFIED-ACTION 9680 18.1% 4993 15.8% 14673 17.2%
PROPERTY 5056 9.5% 3202 10.1% 8258 9.7%
UNK∗ 4809 9.0% 2832 8.9% 7632 9.0%
ISA 4653 8.7% 3025 9.6% 7678 9.0%
ACTION-ON 3372 6.3% 2276 7.2% 5648 6.6%
FUNCTION 2151 4.0% 2080 6.6% 4231 5.0%
PART-OF 1863 3.5% 977 3.1% 2840 3.3%
QUALIFIED-ISA 1748 3.3% 533 1.7% 2281 2.7%
REQUIRES 1656 3.1% 274 0.9% 1930 2.3%
DEFINITION 1005 1.9% 620 2.0% 1625 1.9%
COMPARATIVE 605 1.1% 670 2.1% 1275 1.5%
MADE-OF 407 0.8% 284 0.9% 691 0.8%
POSSIBLE-STATE 192 0.4% 167 0.5% 359 0.4%
TOTAL 53447 100.0% 31620 100.0% 85067 100.0%
Table 8.4: Numbers of assertions by type. First two columns of data
present data for the seed knowledge base, middle two for the data ac-
quired by Learner and the last two for the resultant knowledge base
(seed KB plus the acquired knowledge). ‘UNK’ represents assertions
that could not be automatically classified. Approximately 5.5% of all
assertions could not be classified because they used the highly ambigu-
ous verb “have,” which means “part of,” in approximately 60% of the
cases in the resultant knowledge base (e.g. “horses have manes”), but
can also mean “owns”(e.g. “people sometimes have cars”) or something
else (e.g. “children have parents,” “every state has a state flower”).
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plete (the difficulty of authoring a large knowledge base is one of the
motivations for deploying the Learner system).
Two tables published by Mueller (Mueller, 1999, 2002) on some ex-
isting knowledge bases have been reproduced here. Table 8.5 presents,
for different knowledge bases, the number of concepts, the number of
a-kind-of and is-a assertions, the number of part-of or material-of as-
sertions, and the number of other assertions.
Name Concepts ako/isa part-of/ Other
material-of
Cyc∗ 149,052 97,172 16,000+ 1,497,000
Cyc Upper Ontology 2.1 2,846 7,161 0 2,579
(Cycorp, 1997)
Mikrokosmos (Mahesh, 1996) 4,500 - - -
MindNet 45,000 47,000 14,100 32,900
(Richardson et al., 1993, p. 9)
SENSUS (Knight and Luk, 1994) 70,000 - - -
ThoughtTreasure 0.00022 27,093 28,818 666 21,821
(Mueller, 2000)
WordNet 1.6 99,642 78,446 19,441 42,700
(Fellbaum, 1998; Miller, 1998)
Table 8.5: Number of concepts and common relations in other knowl-
edge bases. Note that relations in MindNet, being automatically ex-
tracted from dictionary text, are not always correct. Adapted (with
permission) from Mueller (1999). ∗Data about the CYC system has
been obtained separately and describes KB 616 version of the CYC
knowledge base as of January 2003 (personal communication, K. Pan-
ton, 2003). In addition to 97,172 “genls” assertions (expressing, e.g.,
that all apples are fruit), CYC also contains 435,622 “isa” assertions
(expressing such assertions as “United States is a country” and “Father-
of is a two-place predicate”) The “other” figure includes the “isa” asser-
tions, but does not include additional 288,450 “bookkeeping” assertions
stating such meta information as who and when added the knowledge.
Another currently growing knowledge base is the Open Mind Com-
mon Sense (OMCS), from which the seed knowledge for Learner has
been extracted. OMCS, like Learner, does not disambiguate the as-
sertions it collects. Furthermore, OMCS does not provide any syntac-
tic or semantic filters on contributor input, and does not collect truth
values. OMCS, however, has wider coverage — its scope includes col-
lection of stories, descriptions of images, and so on.
The data summarizing OMCS as of early 2002 is reproduced in Ta-
ble 8.7. As of January 13th, 2003 the knowledge base had 494,489 con-
tributions, with identical or similar assertions sometimes contributed
more than once (personal communication, P. Singh, 2003).
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Type of
relation
OpenCyc 0.6.0,
2002-04-03
ThoughtTreasure
0.00022,1999-12-08
Explanation
hierarchical 37,755 (62.0%) 28,818 (56.2%) ISA, collections
typing 20,293 (33.3%) 845 (1.6%) argument types,
selectional restrictions
other 1,246 (2.0%) 16,518 (32.2%) other
definition 1,005 (1.7%) 25 (0.0%) concept definitions,
equivalences
implies 569 (0.9%) 0 (0.0%) logical implications
part 10 (0.0%) 807 (1.6%) object parts and
substances
object property 0 (0.0%) 422 (0.8%) object properties
spatial 0 (0.0%) 1,796 (3.5%) typical locations,
arrangements on grids
script 0 (0.0%) 2,074 (4.0%) relating to scripts
Total 60,878 (100.0%) 51,305 (100.0%) –
Table 8.6: Knowledge in OpenCyc and ThoughtTreasure. Adapted
with permission from Mueller (2002).
Class of Knowledge % of Collected
Scripts/Plans 14.4
Causal/Functional 11.9
Spatial/Location 10.2
Goals/Likes/Dislikes 5.5
Grammatical 5.5
Photo descriptions 5.4
Properties of people 4.8
Explanations 2.6
Story events 1.8
Other 37.9
Total 100.0
Table 8.7: Knowledge in OMCS. Adapted with permission from Singh
(2002).
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Overall, it can be seen that CYC currently has a significant lead
over all other efforts. Furthermore, the knowledge in CYC is fully dis-
ambiguated (its concept hierarchy is finer-grained than WordNet’s and
was specifically designed to capture world rather than lexical knowl-
edge). However, the approaches of collecting knowledge from volunteer
contributors (both OMCS and Learner) have collected (admittedly
ambiguous) knowledge at a much lower development cost and shorter
time frame (for example, OMCS has been collecting knowledge for two
years rather than CYC’s nearly two decades). Significant promise for
future growth both for CYC (personal communication, D. Lenat, 2003)
and for other (freely available) large scale commonsense efforts may lie
in relying on volunteer contributors, together with developing methods
for disambiguation and acquisition of (highly) unambiguous knowledge
from contributors who have had very little training.
8.4 Rate of contribution to Learner
In this section, I address the behavior of visitors to the site, examining
the volume of contributions, frequency of return visits, and so on. The
top four sources from which contributors arrive at the Learner (“1001
Questions”) web site are as follows:
• MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Projects page1 (about 40%
of the contributors),
• MSN search engine and directory (about 25%),
• Google (about 12%),
• Gamespotter2 (about 8%).
The remaining 15% comes from other sources. The terms used in
the search engines to find the site range from “free online game” and
“online knowledge games,” to “questions games” and “game making
questions.” Some queries to Google are “open mind 1001” and “1001
Questions game,” suggesting that the searches are specifically for the
Learner web site.
To make using Learner less of a chore, Learner does not require
contributors to log in or identify themselves. The only information
collected about a contribution is the IP address of the computer from
which the contribution was made (as reported by the client to the web
server on which Learner resides), the exact time at which a given
1http://www.ai.mit.edu/research/projects/projects.shtml
2http://www.gamespotter.com
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contribution was made (i.e., the time when a assertion was passed to
Learner from the web server), and a unique session id generated at
the beginning of the session and stored on the contributor’s machine.
Cookies on the client machine are used to store information about the
previous topic the contributor was teaching Learner about, and to
provide a unique identifier for each contribution session (for the purpose
of later statistical analysis of the contribution behavior). Cookies do
not survive for more than one hour from the time of last contribution
in a session.
The IP address of the contributing computer should be considered
to be at most a crude proxy for the identity of the contributor. For ex-
ample, the one-to-one correspondence between contributors is violated
when computers reside behind the firewall of a large company. All such
computers may appear to have the same IP address, making contrib-
utors from different machines appear to have the same IP address. A
single physical computer in a home may be shared by family members,
computers in a school computer lab may be shared by many people
affiliated with the school, and a computer in an Internet cafe (Internet
cafes currently being the dominant mode of Internet access in many
countries) may be shared between many customers.
Conversely, a single contributor may be using a machine with a
dynamic IP address, may be sometimes visiting Learner from work
and sometimes from home, or may be accessing the Internet via Internet
cafes, using a computer with a different IP address each time.
Despite the above cautions about interpreting IP addresses as
unique contributor identifiers, an analysis of the total number of as-
sertions contributed per IP address can still provide some valuable in-
sights. Such an analysis is presented in Figure 8.6. For the purpose of
this discussion, a contribution is any assertion (parsable or not, already
present in the knowledge base or not, and with any truth value). The
logarithmic Y axis represents the number of contributions. Note that
the period for which this data has been tabulated is 72 days rather
than 61 days over which figures for Section 8.3.2 were calculated. The
total number of contributing IP addresses over the 72 days is 1047. The
average number of contributions per IP address is 59.2.
One notable trend in Figure 8.6 is the plateau (a relatively large
number of IP addresses) with exactly twenty contributions. The re-
sponsible factor may be the fact that the system presented up to 20
knowledge acquisition questions per screen. A large portion of the IP
addresses making twenty (or fewer!) contributions, presumably saw
one set of questions of the system, answered those questions, and have
not proceeded further.
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Figure 8.6: Number of contributions per IP address. Distinct IP ad-
dresses are listed along the X axis. The actual addresses have been
suppressed, their rank is indicated instead. The addresses are arranged
in the order of decreasing number of assertions contributed. A contri-
bution is any assertion (parsable or not, already present in the knowl-
edge base or not, and with any truth value). The logarithmic Y axis
indicates the number of contributions.
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Another aspect of contributor behavior is the number of their repeat
visits to the system. One possible way to estimate the number of
repeat visits to the system would by looking at the number of unique
“sessions,” where a single session is tracked by a cookie set on the client
computer. Because cookies are sometimes turned off on the machines
of the contributors, cookies have not proven very useful in tracking the
identity of a session. Instead, the present analysis defines a notion of a
contributing day — for a given IP address, a 24 hour period (starting at
midnight US Eastern time) is called a contributing day if a contribution
of at least one assertion (with any truth value) was made during this
24 hour period from this IP address.
The analysis of the number of contributing days for 1047 contribu-
tors over 72 days is presented in Table 8.4. Note that the count does
not exactly represent how many times a contributor decided to have a
session with Learner. The approach of counting “contributing days”
collapses genuine multiple visits per day into a single “contributing
day,” causing an underestimation of the number of visits. On the other
hand, a single session that continues through midnight of US Eastern
time results in two “contributing days.” Presumably, the numbers of
“contributing days” per IP would be larger if calculated over longer
period, especially because some contributors had their first visit to the
site at the end of the period and have not yet had a repeat visit by the
end of the measurement period. On a contributing day, the average
contribution from a single IP address was 54.29 assertions.
Number of Number of
Contributing such IP
Days Addresses
1 987
2 47
3 3
4 2
5 3
6 2
7 2
8 0
9 1
Total 1047
Table 8.8: Number of IP addresses that had N contributing days, cal-
culated over initial seventy two days.
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While both numbers on the number of contributions per IP and
the repeat visit rate per IP may be somewhat difficult to interpret, the
provided data may be useful in comparing Learner in its current form
to a different system that makes similar data available. This data can
also be useful in calculating the effect on the contribution volume and
repeat visit rate of such additional factors as interface improvements,
introduction of prizes for best contributors, or emailing subscribing
contributors with a newsletter summarizing the progress of the site.
8.5 User feedback about Learner
One of the goals of this work is to create a large knowledge base of
commonsense assertions. In order for this effort to succeed, in addi-
tion to technical competence of the knowledge collection process, it is
desirable to ensure that visitors to the site have a positive experience.
To find out what the contributor perceptions are, I have asked them to
comment on the system.
For the period of fifty days, every page of questions presented by
Learner contained the following instructions (together with a text
entry box for the comments):
The site is in beta testing. We are extremely eager to receive
your feedback on which features of the site you find helpful or
annoying, and what you can suggest by way of improvement.
Enter your comments here. Comments on quality of questions
posed and ease or difficulty of answering them (with examples
as appropriate), are particularly needed. Include your email
address if you’d like.
In all, 118 complete, non-redundant comments were received.
Mainly, the comments asked for a clarification of documentation or
more information. Many comments also pointed out manifestations of
three bugs in the system, which have since been addressed. There were
on the order of 30 comments that have commented on the quality of
the overall site, the interface, or suggested specific extensions of the
current functionality.
The remaining comments have focused on the quality of the site
and the concept it embodies or have requested new features.
Of the sixteen comments on quality of the site, twelve (75%) were
positive, for example:
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“Congratulations, I shall access this wonderful project often
even though I use a public computer and have little time”
– From Sao Paulo, Brazil,
“This is a very interesting system. I am very fascinated. I
will give that link to all my friends,”
“This is a very interesting experiment,”
one was mixed:
“Your program is quite smart, but it asks too many non-
sensical questions,”
and three were negative, for example:
“Needs to work on the grammar.”
The feedback that focused on the interface generally expressed that
the interface was not very intuitive at first, but that the contributor
eventually figured it out. One contributor praised the transparency of
system’s function:
“It’s very useful having all the ‘[i]’ buttons [because] you
can find out easily how to drive it.”
A few users, while happy with the overall experience, have pointed
out the syntactical limitations of the system, for example:
“It never accepts my mathematical info,”
“Not being able to parse lists is cumbersome,”
“Faster data entry method would be nice; maybe have
an ‘expert user’ mode as an option.”
The few remaining comments requested an array of features. One
of the most popular suggestions (four comments) was to extend the
acquisition strategy to validate the knowledge collected. The users have
commented that both typos and human error in entering the knowledge
can contribute to errors, in particular to false assertions being stored
in the system as true.
For example, one comment read:
“Eventually you need a way of changing established facts
caused by typos.”
Two contributors have suggested adding the answer
“I (personally) don’t know”
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to the set of available choices. See Section 5.2 for a discussion of this.
Finally, contributors have suggested that more advanced reason-
ing by the system would further improve the quality of the system’s
questions. Contributors have cited scenarios where (i) the ability to
generalize from specific answers and (ii) ability to carry out rule-based
inference would have been helpful.
One concrete example of need for generalization quoted was: when
presented with a set of assertions “fire can heat X,” “fire can heat Y,”
“fire can heat Z,” the system should be able to generalize that “fire can
heat any object.”
The need for rule-based reasoning was motivated by the example:
once “X is not a food” then the system should not ask whether “X is
tasty.”
To sum up, it seems that contributors were largely satisfied with the
site, provided useful information on the bugs that were consequently
eliminated. The critical comments have suggested features that are
mostly in line with what I perceive to be the limitations of the current
system (Section 8.5.1) and are discussed in the Section 9.2 (Future
Work).
8.5.1 Limitations of cumulative analogy
The simplicity of Learner’s fundamental algorithm for posing ques-
tions brings into high relief the additional types of reasoning that are
currently missing from the system.
Given the success criterion that a knowledge acquisition system
should collect useful knowledge, a question-posing knowledge acqui-
sition system can fall short of our expectations in two ways: (i) not
posing the questions which would be useful (failing to collect some use-
ful knowledge), and (ii) posing questions which are not useful (collecting
useless, often redundant) knowledge.
Cases where the system poses questions that are not useful are easier
to spot, and I address them first.
Based on my own experience with the system and the contribu-
tors’ feedback, the following currently missing types of reasoning can
be identified. Implementing these should lead to an improvement in
question quality:
Handling implications. For example, the system currently has no
way to establish that “if something is neither edible nor drink-
able, one should not enquire whether it is tasty.” This is be-
cause the system cannot explicitly represent that “tasty” applies
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only to edible or drinkable things (here, scoping is treated as a
kind of implication). The inability of cumulative analogy to han-
dle implications seems mostly acceptable when acquiring abstract
assertions. In a domain where a lot of causal or configuration-
based reasoning was required, this limitation would be a lot more
pronounced.
Handling disjointedness. The system currently does not under-
stand that some situations are mutually exclusive with others.
For example, knowing that “people walk on 2 legs” does not pre-
vent the system from asking (for example, by similarity with dogs
or cats) whether “people walk on 4 legs.”3
The questions that would be useful but were not posed are revealed
indirectly: some questions posed by the system reveal that it should
have instead posed different questions, as follows:
Handling generalization. The system sometimes asks numerous
overly specific questions. For example it may pose the question
“X exists in three dimensions?” about many objects in place of
X. The reasoning mechanism needed to avoid asking these given
the more general assertion “Objects exist in three dimensions”
is already implemented in the current system (see Section 4.3.1).
What is missing is the ability to acquire the more general knowl-
edge without it being volunteered.4
Additionally, the analysis of the seed knowledge base in Chapter 7
has revealed that the seed knowledge base has a large number of unique
assertions (a large number of properties each of which was asserted
about a single object). While some of the unique properties are quite
exotic (such as the property of a “caterpillar” which states “will turn
into a butterfly”), the inability of reasoning by analogy directly
over properties to acquire new properties is an important limitation
of cumulative analogy. I feel that allowing the contributor to both
add new knowledge and to modify the knowledge acquisition questions
when answering them ameliorates this shortcoming in Learner as it
has been deployed. Section 9.2 (Future Work) further elaborates on
the above points and discusses how they can be addressed within the
framework of cumulative analogy.
3Note, however,that knowing what is disjoint is non-trivial. For example, English
and French are two different languages, but it does not mean that a person that
speaks one does not speak the other.
4Note that to handle generalization in the syntactic object position, inferring
quantification of syntactic objects would also have to be addressed.
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Chapter 9
Discussion
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I overview
some of the relevant prior work from the expert system, machine learn-
ing, knowledge acquisition interface, and text mining traditions. There
is a vast body of literature in each of these areas. In overviewing the
literature, I focus on the work that has been particularly influential
to my thinking regarding knowledge acquisition. The second section
discusses future work regarding the knowledge representation and the
algorithms that, in light of the experience with the deployed system,
are likely to improve the quality of the knowledge acquisition questions.
Also briefly discussed are ways to improve the resulting knowledge base.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the third section summarizes
the most important contributions of the completed work.
9.1 Background
Prior work that is relevant to this work can be categorized as follows:
1. Early expert systems.
2. Systems that form expectations from prior data and use the ex-
pectations to aid knowledge acquisition.
3. Knowledge representation, especially seeking to capture what is
easily expressed in natural language.
4. Machine learning, especially in concept formation and learning
association rules.
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5. Natural Language Processing, especially extracting relationships
from free text (text mining) and answering questions by finding
answers in text (question answering).
6. Projects gathering (and using in an application) knowledge from
ordinary web surfers who elect to participate.
These categories span several research communities, but they all
provide relevant background for some aspect of this thesis. I examine
the work in each category in turn, explaining its relevance to the theory
and the system developed in this work. First, however, I review the
literature on the amount of commonsense knowledge that needs to be
collected to capture a rough equivalent of the commonsense knowledge
a ten year old child might have.
9.1.1 Amount of commonsense knowledge
When addressing the task of collecting commonsense knowledge, a nat-
ural question that arises is how much of commonsense knowledge do hu-
mans possess. Answering this question would permit bounding the task
of collecting commonsense knowledge and estimate, however crudely,
the accomplished progress towards the goal of acquiring the common-
sense knowledge of a human.
Furthermore, estimating the amount of a certain kind of knowledge
or estimating the amount of knowledge in a given subdomain of com-
monsense can allow one to estimate when the sufficient amount of such
knowledge has been collected and when can acquisition move on to a
different kind of knowledge or a different subdomain.
However, addressing even the fundamental question of the total
amount of commonsense knowledge is difficult. In my opinion, answer-
ing this question is complicated by two properties of human knowledge.
One problem is the question of granularity of human knowledge, and
the related question of where the line between commonsense and eso-
teric expert knowledge should be drawn.
The hierarchical (fractal) structure of knowledge at various levels
of specificity can well be observed in medical literature. According to
estimates and calculations reported by Pauker et al. (1976, pp. 14–
15), an average person without medical training knows approximately
100,000 real-world facts that are relevant to medicine. In addition to
this, two popular (and roughly equivalent) textbooks on general inter-
nal medicine have approximately 2,000 pages and have approximately
100 facts per page. At the next level of specificity, about ten subspe-
cialty texts covering areas such as nephrology, cardiology and hema-
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tology can be identified, each with textbooks containing approximately
60,000 facts each (Pauker et al., 1976, pp. 14–15). Even accounting for
overlap between subfields, the authors of the investigation believe that
there are roughly twice as many new facts (i.e. 400,000) introduced at
this level of specificity. Any binary division of facts into “common” and
“uncommon,” it seems, would have to introduce an arbitrary boundary.
The second problem with estimating the amount of human knowl-
edge is the inferential nature of the knowledge. For example, Lenat
cautions against adhering too closely to numbers of terms and axioms
in an inferential knowledge base, referring to both numbers as being
a “red herring.” Lenat’s critique of excessive focus on the numbers of
axioms has to do with the inferential nature of the knowledge base —
several axioms can compactly express something that is equivalently (or
almost equivalently) expressed by thousands of axioms. One example
is that “any animal belongs to at most one species” can be expressed
either as the ontology of species and a single statement asserting that
the leaves of the ontology are disjoint, or as a (much larger) set of as-
sertions each stating disjointedness of a given pair of species (Lenat,
1995, p. 35).
Despite these difficulties, there are several approaches to roughly
estimating the amount of commonsense knowledge a ten year old or
adult human living in a modern society possesses.
One early discussion is due to Minsky:
“My impression, for what it is worth, is that one can find
fewer than ten areas, each with more than ten thousand
“links.” One can’t find a hundred things that he knows a
thousand things about. Or a thousand things, each with
a full hundred new links. I therefore feel that a machine
will need to acquire on the order of a hundred thousand
elements of knowledge in order to behave with reasonable
sensibility in ordinary situations. A million, if properly or-
ganized, should be enough for a very great intelligence. If
my argument does not convince you, multiply by ten” (Min-
sky, 1968, pp. 25–26).
In publications predating the “red herring” stance, Lenat et al.
approximate the amount of knowledge necessary for human-level com-
monsense reasoning at 108 axioms, a number three orders of magni-
tude higher than the lowest of Minsky’s earlier figures (Lenat, Guha,
Pittman, Pratt and Shepherd, 1990).1
1Unfortunately, I have been unable to discover the detailed origins or derivation
of this estimate.
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Some more specific psycholinguistic data that sheds light on the
issue of the total amount of commonsense knowledge have been ag-
gregated in the work by Dahlgren et al. (1989) on naive semantics. To
assess which features humans typically associate with concepts, the fol-
lowing psycholinguistic studies have been conducted: To arrive at the
most “characteristic” features of categories such as DOG, LEMON, and
SECRETARY, between 20 and 75 subjects were asked in earlier stud-
ies to freely list “characteristic” features of these categories. Features
that were freelisted by at least one fifth of the subjects were chosen for
another experiment, in which subjects were asked to rate the typicality
of the features. The number of features ranked as “highly typical” in
the second experiment averaged 15 per topic (this description has been
adapted from Dahlgren et al. (1989, pp. 153–154)). If one assumes the
passive vocabulary of concepts to be on the order of 100,000 (which
exceeds an average person’s linguistic vocabulary), the total number
of such agreed upon characteristic features is on the order of several
million.
Perhaps the most convincing bound on how much knowledge hu-
mans retain comes from the studies of how much information humans
are able to remember and retrieve after a long period. Landauer has
carried out a review and quantitative analysis of his own and others’ ex-
periments on human ability to memorize various types of information.
The analysis included memorization of visual, verbal, and musical infor-
mation and has yielded similar results for the rate at which information
can be remembered so that it can be retained over the long term. All
estimates point to humans being able to retain approximately two bits
per second (Landauer, 1986). This implies a per-year rate of only about
8 megabytes, or several hundred megabytes over a lifetime. These esti-
mates, of course, do not include any non-learned information, such as
the information present in the “hardware” humans use — for instance,
it does not include any hard-wiring for causal or spatial reasoning that
may be encoded in the genome. Still, if the figure for what human
brains are able to retain is in the hundreds of megabytes within an or-
der of magnitude, the overall project of collecting even tens of millions
of axioms should be achievable (provided that the right knowledge is
being collected!) by collecting from tens of thousands of contributors
in merely a few years.
9.1.2 Early expert systems
A great deal of knowledge acquisition work happened in the late 80’s
and early 90’s in the context of expert systems. Some tools (BLIP,
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ILROID, INDUCE, ID3) constructed expert systems by running a non-
interactive procedure on a large data set to induce a set of rules. Other
tools (EXPECT, FIS, KREME, MEDKAT, NEXPERT) constructed
expert systems by relying on a knowledge engineer to elicit knowledge
from an expert and encode that knowledge.
These shells generally either hard-coded for a particular problem
solving method of the performance application (MOLE, SALT) or the
domain (OPAL, STUDENT), had to settle for gathering only shallow
knowledge, or required extensive programming by an AI programmer
for each new problem. A good overview of the approaches taken by
earlier KA systems is (Gaines and Shaw, 1992).
More recently, much work has focused on moving towards “multi-
functional knowledge bases” — systems that can support more than one
problem-solving approach (Aamodt, 1995). This trend correlates with
increased attention to acquiring and encoding problem solving methods
(PSMs). PSMs are a kind of meta knowledge, specifying how other,
factual knowledge should be used. The idea has been that by having
a large library of problem solving methods, task independent factual
knowledge can be processed by applying the right methods to it. There
has also been some work to simplify the acquisition of PSMs (Kim and
Gil, 1999). Two overview papers (Boose, 1989; Menzies, 1998) contain
a detailed classification of and further pointers to many implemented
systems.
9.1.3 Forming expectations from existing knowl-
edge
Using previously acquired knowledge to aid future acquisition is a major
theme of this work. Here is an overview of existing systems which
leverage knowledge that they have in order to guide their consequent
interviewing of experts:
• Teiresias (Davis, 1979) worked with experts to help maintain a
knowledge base. The system helped acquire and refine proposed
rules by analogy with similar rules that were already known. For
example, if similar rules typically included an additional con-
straint about the patient’s age, it would suggest that the new
rule may need such a constraint as well.
• Salt (Marcus and McDermott, 1989) is a system for helping
solve design problems, such as selecting elevator doors, cables,
and motor type given (i) the requirements of a particular building
and (ii) lookup tables of costs of various parts. The system was
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able to examine the set of rules the expert gave it for how they
“fit together.” If there were some inconsistencies or if not enough
information was present to run the system, it would ask the expert
to fix its rules. It was hard-coded to find places were rules could
be fixed and suggest those to the expert.
• Expect Method Developer (EMeD) (Kim and Gil, 1999) helps
an expert contributor create problem-solving methods for the ex-
pect system. The system works by analyzing interdependencies
between methods to create expectations about what other meth-
ods need to be defined and what they will look like. Because
methods have stated capabilities which are much like return types
of functions in a programming language, and the capabilities are
organized in a hierarchy, the system can presuppose that methods
with similar capabilities will have similar requirements (inputs).
The system also checks if a method uses yet undefined types and
proposes to either change it to an existing type or define the type
at a later time.
An approach to eliciting new knowledge that has enjoyed a lot of
popularity because of its simplicity is based on Kelly’s Personal Con-
struct Psychology (PCP) (Gaines and Shaw, 1993). It uses repertory
grids to rank various constructs (properties) of several elements (ob-
jects) in a grid.
For example, a grid can be made with the American presidents as
the columns of a grid and their “party affiliation,” “popularity,” and
“charisma” as rows of the grid.2 Each president than has a numeric
value on each of these scales. The elicitation technique associated with
the approach is to compute which elements seem similar or identical
based on the data known so far and then ask for a new construct (prop-
erty) that would distinguish the two. Another surprisingly effective
method (called triad-based elicitation) is to select any three elements
and query what two elements have in common that a third does not.
While somewhat constrained in what kinds of knowledge can be
acquired, the PCP-based approaches are effective in gathering a lot
of knowledge rapidly. The knowledge gathered in a grid can also be
analyzed in a couple of interesting ways: the induct (Gaines, 1993,
p.465) algorithm infers subsumption rules from the grids and the focus
algorithm (Shaw, 1980) clusters the elements in the grid in a hierarchy
2At the time of writing, WebGrid III, a system that allows construc-
tion and analysis of both simple and advanced grids, was available online at
http://gigi.cpsc.ucalgary.ca.
129
by their similarity. (The work on the cobweb and classit algorithms
has subsequently built upon the focus algorithm.)
While the knowledge in Learner is more heterogeneous than
simple numerical values on scales of the PCP-based approaches, an
interesting potential extension of my work is to apply the Lear-
ner-collected knowledge the same methods of processing as to the
knowledge collected with PCP-based approaches. Such possible post-
processing includes induction of rules and extraction of hierarchies from
(clustering of) the objects and their features.
Reasoning by analogy, similarly to case-based reasoning, can be
viewed as a form of leveraging prior knowledge in understanding new
examples. Analogy has proven to be a powerful tool when knowledge
is acquired incrementally.
Particularly relevant to this approach is Winston’s work on anal-
ogy (Winston, 1972) which focused attention on the differences new
knowledge has from what is already known, and, in consequent work,
processed English-like input to be able to draw analogous inferences
given similar new input (Winston, 1982).
Also relevant are the notions of analogy in Teiresias (Davis, 1979),
and Forbus’s approach to analogy by mapping between partially aligned
structures of concepts in two domains, as formalized in the work on the
Structure Mapping Engine (SME) (Forbus, Falkenhainer and Gentner,
1986).
9.1.4 Knowledge representation
I briefly overview several systems that are aimed at representing knowl-
edge. Learner uses structures storing simplified parsed natural lan-
guage as a representation, but also has the ability to recognize asser-
tions made in natural language into a frame-like representation.
Early work such as the Owl language for knowledge representation
(Szolovits, Hawkinson and Martin, 1977) was strongly based on natural
language, and pursued the idea that the meaning of any term came from
all its uses in the knowledge base rather than from a formal definition
or axiomatization (the view later built on by work on naive semantics,
Dahlgren et al. (1989)).
The most ambitious project has been Cyc, a multi-decade endeavor
to encode commonsense knowledge by a team of enterers (Lenat, 1995).
The project has evolved as it unfolded, currently representing knowl-
edge in CycL, a formal logic-like language. Cyc comes with its own
browser, inference engine and some ability to process and generate nat-
ural language.
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Other systems aimed at capturing the sort of knowledge this work
tries to capture also take a logic-based approach. The most notable
examples are the kl-one family of systems, including classic (Brach-
man, McGuiness, Patel-Schneider and Resnick, 1990).
Another ongoing project with the goal of creating an intelligent
agent capable of communicating in natural language is sneps (Shapiro,
2000).
Another recent development elaborating on well-established ap-
proaches is karl, a language incorporating frame-logic (Fensel et al.,
1998), and daml+oil, a knowledge representation language expressed
in RDF (DAML, 2002). These systems establish a baseline for what is
expressible and inferable in today’s systems, as well as exemplify the
existing approaches to representing different kinds of knowledge.
9.1.5 Machine learning: concepts and relationships
Machine learning provides techniques for extracting concepts and rules
from data.
Algorithms such as Foil (Quinlan and Cameron-Jones, 1995) and
Chillin (Zelle, Mooney and Konvisser, 1994) learn from positive and
negative examples to form Horn clauses describing these, in effect cre-
ating descriptions for classes of objects from examples. While the sim-
pler ones try to reflect the given data exactly, the more elaborate work
(Brunk and Pazzani, 1991) introduces information-theoretic stopping
criteria to avoid overfitting noisy data. For more details on inducing
rules from the observed data, a good overview can be found in (Califf,
1998).
Some work that aims to bring machine learning to other aspects of
knowledge acquisition includes focl-1-2-3 (Brunk and Pazzani, 1992).
This system automatically generates hypotheses and allows an expert
to select the correct ones from the generated ones. This system also
maintains connections between rules and the examples they explain,
making knowledge maintenance easier.
Some work has also looked at interleaving machine learning and
knowledge acquisition to make knowledge acquisition easier (Sommer,
Morik, Andre and Uszynski, 1994; Webb, Wells and Zheng, 1999;
Morik, Wrobel, Kietz and Ende, 1993). However, current systems still
construct knowledge acquisition interfaces for contributors that need
to be trained in using these tools. In contrast, this work takes a dif-
ferent approach — enabling collection in plain English from untrained
contributors.
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9.1.6 NLP: text mining and question answering
The advent of the web has made large textual corpora readily available,
leading to an explosion of work the fields of text mining and question
answering.
Text mining work has especially focused on extracting ontologies
(taxonomic information) from various sources, as overviewed in (Maed-
che and Staab, 2001).
While Learner does not analyze text written for other people,
it is engaged in extracting knowledge from the mass of contributed
assertions (to pose new knowledge acquisition questions). Hence, some
approaches in text mining may be useful on this task as well. Some
particularly relevant work in the field includes (Faure and Ne´dellec,
1998; Hahn and Schnattinger, 1998; Maedche and Staab, 2000).
The advent of the web also brought about a resurgence in work
on question-answering systems (Cardie, Ng, Pierce and Buckley, 2000;
Dahlgren, Ljungberg and Ohlund, 1991; Kwok, Etzioni and Weld,
2001).
Typically, these work in conjunction with a search engine to try to
retrieve from collection of documents, not just a relevant document,
but a specific answer to a given question. These systems generally
lack domain knowledge and rely on language processing and statistics,
rather than deduction, to find the right answer. While these systems
are typically built to aid question-answering, they can be viewed as
knowledge extraction systems.
Additionally, systems such as MindNet (Dolan, Vanderwende and
Richardson, 1993; Richardson, Vanderwende and Dolan, 1993) and that
of Hearst (Hearst, 1992) process textual corpora or machine readable
dictionaries to extract not answers to questions, but “is-a” (and, in
case of MindNet, other) relationships between the concepts present in
the text being analyzed.
All of the above systems face many of the same challenges that
Learner does: the need to canonicalize text, the ability to cope with
incorrect or out-of-context assertions, and the ability to weigh evidence
for and against something being true.
9.1.7 Gathering from contributors over the web
Most people in the world are not trained in knowledge representa-
tion. Thus, collecting knowledge from these people presents a chal-
lenge. Also, there are many people in the world, and therefore it is
desirable to be able to acquire from many contributors, pooling their
132
contributions and bootstrapping on their individual expertises.
The knowledge acquisition community has typically approached this
challenge by designing user interfaces that allow a user to enter and
query knowledge by filling in forms. Prote´ge´-2000 (Li, Shilane, Noy
and Musen, 2000) is a project seeking to break out this functionality
in a modular fashion, but numerous other user interfaces were created,
including the WebGrid system based on personal construct psychology
(Gaines and Shaw, 1998), the OntoEdit browser, CYC browser, EMeD,
and so on.
While these approaches do simplify knowledge entry, they do so by
constraining what knowledge can be entered and by forcing the con-
tributor to use a particular way of representing knowledge (sometimes
changing the meaning subtly). Because the contributor has to be skilled
in the particular representation employed, these approaches are more
suited to simplifying the entry for trained contributors.
On the Internet, there are also several simple systems implemented
for entertainment purposes. These are, effectively, knowledge acquisi-
tion tools tied to performance applications:
• Guessmaster.com is a Web site containing several games that pose
previously gathered questions trying to guess the person, object,
animal, TV show, or movie (depending on the game). Data gath-
ered is in public domain from John Comeau.
• 20Q.net, http://www.20q.org is a learning program that plays
the game of 20 questions. It gathers and re-uses the information
useful in guessing an object. It is an interesting demonstration
of gathering from a community on a specific, well-defined “toy”
problem.
• Open Mind Animals, is forthcoming online at
http://openmind.org/Animals.html (Stork and Lam,
2000).
Similarly to the above systems, it a learning program that tries to
guess the animal a human player is thinking of by posing yes/no
questions.
When these systems fail to guess the object the player is thinking
of based on the player’s answers, these systems ask the player to con-
tribute a new yes/no question that could help differentiate the player’s
object from others.
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Out of machine learning tradition comes the Open Mind Initiative
(Hearst, Hunson and Stork, 1999), an umbrella project with the explicit
goal of gathering a variety of knowledge from ordinary “netizens.” The
Open Mind Initiative is quickly gathering support; it focuses on cre-
ating a common platform of tools for gathering from netizens, sharing
the collected data, cross-validating their input, rewarding the best con-
tributors, and so on.
To date, one of the most ambitious projects to gather commonsense
knowledge from untrained contributors is Open Mind Commonsense
(Singh, 2002), which uses templates and prompting for free-form text
to gather knowledge.
9.2 Future Work
The goals of this work have been to define a clear vision — to acquire
commonsense knowledge from untrained contributors, and to take con-
crete steps towards this vision — to formulate, implement, deploy and
analyze knowledge acquisition via cumulative analogy. To maintain fo-
cus, many fascinating and promising directions had to be left outside
of the scope of this work. Here are some of these, with the topics I
believe to be most important being higher on the list:
Richer internal representation. The knowledge is currently stored
in a form that is close to how it was entered. Introducing the
ability to reify more abstract assertions derived from the entered
assertions, together with an update of how questions are actually
posed, should allow for better knowledge acquisition. The new
capability can be introduced without significant changes to the
question-formulating or filtering algorithms. For example, recog-
nizing that “sugar is sweet” as asserting “has a (specific value
of) taste” and “Tabasco sauce is spicy” as stating that “has a
(specific value of) taste” could lead the system to infer by the
current mechanism that, for example “salt” or “pepper” also
have specific values of taste, leading the system to ask what that
value is (i.e. ask how salt or pepper taste). This would allow
Learner to tap related, not only identical properties in posing
its questions.
Additional reasoning mechanisms. The system could be outfitted
with additional mechanisms both (i) to filter the presented knowl-
edge (causing Learner to pose fewer non-useful questions) and
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(ii) to formulate questions by means other than cumulative anal-
ogy, working side by side with cumulative analogy (causing Lear-
ner to pose additional useful questions). These are discussed in
greater detail in Section 9.2.1.
Better use of collected assertions. The assertions in the knowl-
edge base are currently used in two ways: (i) to establish sim-
ilarity between objects in Select-NN and (ii) to create new hy-
potheses for knowledge acquisition in Map-Props. As is discussed
in Chapter 7, there may be significant number of correlations in
properties between objects that are not necessarily similar (for
example, many metal objects, similar or not, tend to be hard and
shiny). The presented algorithms could be extended to extract
correlations between properties of non-similar objects and to use
these correlations to pose new knowledge acquisition questions.
This is elaborated in Section 9.2.2.
Better estimation of importance of properties. Currently,
importance of each property is computed according to functions
Wt and FreqWt (see Section 4.2). These rely on the number of
objects for which a property is true to estimate how significant
it is. Indeed, very common properties (e.g. “a person can hold
X” is true for very many objects X) probably tell us little about
object similarity. However, there are many exceptions to this
general trend. For example, there are many “animals” (and hence
assertions “X is an animal,” and yet being told that something is
an animal is quite informative. It would be interesting to estimate
importance of a property by how much information it provides.
Perhaps this could be estimated from how many correlations or
implications can be derived from asserting this property. If a
more sophisticated and yet tractable algorithm for computing
“importance” can be introduced, properties with high importance
could be made to have a greater effect on similarity than the
unimportant ones, resulting in improved similarity judgments and
presumably better questions.
Additional critics. For example, the system could refrain from ask-
ing questions which are very similar to each other, or questions
whose answers depend on other questions being posed at the same
time. Critics could also employ some additional method com-
pletely orthogonal to the generation methods to assess quality of
the generated questions. As a simple example, they can use sta-
tistical plausibility of word pair co-occurrence in the question to
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remove the implausible questions (or to lower their scores).
Better use of collected replies. Currently, only “Yes” and “No”
replies affect the operation of the system in a sophisticated way.
The other answers are merely stored; the other answers only pre-
vent the identical question from being posed again. Other col-
lected replies could be used better. Possible strategies specific to
particular replies are discussed in Section 9.2.3.
Other work, while not addressing question quality, can further im-
prove the quality of the resulting knowledge base. Two main directions
for improvement are as follows:
Improving reliability. Currently, a limitation of the system as a
whole is that an incorrect assertion cannot be overridden or cor-
rected. Empowering contributors with the ability to override
something the system already believes would be a path towards
making the knowledge in the knowledge base more reliable. For
example, according to one contributor’s comment, the contributor
has added this assertion as a result of accidentally omitting an ‘n’:
“lilies are ice.” Two subtasks can be identified: (i) automatically
detecting “suspicious” assertions and (ii) designing a mechanism
that would allow contributors to override incorrect contributions
while preventing a malicious editor from significantly corrupting
the existing knowledge base.
Removing ambiguity. The other way to improve the knowledge base
is to remove some of the ambiguity present in the contributed as-
sertions. It can be removed, for example, by having contributors
disambiguate some of the lexical items (words) in the assertions
into their WordNet senses, in a manner similar to (Chklovski
and Mihalcea, 2002), possibly in conjunction with unsupervised
disambiguation methods. Specific proposals on addressing the
ambiguity are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
As has been discussed in Chapter 1, Learner can be viewed as
a system that leverages human contributors to clean up “noisy” hy-
potheses that it constructs. As discussed in Section 9.1.6, other re-
search efforts such as MindNet and Hearst’s hyponym acquisition sys-
tem (Hearst, 1992), generate assertions (noisily) from a different source
— by mining machine readable dictionaries or arbitrary texts from the
World Wide Web. Hence, perhaps a larger system that combines text
mining and acquisition and verification from human contributors, is
possible. This approach could be particularly appealing for acquiring
seed knowledge in new subdomains.
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9.2.1 Additional reasoning mechanisms
The two most important reasoning mechanisms to implement would
be rule-based reasoning and generalization from examples. Rule-based
reasoning could be used in a number or ways:
• to suggest new questions — if the inference is probabilistic, one
could ask whether assertions inferred with medium or low confi-
dence are true;
• to filter questions — for example, not asking about the taste of
something that is not edible or drinkable
• to improve evaluation of similarity of two objects — by comparing
not only what is known about them explicitly, but also what can
be inferred about them;
A typical rule could be represented as a conjunction of left-hand-
side assertions (preconditions) and a right-hand-side assertion (implica-
tion). The terms could be expressed (as well as indexed and retrieved)
as assertions, with the additional possibility of turning the base form
of any word into a variable. For example, “?cats? eat meat because
?cats? are carnivores.” Here, “?cats?” represents a variable that can
be substituted with other terms (the original term is preserved to pro-
vide information on syntactic conjugation of the new term being sub-
stituted. The standard forward and backward chaining methods can
be run over these rules to perform inference.
Necessary for rule-based reasoning are the rules themselves; I briefly
discuss how they can be acquired. There are two sources: the rules can
either be mined from the knowledge base, or acquired directly from
contributors. Mining them from the knowledge base is discussed in
Section 9.2.2.
As for acquiring rules directly from contributors, one strategy would
be for the system to watch for the assertions that receive the answer
“no” and request the reason for it being so. For example, upon learning
that “cows do not eat meat,” the system could enquire for the reason
(the antecedent of the rule), and receive as the reason “cows are not
carnivores.” From that, variablizing the matching components in the
antecedent and the consequent (in this case “cows”), the system would
acquire the rule:
¬A(X, be carnivore)⇒ ¬A(X, eat meat).
The rule may be refined later in light of additional information (for
example, the above rule may be applicable only when X is an animal).
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The other significant reasoning mechanism suggested by my and the
contributors’ experience with the system is generalization (inductive
inference) from examples. The idea is to use assertions about the more
specific concepts in a hierarchy to acquire assertions about the more
general concepts.
One approach to implementing generalization would be as follows.
At any node in the taxonomy of all known entities (which is a directed
acyclic graph with a designated top node), an assertion can be said
to hold for “all,” “none,” or “some” of the subsumed nodes. For ex-
ample, the assertion “animals need to breathe” would be interpreted
as the property “need to breathe” having the value “all” at the node
“animal.” Similarly, “some living things need sunshine” would be in-
terpreted as “some” at the node “living thing.” For most nodes, the
value for a given property would be “unknown.” An algorithm could
then be defined to hypothesize values for higher nodes based on the
values of subsumed nodes. For example, if a property has the value
“all” for all known direct subnodes of a node, one can hypothesize that
it also has the value “all” for the node itself. Some preliminary exper-
iments indicate that a more relaxed policy (for example, at least three
positive disjoint examples and no counterexamples) should also suffice
for fairly robust generalization.
9.2.2 Better use of collected assertions
Clusters of properties may exist on a sub-object level, and cut across
object similarities. Mining such correlations between properties, with
attention to taxonomic relationships, should be possible.
The task of mining correlations between properties is quite sim-
ilar to the standard task of mining association rules in datamining
(Agrawal, Imielinski and Swami, 1993). Particularly relevant is the
work that also accounts for taxonomic relationships between objects
(see, for example, (Han and Fu, 1995)). In datamining, however, a
particular datapoint is either present or unknown. In contrast, in this
task, each datapoint can, at a minimum, be in one of three categories:
known to be true, known to be false, or unknown. The evaluation of
correlation (in particular, the notions of strength and support of an
association rule used widely in datamining) would have to be extended
to reflect the richer input in this particular task.
Using a datamining-like analysis of the data, certain pairs or larger
groups of strongly correlated properties could be uncovered. The re-
sulting correlated groups can be used in a number of ways:
• to hypothesize and acquire rules for use in a rule-based inference
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mechanism,
• to directly pose knowledge acquisition questions (without ever
resorting to variablized rules),
• by looking for perfectly correlated pairs of properties with suf-
ficient support, redundant properties (multiple ways of phrasing
essentially the same thing) can be identified and the redundancy
removed from future KA questions and during evaluation of ob-
ject similarity,
• make question posing based on similarity between clusters of
properties (note that this might make the system less transpar-
ent).
9.2.3 Better use of collected answers
As mentioned above, only the answers “Yes” and “No” have a sophis-
ticated impact on the questions posed by Learner. The system could
be extended to make better use of the other replies currently being
collected .
For example, an assertion being answered with “Some/Sometimes”
(e.g. “hats protect heads from blows,”) could be used as a sign to ask
a more specific question. That is, the system could ask what kinds of
hats that protect heads from blows, to learn, for example, that a “hard
hat” and a “helmet” are the such kinds of hat.
Once a contributor ranks an assertion as “Nonsensical” or “Matter
of opinion,” the system could try to develop a mini-theory (even if a
very primitive one) of why this is so. In many cases, for example, the
nonsensicality is due to the object belonging to a class of objects that
do not combine with this property. For example, upon learning that
“beaches do many things with money” is nonsensical, the system could
not only avoid posing this question about “beach” in the future, but
also decrease the score of this question for things similar to “beach.”
9.3 Contributions
This work makes the following contributions:
1. Theoretical and empirical demonstration of the power
of reasoning by shallow semantic analogy (namely, cu-
mulative analogy) for knowledge acquisition. Cumulative
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analogy is an N nearest neighbor technique that maps the prop-
erties that hold about nearest neighbors onto the target. In this
work, it is used to formulate the knowledge acquisition questions.
The implementation of cumulative analogy, detailed in Chapter 4,
consists of two algorithms: Select-NN, which selects the nearest
neighbors Osrci to the current topic Otarget , and Map-Props,
which maps properties from these nearest neighbors onto Otarget .
The output of Map-Props is used to form knowledge acquisition
questions.
The theoretical analysis of cumulative analogy in Chapter 7 es-
tablished an upper bound on what fraction of assertions are
directly acquirable (acquirable without the bootstrapping effect
of acquired knowledge enabling additional acquisition). Direct
reachability is a lower bound of the asymptotic reachability re-
alized if the acquisition process is allowed to bootstrap from the
knowledge it acquires.
On the seed knowledge base used, I showed that reachability
ranges between 47.3% and 67% for different strictnesses and
scopes of reachability. Note that the analysis (and the percent-
ages reported) are restricted to the objects with sufficient num-
ber of properties, with the threshold for the minimum number of
properties known varying between 2 and 20.
I have also empirically demonstrated that basing the analogical
reasoning on the nearest neighbors is responsible for the observed
success rate of posing knowledge acquisition questions by analogy.
Evaluating the percentages of questions answered affirmatively,
negatively and judged to be nonsensical in the cumulative analogy
from nearest neighbors case compares favorably with the baseline,
no-similarity case that draws analogies from randomly selected
objects in the knowledge base rather than on nearest neighbors.
Of the questions generated by cumulative analogy, contributors
answered 45% affirmatively, 28% negatively and marked 13% as
nonsensical; in the control, no-similarity case 8% of questions were
answered affirmatively, 60% negatively and 26% were marked as
nonsensical.
The application of cumulative analogy to knowledge acquisition
has also uncovered some limitations of the approach. I identify
the three most significant ones. The first is its need for a (prefer-
ably large) set of “seed” knowledge to base analogies on. The
second is its inability to acquire properties not shared with other
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objects in the knowledge base. This is ameliorated in the imple-
mented system by mixing knowledge acquisition by analogy with
allowing the contributor to modify the acquisition assertions and
to volunteer additional knowledge. The third is its unawareness
of taxonomic “is a” relationships between objects when such re-
lationships are present.
Lack of ability to reason about taxonomic relationships leads ana-
logical reasoning alone to pose many redundant questions. For
example, for each particular kind of animal, the algorithm may
ask if this animal “can breathe.” Simply establishing that “ani-
mals can breathe” and being aware of the taxonomic relationships
should have been sufficient. This limitation has been addressed
with the additional module that filters questions which are infer-
able from more general assertions.
2. Introduction and characterization of cumulative analogy,
a class of analogical reasoning algorithms which pool ev-
idence from multiple nearest neighbors. This class of algo-
rithms operates on a collection of assertions about objects having
and lacking properties. Although applied to knowledge acqui-
sition, these algorithms exhibit a set of features that I believe
makes them an attractive reasoning method for a wider set of
tasks, such as querying the knowledge base by analogy for ques-
tion answering and checking consistency of the knowledge base.
The operation of cumulative analogy and its characterization have
been addressed in the previous point. The chief strengths of this
class of algorithms are as follows:
Ability to bootstrap. The amount of bootstrapping has also
not been quantified, but it is also easy to observe. One
example of bootstrapping (also given in Section 4.2.5) is
as follows: when starting with the seed knowledge base
and teaching about “newspapers,” the similar topics, to-
gether with their similarity scores, are: “book” (6.72), “map”
(2.76) “magazine” (2.67), and “bag” (2.51). The three
highest-scoring knowledge acquisition questions posed are
“newspapers contain information?”, “all newspapers have
pages?” and “newspapers are for reading?” If these ques-
tions are answered affirmatively and the answers are sub-
mitted to the system, the set of the similar objects remains
the same, but their scores become: “book” (10.94), “map”
(5.53) “magazine” (4.12), and “bag” (2.51). As can be seen
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from the change in similarity scores, the less similar topic
(“bag”) became less influential in creating knowledge acqui-
sition questions relative to others. This should lead to ques-
tions posed by Learner being more focused. Conversely,
when a question is answered negatively, the source topic(s)
from which this question was formulated will become less
similar on future iterations, again helping Learner sup-
press irrelevant source topics.
Ability to cope with noise. Although the ability to cope with
noise has not been quantified empirically, it has been ob-
served a number of times and should be easy to reproduce.
One example of this, given in Section 4.2.5, has to do with
acquiring knowledge about “tool” starting from the seed
knowledge base. Although the set of similar objects in-
cludes such spurious matches as “fire” and “horseshoe”,
the knowledge acquisition questions posed by cumulative
analogy are still quite reasonable. As is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.5, as long as the total level of noise is relatively low,
noise tolerance allows the system to cope with noise arising
from insufficient knowledge, lexical and structural ambiguity
of the collected knowledge, and noise arising from accidental
or malicious incorrect submissions by the contributors.
The measure of reach of analogy is closely related to measures
of correlatedness of knowledge also introduced by this work and
summarized below.
3. Novel measures of correlatedness of knowledge. Chap-
ter 7 introduced two measures correlatedness between objects in
a collection of assertions about objects and their properties.
Measuring how correlated objects in a knowledge base are (i.e.
how many properties or what percentage of properties they share)
may have additional applications, but in this work it has been
important in analyzing applicability of analogical reasoning. If
pairs of objects that share more properties than can be expected
by chance are rare, analogical reasoning about objects based on
matches of properties may be irrelevant to such a knowledge base.
If, for any object, there is at least one other object that shares
very many properties with it, one method of analogical reasoning
may be appropriate. If, instead, there are many objects that
share with it exactly two (rather than many) properties, another
method may be more appropriate.
142
The first measure introduced in this work is the “average similar-
ity histogram.” It calculates with how many objects, on average,
a given object in the knowledge base shares one property, with
how many it shares two, and so on. This measure has been used
both on the real knowledge base as the starting point for knowl-
edge acquisition by analogy, and on a synthetic knowledge base
with the same frequency characteristics of properties, but with
correlations between objects due purely to chance.
It was used to establish the difference between the observed
amount of similarity with what could be expected by chance,
and to provide an indication of where on the spectrum between
rare strong correlations and frequent weak correlations the real
knowledge base is located. The results indicated that a mixture of
both few strongly and many weakly correlated objects are present;
these results motivate the chosen approach to analogical reason-
ing, with several (up to ten) most similar objects contributing
to similarity, with those most strongly correlated having a bigger
impact.
One limitation of the average similarity histogram approach is
that it averages data for objects with potentially vastly different
numbers of properties. By doing so, it loses information on what
percentage of all properties on an object were shared. To bring
clarity to this issue, a different measure was introduced: percent
similarity of an object to the object most similar to it (in other
words, to its nearest neighbor). In this work, the average data and
the standard error was computed for twenty-four categories of ob-
jects: the first category contained all objects with two properties,
second with three, and so on. Grouping objects by categories
in this way allowed us to see how the percentage of properties
shared behaves with respect to the number of properties of an
object. The analysis uncovered that objects in most categories
shared about 20% of properties with their nearest neighbor, with
objects with fewer properties sharing more than 20%. Note that
the denominator in the percentage includes all properties, even
those unique to a single object in the count (i.e. those that could
not be shared with the nearest neighbor).
The results of applying this measure contributed to my choice
of using more than a single nearest neighbor as the source of
mapping in Map-Props, the algorithm that generates properties
likely to be true. The expected coverage that would result from
using many nearest neighbors has been bounded with another
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measure, the “reach of analogy,” which is described above, in the
discussion of the first contribution.
I conjecture that these measures can be applied to other knowl-
edge bases to compare the applicability of knowledge acquisition
by analogy between knowledge bases. These measures could be
used to assess whether and what form of analogical reasoning is
appropriate to a given knowledge base.
4. A simplified object-property representation for asser-
tions in natural language. A popular view in the Artificial In-
telligence community maintains that the choice of representation
is frequently more important than the choice of algorithm. For-
mulating a representation for natural language assertions which
facilitates comparison of properties for equality of meaning has
been an important part of this work.
I have introduced the “signature” representation, over which all
comparison of properties for equality is carried out. The signature
of a sentence is meant to preserve its most important informa-
tion; it is the set of nouns, verbs, adjectives (together with their
parts of speech) that appear in subject, main verb, object(s) and
prepositional phrases of a sentence, as well as adverbs in adver-
bial phrases. All words that make up a signature are reduced to
their basic forms. For example, the assertion “all dogs bark” has
the signature: “{dognoun , barkverb}.” Signatures are discussed
in greater detail in Section 3.3.
I believe that the signature representation plays an important role
in performance of Select-NN, the algorithm that establishes the
nearest neighbors. Informal experimentation in the exploratory
stages of this research looked at alternative schemes that retain
more information from a sentence (for example, retains the base
form of all the words present in the sentence). The experimen-
tation suggested that matches between properties in these more
detailed representations were in practice often insufficiently fre-
quent for Select-NN to return a strong set of similar objects.
5. Demonstration of applicability of the generate-and-filter
architecture to the task of generating knowledge acqui-
sition questions. Generate and test is a classic, well known ap-
proach in the Artificial Intelligence community. The contribution
this work makes is the demonstration of its applicability to the
particular problem of generating knowledge acquisition questions.
I speculate that the generate and test architecture has applied
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well to the task of formulating knowledge acquisition questions
due to two characteristics of the task: (i) the lack of constraint on
the methods for formulating questions, and (ii) presence of con-
straints on what questions should not be posed. Two examples of
the latter include not posing questions that the system will not
accept, and not posing questions the answer to which is already
known.
This work also contributes to the scientific community a growing
knowledge base of assertions, a resource that will be useful in imple-
menting practical systems that use common sense. The knowledge base
should also enable a variety of semantic approaches to processing nat-
ural language.
Additionally, I hope that the public launch to a wide audience of
a system that uses the state of the art in language and knowledge
processing promotes the fields of artificial intelligence and natural lan-
guage processing by attracting attention of a broader audience to the
open problems. In other words, I hope this work contributes to pop-
ularizing the state of the art and the current challenges in the fields
of AI (specifically, knowledge representation and analogical reasoning)
and NLP (specifically parsing, language generation, and ambiguity in
language).
This work has also taken steps in characterizing the kinds of com-
monsense knowledge that need to be acquired in order to capture
human-like common sense. In this work, I have taken a “naive se-
mantics” view of commonsense knowledge. In Section 3.2, I briefly
described the kinds of knowledge that lie outside the set of assertions
about objects and their properties. In Section 8.3.1, I have presented a
more fine grained classification of assertions about properties of objects.
A further elaboration of this effort should be useful in organizing the
field’s pursuit of capturing and representing commonsense knowledge,
which should some day enable commonsense reasoning by machines.
Lastly, a contribution this work makes to further research is a sim-
ple tool that allows experimentation with a variety of approaches to
reasoning over natural language. The thoroughly commented source
code of the Learner system is available under an open source license
at:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/learner .
It includes a number of features not exploited by Learner itself but
documented in the manual included with the distribution. The features
include support for variables, rules, and rule-based inference, both over
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natural language assertions and their signatures, and over a frame-like
internal representation of knowledge.
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Appendix A
Link Grammar Parser
The Link Grammar Parser is a constraint-based English-language
parser that tries to assign a consistent set of linkages between all words
in a sentence.
The Link Grammar Parser is an impressive system in its own right.
The parser comes out of CMU, is written in C and its source code is
freely available for non-commercial purposes.
Complete distribution and extensive documentation of the link
grammar parser was available at the time of writing at
http://www.link.cs.cmu.edu/link.
For readers unfamiliar with the parser, here is brief example of how
the parser would parse the sentence “cats eat mice”:
+-Sp-+--Op-+
| | |
cats.n eat mice.n
As a list of links, this information can be represented as follows (the
number following each word indicates the position of the word in the
sentence):
((cats.n,0 Sp eat,1)
(eat,1 Op mice.n,2))
The above parsing contains the following information about the
word “cats”:
• “cats” is a noun — because of “cats.n”,
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• “cats” has the subject role in the sentence – it is on the left side
of an “S” link.
• “cats” and “eat” are plural — they are linked by the “Sp” link
in which the lowercase “p” denotes plurality.
The parser has also been equipped with a post-processor that can
pull out constituent tree structure (noun phrases, verb phrases, and so
on) from the linkage data. However, Learner uses the parser’s native
representation because it holds more information and is better suited
for analyzing similarity.
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Appendix B
FramerD
FramerD is a distributed object-oriented database authored by Ken
Haase and used by Learner. FramerD is available under the LGPL
and includes persistent storage and indexing facilities that can scale to
very large database sizes, as well as a language FDscript, a superset of
Scheme.
Learner is implemented in FDscript.
FramerD also comes with a version of the WordNet lexical database
and a released part of the CYC ontology combined and converted into
the FramerD format (the database is called Bricolage or Brico).
Learner uses the WordNet component only.
FramerD also has many attractive features:
• Built-in support for distributed operation.
• FDscript, a Scheme-like scripting language well suited for AI-type
applications.
• Built-in functions for XML and HTML parsing and output.
• Built-in support for perl-like regular expression pattern matching.
• Built-in support for nondeterminism.
FramerD documentation, covering the database implementation
and the FDscript language, was available at the time of writing at
http://framerd.org.
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Appendix C
Natural Language
Generation
This work addresses knowledge acquisition from contributors not
trained in knowledge engineering or formal logic. To acquire knowl-
edge from such contributors, this work performs knowledge acquisition
in natural language. Using natural language removes the need to train
contributors in a knowledge representation formalism, but it also cre-
ates two additional requirements on the system: (i) addressing lexical
and structural ambiguity in the collected knowledge, and (ii) generating
acceptable natural language.
The effects of ambiguity in the language on the algorithm itself as
well as possible ways of disambiguating the collected knowledge have
been discussed in Chapter 6. This appendix describes the processing
implemented in support of the latter issue, that of natural language
generation.
Specifically, Learner carries out the following processing to for-
mulate grammatically correct questions:
Tokenization. When a newly added assertion is being processed, to-
kens such as “fire engine” and “time travel” are identified in it by
comparing against the compound nouns and verbs listed in the
WordNet lexical database. Identified tokens are treated as single,
indivisible words just as a normal single word.
Noun conjugation. Learner formulates questions about both plu-
ral and singular nouns, which requires the capacity to use either
the singular or plural form of a noun. For example, when map-
ping the assertion “books contain knowledge” onto “newspaper,”
150
Learner needs to use the plural of “newspaper” to formulate
the assertion “newspapers contain knowledge.” The number of
the word being substituted is determined from the information
provided by the parser about the original sentence.
In Learner, the correct form is obtained from a lookup table
for irregular nouns and according to standard spelling rules for
the remaining nouns (Jones, 2002) — for example, “box/boxes,”
“baby/babies,” and “shelf/shelves.”
Verb conjugation. Processing assertions containing negations some-
times also requires conjugating the main verb of an assertion. For
example, consider that
“a cat does not have wings,” is transformed internally
into
“a cat has wings” (with a truth value of 0).
The need for conjugation arises because in sentences with an aux-
iliary verb the auxiliary verb carries the information about tense
and agreement with the subject (while the main verb in such sen-
tences is in infinitive form), while in sentences without an auxil-
iary verb it is the main verb that carries the number and tense
information. Once a negation is removed from a sentence con-
taining an expression such as “do not” or “does not,” so is the
auxiliary verb “do” or “does,” and the main verb must be conju-
gated to agree with the subject and also to carry the information
about the tense of the assertion.
In Learner, the conjugation of irregular verbs is carried out by
retrieving the proper form in a lookup table, and conjugation of
other verbs is carried out according to standard conjugation rules
(Jones, 2002) — for example, “walk/walks,” “carry/carries,” and
“garnish/garnishes.”
Injecting and removing indefinite articles. There are cases when
replacing one noun with another — something that is routinely
done by Learner — requires injecting or removing an indefinite
article associated with that noun.
The reason for this lies in the fact that nouns in English fall into
two classes: countable and non-countable. Some examples of
non-countable nouns (also called mass nouns) are: “salt,” “soil,”
“software.”
While singular countable nouns require an indefinite article (for
example, “a carrot is tasty”), mass nouns do not (for example,
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“salt is tasty”). Learner determines when an indefinite article
should and should not be used by looking up whether a noun is
in a list of known mass nouns, and adjusting the assertions it
outputs accordingly.
Selecting the correct indefinite article. A rather cosmetic feature
of Learner is to select “a” or “an” as appropriate. The agree-
ment of the article with the following it word is cosmetic because
the agreement is not enforced by the underlying Link Grammar
parser (so, for example, both “a cat has a tail” and “an cat has
an tail” are considered valid), and the article is never included in
the signature. However, early experiments with Learner indi-
cated that contributors were confused by improper article being
used (a situation that can arise, for example, when the countable
noun following the indefinite article changes from one that starts
with a consonant to one that start with a vowel). An example of
the need to adjust the article is when “rhino” is replaced with
“elephant” in the following assertion: “a rhino has ears.” The
assertion needs to be changed to “an elephant has ears.”1
In the implemented Learner system, every question that is
about to be posed is processed and the correct indefinite article is
selected for each noun that needs an indefinite article. Ignorance
of this approach to which words were changed is intentional; it
allows for independence of the article agreement module from any
prior processing, making the system more modular.
1Also note that whether “a” or “an” is used depends on the word following it,
not on the noun it modifies: “a male elephant has tusks.”
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Appendix D
Deriving the Amount of
Correlation Due to
Chance
This appendix derives a formula for Eav (O, k), the expected number of
objects in a knowledge base with which a randomly selected object in
the knowledge base will share k properties with. This expression is used
to derive the baseline in Figure 7.2 analytically, without performing a
simulation.
Before proceeding with the derivation, some notation needs to be
introduced. Let U denote the total number (the “universe”) of distinct
properties in the knowledge base. Let Oi denote an object with exactly
i properties, and Ni denote the number of objects with exactly i prop-
erties (only “is true” properties are considered in this analysis). I also
use the standard combinatorics notation
(
n
m
)
to denote n!m!(n−m)! .
Lemma D.1 Given a non-negative integer k s.t. k ≤ U , suppose that
an object Oi has i properties (k ≤ i ≤ U) which have been randomly
selected with equal probability and without replacement form a universe
of U properties. Further suppose that an object Oj has j properties
(k ≤ j ≤ U) selected from U in the same manner. Then, the probability
that Oi and Oj share exactly k properties (for k ≤ i, k ≤ j) is given by
any of the three equivalent expressions:(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)(
U
j
) = (jk) (U−ji−k )(
U
i
) = i! j! (U − i)! (U − j)!
U ! (U − i− j + k)! (i− k)! (j − k)! k!
(D.1)
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Proof:
This can be established by a simple counting argument.
Since all assignments of properties to Oi and Oj are as-
sumed to be equally likely, the probability of the event of
interest (Oi and Oj sharing exactly k properties) can be
computed by dividing the number of events in which the
condition of interest is realized by the total number of events
being considered. The first expression above can be estab-
lished by assuming some i properties of Oi have been chosen
and counting the number of ways properties of Oj can be
chosen.
For a given selection of i properties out of U for Oi, the
number of ways that Oi and Oj can share k properties is
the number of ways k “shared” properties can be chosen out
of i multiplied by the number of ways the j − k non-shared
properties of Oj can be chosen from U−i properties that are
the complement of properties of Oi. This, independently of
which i of U properties Oi has, gives rise to the numerator(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)
in the first expression above. The total number
of ways j properties can be chosen out of U is
(
U
j
)
, giving
rise to the denominator.
The second expression is equivalent and can be estab-
lished by symmetry or similarly by counting how properties
of Oi can be chosen given a certain choice of properties of
Oj . The third expression in Eq. D.1 is simply an expansion
of the combinatorial notation for either of the previous two.

The larger result that needs to be derived is, for different values
of k, with how many objects in the knowledge base on average will
an object share k properties. Clearly, this quantity depends on the
number of objects with 1, 2, . . . , U properties (I assume there are no
objects with 0 properties in the knowledge base).
Let E(Oi, k) denote the expected number of objects with which a
given object Oi will share k properties. E(Oi, k) can be obtained by
summing the probabilities that Oi shares k properties with one object
across all objects and subtracting out the object itself. Using the results
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of Lemma D.1 yields:
E(Oi, k) =
 U∑
j=0
Nj
(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)(
U
j
)
− (ik) (U−ii−k)(
U
i
) (D.2)
where Nj denotes the number of objects with j properties.
Averaging across all objects yields the expression for the expected
number of objects with which a given object O will share k properties:
Eav (O, k) =
U∑
i=k
Ni E(Oi, k)
/
U∑
i=1
Ni (D.3)
=
 U∑
i=k
Ni
 U∑
j=k
Nj
(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)(
U
j
)
− (ik) (U−ii−k)(
U
i
)
/ U∑
i=1
Ni (D.4)
This exact expression may be useful in some situations. In others, it
may be more useful to have a simpler approximation. In the remainder
of the appendix, I derive approximations to Eqs. D.1 and D.3.
Recall Sterling’s approximation for n!:
n! ≈
√
2pin nne−n
Using this approximation for the factorials involving U , Eq. D.1 can be
approximated as follows:
(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)(
U
j
) = (U − i)! (U − j)! i! j!
U ! (U − i− j + k)! (i− k)! (j − k)! k! (D.5)
≈
√
2pi(U − i) U (U−i)e−U+i√2pi(U − j) U (U−j)e−U+j√
2pi(U−j) UUe−U √2pi(U−i−j+k) U (U−i−j+k)e−U+i+j−k
× i! j!
(i− k)! (j − k)! k!
=
√
(U − i)(U − j)
U(U − i− j + k)
U (U−i) U (U−j)
UU U (U−i−j+k)e−k
i! j!
(i− k)! (j − k)! k!
=
√
U2 − U(i + j) + ij
U2 − U(i + j) + Uk
( e
U
)k i! j!
(i− k)! (j − k)! k!
=
√
U2 − U(i + j) + ij
U2 − U(i + j) + Uk
( e
U
)k
k!
(
i
k
)(
j
k
)
≈
( e
U
)k
k!
(
i
k
)(
j
k
)
(D.6)
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Eav (O, k) of Eq. D.3 can be approximated by first dropping a minor
term and then applying the approximation derived in Eqs. D.5 through
D.6 as follows:
Eav (O, k) ≈
 U∑
i=k
Ni
 U∑
j=k
Nj
(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)(
U
j
)
− (ik) (U−ii−k)(
U
i
)
/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
U∑
i=k
U∑
j=k
NiNj
(
i
k
) (
U−i
j−k
)(
U
j
) / U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
 U∑
i=k
U∑
j=k
NiNj
( e
U
)k
k!
(
i
k
)(
j
k
)/ U∑
i=1
Ni
=
( e
U
)k
k!
U∑
i=k
Ni( i
k
) U∑
j=k
Nj
(
j
k
)/ U∑
i=1
Ni
=
( e
U
)k
k!
(
U∑
i=k
Ni
(
i
k
)) U∑
j=k
Nj
(
j
k
)/ U∑
i=1
Ni
=
( e
U
)k
k!
(
U∑
i=k
Ni
(
i
k
))2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
For k =1, 2, and 3, Eav (O, k) can be expanded as follows:
Eav (O, 1) ≈
( e
U
)( U∑
i=1
Ni i
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
Eav (O, 2) ≈
( e
U
)2
2
(
U∑
i=2
Ni
i(i− 1)
2
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
=
( e
U
)2 1
2
(
U∑
i=2
Ni i(i− 1)
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
Eav (O, 3) ≈
( e
U
)3
6
(
U∑
i=3
Ni
i(i− 1)(i− 2)
6
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
=
( e
U
)3 1
6
(
U∑
i=3
Ni i(i− 1)(i− 2)
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
156
These expansions show that as k grows the results of the approx-
imation get increasingly more sensitive to the values Ni for large i.
At the same time, Section 7.1 has demonstrated that Ni in the seed
knowledge base is well approximated with the power law approxima-
tion for Ni ≈ Ci2 (for C = 6789). This provides a good fit for values of
i up to
√
C ≈ 82. To approximate values of Ni for 0 < i < U in the
seed knowledge base and avoid the cumulative influence of fractional
number of objects in the approximation for large values of i, I use the
piecewise function for Ni:
Ni =
{
6789
i2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 82
0 for 82 < i.
(D.7)
Under this assumption, Eq. D.7 can be rewritten as:
Eav (O, k) ≈
( e
U
)k
k! C2
(
82∑
i=k
1
i2
(
i
k
))2/ U∑
i=1
Ni (D.8)
Applying this equation to the specific case of the seed knowledge
base amounts to substituting in the values for U = 32, 975, C = 6, 789,
and the total number of objects
∑U
i=1Ni = 12, 326. The approxima-
tions for Eav (O, 1), Eav (O, 2), and Eav (O, 3) then evaluate to:
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Eav (O, 1) ≈
( e
U
)( U∑
i=1
Ni i
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
( e
U
)
C2
(
82∑
i=1
1
i
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈ 2.7182
32975
× 67892 × 4.992 /12326
≈ 7.65
Eav (O, 2) ≈
( e
U
)2 1
2
(
U∑
i=2
Ni i(i− 1)
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
( e
U
)2 1
2
C2
(
82∑
i=1
i− 1
i
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
(
2.7182
32975
)2
× 1
2
× 67892 × 77.012 /12326
≈ 0.07489
Eav (O, 3) ≈
( e
U
)3 1
6
(
U∑
i=3
Ni i(i− 1)(i− 2)
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
( e
U
)3 1
6
C2
(
82∑
i=1
i− 3 + 2
i
)2/ U∑
i=1
Ni
≈
(
2.7182
32975
)3
× 1
6
× 67892 × 31672 /12326
≈ 0.003470
Given the large magnitudes of the numbers being approximated,
the observed results can be said to be in rough agreement with the
results obtained by simulation described in Section 7.2. Estimated
values Eˆ(O, k) resulting from averaging ten runs of the simulation, as
well as the approximate values derived in this appendix are presented
in Table D.1.
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k E(O, k) Eˆ(O, k)
1 7.65 15.58
2 0.07489 0.062
3 0.003470 0.0015
Table D.1: Average number of objects with which an object in the seed
knowledge base shares k properties, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 3. E(O, k) denotes val-
ues obtained from the closed-form approximation, and Eˆ(O, k) denotes
averaged values of ten runs of values obtained by simulation.
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metric, distance, 55
naive semantics, 98
phrases
kinds of, 35
problem solving methods, 128
properties
kinds of, 35
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PSMs, see problem solving
methods
repertory grids, 129
representation, of a sentence,
33
salt, 128
Select-NN, 43
WordNet category filtering
in, 48
signature, of a sentence, 34
similarity, contrast model of, 56
similarity, histogram of, 87
source code, obtaining, 31
taxonomy, see ontology
teiresias, 128
truth value, 35
Tv , see truth value
WNisa, 40, 49, 54
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